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         Police, Paramilitaries, Nationalists and Gangsters: 
        The Processes of State Building in Korea 
by  
Jonson Nathaniel Porteux 
 
Co-Chairs: Allan Stam and Allen Hicken  
This dissertation seeks to understand why developed democracies with high state 
capacity tolerate, and in some cases cooperate with criminal organizations such as 
paramilitaries, mafia organizations, and vigilantes.  The symbiotic relationship between 
these groups is surprisingly common, but it blurs the lines between legitimate and 
illegitimate use of violence and allows political actors to circumvent democratic checks 
on state authority.  While previous research has linked illicit violence to weak or failing 
states, my study is unique in its empirical and theoretical focus on both economically and 
politically developed governments. 
It is argued that state monopoly over the use of violence purposefully varies.  
Political actors must continually exercise their authority in the face of both resource and 





maintaining. In the face of resource constraints, political actors sub-contract violence in 
order to extend their reach and expand their forces. Sub-contracting as a result of 
principally politically driven constraints however, serves two goals beyond an expansion 
of forces. First, it allows political actors to distance themselves from police actions 
deemed illiberal—and hence unpopular—by society. Second, because criminal groups are 
extra-legal organizations, subcontracting allows the state to avoid transparency and 
accountability constraints.  The choice to subcontract is thus conditioned not only by the 
end goal, but also by social pressures regarding appropriate means to bring about 
preferred outcomes.  Importantly, the political payoffs from subcontracting are high in 
states with high levels of operational capacity, as they can best manage the potential risk 
that criminal groups metastasize and challenge state authority directly.   
Unbiased, quantifiable data on the linkage between state actors and illicit 
organizations are—largely by design—impossible to obtain.  My primary analysis is 
based on a year of fieldwork in South Korea, utilizing evidence gleaned from interviews 










At 2pm on what seemed to be a normal day in Insadong, a historic tourist 
destination located in central Seoul, South Korea (henceforth, Korea), what seemed to be 
hundreds of police clad in riot gear suddenly appeared and quickly lined up into 
formation on either side of the street and in the back alley ways of the district. 
Ambulances were additionally positioned on opposite ends of the roughly 700 meter long 
road. 76 Street vendors as well were stationed next to their pushcarts, wearing red protest 
bands across their foreheads. Not long after the police were in position, did a group of 
150 young thugs, both male and female, wearing yellow vests, start marching down the 
street, going from one vendor stall to the next, destroying them and beating any vendor 
who challenged them. Guiding the yellow clad thugs were a few intimidating men who 
seemed to be in their early to mid 40s, screaming their well-followed orders. The process 
took about one hour—the thugs having moved from one end of the street to the other and 
back again. The street vendors were selling their wares illegally and were labeled as 
public nuisances—they didn’t pay taxes to the state—they didn’t pay rent—and they 
often sold the same goods as the businesses in the area which had to pay highly to be 
there. The violence committed against the street vendors however, was also a criminal act, 




district office. This event did not occur in pre-1987 authoritarian Korea. It occurred on 
May 24th, 2011 in a country which is often characterized and hailed as being a 
prosperous and consolidated democracy.  
The events which transpired on May 24th are not isolated to either that day or to 
street vendors alone. Rather, the practice as described above is part of a larger 
phenomenon in which the state either directly contracts the services of private security 
firms, or tolerates their use in limited, highly controlled areas. Questions raised in my 
mind that day are the questions that motivate this study. If the vendors are breaking the 
law, why can’t the police simply arrest or otherwise sanction them in to compliance? 
How come Korean society, a society that has a well-documented history of being both 
contentiousness and in favor of civilian controlled rule, not be able, or more accurately, 
willing, to hold its elected leaders and the police accountable for allowing such acts to 
occur? Why would the state collaborate with groups to carry out criminal violence against 
its own citizens—in broad daylight and in a democracy no less? This phenomenon 
directly contradicts the notion of the legitimacy of the state on the one hand, and on the 
other, the illegitimacy of the groups which engage in criminal violence. This dissertation 
is an attempt to understand this complex phenomenon.  
That states collaborate with non-state specialists in violence is not surprising and 
in fact has a long and well-documented history. Indeed, in the early processes of state 
development, state seekers and state actors alike have utilized a range of methods which 
at times have included collaborating with pirates, mercenaries, paramilitaries and 
gangsters as the occasions present themselves. That such collaboration has or continues to 




less understood however, are the conditions under which state actors in high capacity, 
democratic states would collude with private actors in carrying out extra legal violence 
within their own territorial boundaries, and against their own citizens whom they have 
been charged with protecting. 
1.2: Methodology 
This study focuses on explaining the causal mechanisms involved in the choice to 
sub-contract violence to non-state actors, and does so with an emphasis on hypothesis-
building. Although a study like this would have benefited greatly from being able to test 
the causal relationships, quantifiable, unbiased data on this type of phenomenon is 
difficult to come by at best—this is largely by design. The central question of this 
dissertation, as it should be, drove the decision to employ a qualitative, historical 
analysis/narrative and process tracing approach.   
The first part of this task entailed utilizing both secondary and primary source 
materials, such as scholarly and journalistic publications, and government documents, 
some of which were recently declassified. This included going beyond the bounds of 
political science research, including studies from the disciplines of history, sociology, 
economics, criminology, law, anthropology, urban studies, urban planning and others. 
The data obtained was then linked together to form a map of the evolution of Korea’s 
state development and state-non-state relationships over time. As will be shown later, 
there is a tremendous amount of cross-temporal, cross-regional and cross-issue variation 
with respect to the use of state or non-state sources of coercion. The analysis was an 




The second phase of this research included interviews and observations—this was 
the most difficult, time-consuming, and admittedly precarious part of the research for this 
dissertation. It is also the part which distinguishes this study from the vast majority of 
scholarship on the subject which more often than not (and for understandable reasons), 
rely on less direct sources of information and first hand observations.3 The collaboration 
between state and non-state sources of coercion in the area of criminal violence, works, 
as it will be argued, predominately when it is not brought to light. The first generalizable 
argument that this dissertation brings forth is that state-actors collaborate with non-state 
actors in order to enhance their capacity. This type of phenomenon, in domestic settings, 
typically occurs in weak and/or failed state environments and has a tremendous amount 
of scholarship. The second argument however, that state actors utilize non-state actors in 
order to avoid transparency and accountability measures, which is inexorably linked to 
democratization, works to the extent that state actors are able to plausibly deny their 
involvement in such illegal activities. It follows then that in equilibrium, there is little to 
no systematic data.  In order to overcome the difficulties of having very little data with 
which to work with, I decided that the best approach to use would be to conduct extensive 
fCfield work in Korea, over the course of one year with which a Fulbright award made 
possible—funding without which this study would not have been able to take place.  
One of the first questions I am often asked regarding my research is why I choose 
Korea? To begin with, the phenomenon in Korea meets the standard methodological 
requirements; there exists substantial variance over time, space and issue area with 
respect to the dependent variable, with clear critical junctures, all of which collectively 
facilitates the analysis. This dissertation however is not a story about Korea per se, but 
                                                      




rather the larger phenomenon of state-non-state collaboration in violence. This 
phenomenon is unfortunately ubiquitous and research could have just as easily been 
justified in my former backyard of Detroit as it was in Seoul. The problem however is 
that although I do speak English (it is in fact my native language), I do not have the 
necessary connections required to conduct such a study in Detroit. I do however have 
those connections in Korea.  
Although I fashion myself as first and foremost, a comparative political scientist 
rather than a “Koreanist” or even an “East Asianist,” it would be dishonest to deny that I 
have a keen interest and fascination of the history and culture of Korea and her 
surrounding neighbors—perhaps because first and foremost they are so foreign to my 
own native culture. Without those interests, I would not have studied Korean in the first 
place (and Japanese to unfortunately a much lesser degree), and two; I would not have 
spent so much time in the region.  
Over the course of a number of years living and studying in Korea, beginning first 
in 2004, I was able to develop a unique set of contacts with Korean actors from both the 
formal and informal political, economic and social sectors, which allowed such a study to 
take place. The fact that I am a conspicuously non-Korean from the San Francisco, Bay 
Area, who could speak slightly understandable Korean no doubt afforded me 
opportunities and certain protections that an everyday Korean might not enjoy so easily. 
Still, a random sample of interviewees willing to provide me information on both past 
and on-going illegal activities and collusion, at the risk of both legal and extra-legal 
punishment, was not possible. Thus, a snowball sampling technique was employed in 




The implementation of a snowball approach proved to be quite effective owing to 
the ways in which networks work in Korea. Korea’s four most important networks 
include family ties, regional ties, school ties and military ties. Such networks tightly link 
a tremendously diverse range of people from various social, economic and regional 
backgrounds. In Korea it seemed that much of the citizens were only two degrees of 
separation apart from anyone else. In the US, it is highly unlikely that an elementary 
school teacher for instance, would be in any way connected to a gangster or a national 
level prosecutor or politician. In Korea, through such networks, such seemingly unlikely 
relationships are surprisingly common. I was thus able to utilize those networks in order 
to gain access an ever-increasing span of actors that would normally have never given me 
even the time of day.    
Although the vast majority of contacts were obtained in the course of my on-the-
ground fieldwork in Korea, prior to my arrival I had secured a number of contacts in 
order to facilitate my start. One of those included a tie to the former Minister of Justice 
Kim Jung Gil who I had met and extensively interacted with during his one year visiting 
scholarship at the University of Michigan. Minister Kim, a member of the former 
President Kim, Dae-jung’s regional network and powerful faction then, introduced me to 
other members of his network within the Ministry of Justice. Again owing to a unique 
characteristic of Korean culture, one that is hyper-hierarchical in nature, members of 
Minister Kim’s network, even though Minister Kim was no longer in formal power, were 
obliged to assist me.  
In addition to gaining access to the powerful Ministry of Justice network, I had 




which was a researcher at a social research institute, who in turn introduced me to the 
former high-ranking police officer in charge of organized crime in Korea. These meetings 
facilitated my being introduced to the then current head of the violent crime division (of 
which the organized crime division is subordinate to) of the Korean National Police 
Agency. These connections in turn led to connections down the chain of command. Again, 
because of the hierarchical nature of Korean culture (although obviously not a 
characteristic exclusive to Korea), all connections were made in a top-down manner—I 
would first meet the highest-level person I could, and then request introductions to actors 
of the same rank or lower.  
In addition to this not being a story solely about Korea, it is also not a study about 
organized crime, or Korean organized crime to be more exact. This study is concerned 
with state-non-state collaboration in the area of criminal violence. As such, it matters 
little whether or not those non-state actors are paramilitary groups, legally francized 
private security firms, or mafias. That being said, the vast majority of non-state actors 
actually committing or at the very least, organizing the criminal violence in Korea are in 
fact members either directly or indirectly linked to Korean mafia-type firms (defined 
briefly here as economically motivated firms which specialize in extra-legal violence). So 
how does one go about meeting such figures and gaining their trust? The answer for me 
was two-pronged.  
The first method was again a function of network ties—this time through a sports 
network. Having been involved in Korean sports for over 25 years, I had come into 
contact with a number of high-level organizers and administrators of various sporting 




formed. In Korea, just like elsewhere, the sporting world (especially combative sports), 
are often closely connected to both public and private sources of coercion where both 
sides of the spectrum often recruit. Such connections led to my initial contacts with those 
either directly or indirectly related to organized, private coercion. Of these connections, 
two individuals were willing to speak candidly about the phenomenon. Although a 
substantial amount of information was obtained from these two sources, I was unable to 
convince them to introduce me to other actors.  
The second method was almost purely by accident. Having already been begun 
my research in Korea, I had joined a local gym in my neighborhood. After a few months 
had gone by, the owner of the gym informed another member that I was a political 
scientist, which increased his interest given that he fashioned himself as a local level 
political power broker. In the course of a number of conversations, I informed him of the 
nature of my study of which we discussed in detail. After a number of subsequent weeks 
of meetings he offered to introduce to me his local organized crime contacts—an offer 
which I gratefully accepted.  
That chance meeting at the gym led to my introduction to the local bosses in the 
area, of which I was invited to visit them either every week or everyday in their office. I 
was in fact somewhat viewed by them as a novelty, a fact which was perfectly fine by me. 
Most of the meetings involved drinking coffee and sitting around either talking directly to 
them or simply listening to their discussions. Over 70% of my interactions with such 
figures it should be pointed out, included my simply sitting quietly and observing who 
was coming in and out of the meetings, their mannerisms, and listening to their (more 




interactions were informal in nature—such actors did not enjoy, nor feel at all 
comfortable with being interrogated for obvious reasons. I would mostly sit quietly and 
observe something, after which I would ask a question related to that observation. On that 
note, much of my early time with these actors was spent learning not only which 
questions to ask, but how, and importantly when, to ask them. For example, in a meeting 
which had occurred shortly after I was introduced to the boss of one group, I had 
mentioned that in Taiwan, it is well known that there were, and continue to be close 
relationships between politicians, police and gangsters, and if that was the case in Korea.4 
Their answer was emphatically no, and that it was a feature of the past in Korea. This 
answer however was refuted by a number of sources in other areas but if I had challenged 
their initial answer it would not have put me in good standing with them. A few months 
later however, at a gathering at a nightclub, two district-level politicians showed up and 
acted subservient to the boss as he harangued them, and in one instance, kicked one of 
them, the reason of which I gathered, was due to their prolonging a public works project 
of some sort. Two days later (I required a day of recovery from the previous night) I 
asked the boss about the previous nights instance and he stated “of course we have to 
have relationships with politicians, we’re business people!” He was in fact quite pleased 
that I had seen how much “power he had.” He then went on to boast about how all the 
politicians throughout the country were afraid of him. Although I did not directly see this 
or other bosses’ direct interactions with high level politicians, the fact that I did see some 
of the political elite, or at least their representatives attend the events of these groups 
(most of the time weddings) in part confirmed the existence of at least minimal 
                                                      





connections.  In one meeting with a national level politician I found out that his driver 
(and assumedly his bodyguard) was a retired, though still relatively young, former 
captain of one of the organized crime groups in the politician’s area.  The former 
organized crime member however maintained connections with his former group which 
in turn facilitated an indirect criminal-political nexus. These types of connections will be 
further discussed in chapter 3.  
In addition to visiting their office on a near daily basis, they welcomed me to their 
various nightclubs, restaurants, legal and illegal gambling halls, and on numerous 
occasions, along with them on their excursions outside of Seoul to events in places such 
as Inch’ǒn, Pusan, Pohang, Chǒnju, and Suwǒn, among other locations.  
 Because of the boss’s high level status, a range of actors tended to visit the same 
office, which in kind led to me being introduced to a number of other similar type of 
actors of varying levels and backgrounds—be the bosses themselves, advisers, mid-level 
gangsters, police, local level politicians, etc. Through these connections I was further 
introduced to other local and national level bosses at various events and gatherings, the 
importance of which will be discussed in the following chapter. Everyone I met knew 
explicitly what type of research I was conducting. If I was in fact allowed to interact with 
them and ask questions, I provided them with a statement of my research intent and 
assurances of guaranteed anonymity according to the IRB requirements.  Furthermore, 
the gangsters knew I was meeting with police mostly during the early afternoons, and the 
police knew I was meeting gangsters often in evenings—usually on the same days. In one 




outside of Seoul, after which I was picked up by one mid-ranked gangster who lived in 
the area and driven back.  
Additionally, through the intensive use of networks I was able to obtain the 
necessary introductions for a range of actors involved in both the public and private 
sources of coercion. In addition to academics, politicians, prosecutors, police and 
gangsters; connections with entrepreneurs, journalists and victims were made. 
Connections with journalists and victims it should be noted were overwhelmingly made 
through my directly contacting them either through e-mail or phone. Once those 
connections were made I would again utilize their connections to meet others.  
The empirical evidence obtained from each of the actors was then continuously 
triangulated and verified for accuracy and reliability. Again, following the IRB’s strict 
guidelines, the names of respondents and any identifying information, except for a few 
public actors (with their permission), were, and remain to be kept strictly confidential.  
The choice to study this phenomenon in one country setting (albeit with multiple 
observations across time, space and issue area) and the methodological approach adopted, 
admittedly limits the ability to both ‘test’ the hypotheses derived and evaluate the 
generalizability of those explanations. Some of the findings are to be sure, unique to 
Korea. Most importantly, Korea’s long history of brutal repression under various forms 
of colonialism and authoritarianism affects the ways in which the police and military (and 
by extension, the state), are able to operate in the present context. Indeed, the ways in 
which Koreans view violence by specific state actors (e.g. the police or military) is 




too distant a past. Violence by the state in turn has significant symbolic valence and its 
use threatens to break the carefully constructed image of Korea’s new democratic era.5  
Over the course of 42 years, from the end of colonialism to the move towards 
direct presidential elections, Korea grew to become both a strong state while 
simultaneously having a powerful, contentious society.6 In the late 1980s the once 
fragmented forces of students, labor, the intelligentsia, religious organizations, and 
importantly, the middle-class, galvanized into a single force with a common interest in 
the removal of authoritarian rule. What they got was political liberalization. This largely 
placated the middle class which de-mobilized, leaving the more radical elements to battle 
for reform on their own. Since that time and the time this study was conducted, the state 
has attempted to keep the middle class on the side-lines. Violence by specifically state 
actors however, threatens to awake and unite those forces. One of the observable 
implications of Korea’s history then, is collaboration between state and non-state 
specialists in violence in the market for forced evictions and labor suppression. Why 
forced evictions and labor suppression? The answer to this is that both are related with 
the socio-economic well-being of the middle class. Forced evictions are first and 
foremost part of large redevelopment and beautification projects which not only increase 
the housing stock, but additionally improve other areas of infrastructure which are 
important in maintaining a strong, growing economy. Labor unrest in turn threatens the 
economic vitality of the state. State actions of violence in such projects however, act as a 
politicizing agent. In the instances where the state has been forced to intervene, the 
middle class has mobilized. In the vast majority of projects however, the state has been 
                                                      
5 Kwon, J.B. (2011) uses this argument to explain Korea’s changed police tactics in the wake of 
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able to stay out of the mix, acting as a manager of violence as opposed to the ones which 
actually carry it out. In such cases, the middle class has remained conspicuously silent.   
The practice of collaboration between state and non-state actors in the market for 
force however, is again not unique to Korea. It is my intention to not only contribute to 
the study and understanding of Korean politics but also to additionally utilize the findings 
obtained from Korea as a prism with which to understand the broader phenomena of 
state-criminal collaboration, state development, and the democratic control and use of 
violence. Those findings with the potential for generalizability are at the same time the 
main argument I put forth in this study. They are the following: there are conditions 
where sub-contracting force to non-state groups which specialize in coercion is not only 
rational but politically advantageous. Similar to sub-contracting in other environments, 
state actors utilize this “market” solution under logic of capacity and a normative 
framework.7 States sub-contract coercion to expand and enhance their existing forces and 
hence their enforcement capability. Normatively, they do so in order to distance 
themselves from actions deemed illiberal by society and thus politically risky.  The 
strategic decision to sub-contract force is further conditioned by concerns over the end 
goals and means with which those goals are brought about. Finally, states that are 
coherent with high levels of capacity are the best able to manage the potential risks of this 
type of sub-contracting.  
 
                                                      
7 This is not the first study to utilize the ‘logic of capacity’ and ‘normative logic’ framework to understand 
sub-contracting force. Dunigan’s (2009) study titled “In the Company of Soldiers: Private Security 
Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness and the Democratic Advantage,” for instance, employed this 
logic in her study on contracting the services of transnational private military companies. To the best of my 
knowledge, this framework has not been utilized to understand the conditions with which state actors would 




1.3: Organization of Dissertation 
This study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 includes this introduction.  
Chapter 2 presents this study’s theoretical considerations and does so through the 
discussion of a range of interdisciplinary studies. Chapter three is descriptive in nature, 
and presents an outline and discussion of the evolution of Korea’s market for both public 
and private force. Because the private actors in the market who are involved in the 
present day forced evictions and labor suppression are largely controlled and staffed by 
members of Korea’s gangster elite, special attention to these groups will be carried out. 
To my understanding, this section presents one of the few explanations of the history, 
structure, and present day situation of such illegal groups, in either English or Korean, 
based primarily on primary sources such as interviews and participatory observations.  
Chapter four is the first empirical chapter, and outlines and analyzes early state 
development in Korea from the end of 1945 to 1960. Early state development processes 
in general are often quite tumultuous. Korea’s history is not different. During this period, 
state-seekers and state actors recruited gangsters and violent youth which made up 
paramilitary factions. This practice continued throughout the end of the Korean War and 
the end of Rhee Syngman’s forced capitulation. State-non-state collaboration during this 
period, as it will be argued, largely occurred under logic of capacity.  
Chapter five is where things get puzzling. This chapter starts off with a brief 
discussion of the political and economic dynamics following Park Chung Hee’s 1961 
coup d’état. Subsequently a description and analysis of the evolution and role of civil 
society in Korea will be covered. Both the discussion of the political dynamics and role 




based case studies on forced evictions and labor repression which are covered in chapter 
six and seven. Sub-contracting criminal violence under a normative framework during 
Korea’s move towards democratization is explained as being a function of an 
increasingly contentious society, rather than some form of a neo-liberal push towards 
massive privatization. If this study was talking merely about licensing private security for 
shopping malls the neo-liberal explanation might hold weight. The dependent variable 
however is criminal violence which puts it in a separate theoretical category.    
Chapter eight concludes this study by drawing out the theoretical implications of 
the study. In addition, other areas in which the theory developed in this dissertation may 
hold explanatory power will be briefly discussed. These areas include the practice of 
lynching by vigilantes and criminal groups, which ostensibly collaborated with local level 
enforcement agencies in the U.S. South, as well as the case of criminal-state collaboration 

















Although there exist a variety of definitions and variations for the concept of what 
a “state” is, the common unifying theme rests on the commodity of protection—
protection from both external and internal conflict.8 Authors such as North (1981), Tilly 
(1985, 1990) and Olson (2000) among others focused on what they view as the necessity 
of state-controlled violence in order to move out of states of anarchy and uncertainty and 
into predictable environments where productivity and economies of scales can take place. 
As summed up by Bates, Greif and Singh (2002) “state based political order arises in a 
context of (a) the enforcement of private property rights, (b) the pacification of civil 
society, and (c) the payment of taxes”—all three tasks of which depend on the ability of a 
single entity to evolve into the ultimate arbiter of coercion.9 Tilly (1985) further argues 
that state development is a process by which the state must endeavor to make clear the 
lines between legitimate violence (violence under the strict realm and control of the state) 
and illegitimate violence as clearly defined as possible. 
While ideal-type definitions of states characterize such entities as those which 
hold a “monopoly” over violence, in reality few states (if any at all) have ever been able 
to claim such a position. Indeed, more realistic definitions, such as those provided by 
                                                      
8 See for example: Hobbes, T. (1968), Weber, M. (1946), North, D.C. (1981), Levi, M. (1989), Olson, M. 
(2000)  




Tilly (1985) and North (1981) drop the use of the word “monopoly” all together and 
instead focus on the state-based comparative advantage in the control of violence relative 
to non-state sources. This fact in turn challenges simplistic assumptions that development 
will ever reach a completed stage. Rather, as aptly highlighted by Ryter (2002), the state 
must continually produce and re-produce its authority and provide rationale for its 
continued existence in a dynamic political, economic and social environment.10  
State builders have utilized a myriad of ways in which to establish their authority 
including the implementation of mixed strategies of buying, subjecting, or out rightly 
eliminating private powers.11 It is the “buying” aspect that this which the study is 
interested in. The utilization of bandits, pirates, mercenaries and other specialists in 
violence by states and aspiring state seekers in Europe, Asia, Latin American and 
elsewhere is historically well documented. For instance, in Europe large-scale private 
armies dominated the market by force during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, hired 
mercenaries and other privateers then became the norm for state development during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. Such institutional practices however, were not 
unproblematic. Thomson (1994) for example explains that privateers generated organized 
piracy, mercenaries threatened to drag their governments into war, and mercantile firms 
were not unknown for turning their own guns on their home states.12 Still, while 
European governments greatly reduced their reliance on private sources of coercion 
following the French Revolution, Tilly (1985) points out that the institutional practices 
mentioned above continued “as the occasions presented themselves.”13  
                                                      
10 Ryter, L. (2002)  
11 Tilly, C. (1986) 175 
12 Thomson, J.E. (1994)   




Similar to the European experience, government officials beginning as early as 
the Tokugawa period (1603-1887) in Japan began to utilize organized ‘ruffians’ for 
maintaining order in areas where the state’s reach was weakest or most ambiguous. 
Sineware (2008) explains that a policy of cooperation and toleration for their use of 
violence and other nefarious activities was maintained as long as they did not challenge 
the state. Such groups continued to play similar roles throughout subsequent periods of 
Japan’s tumultuous history, including the transition to democracy.14  
Studies of violence throughout Latin America as well illuminate patterns of 
cooperation between state actors and private forces. Beginning in 1950s Columbia for 
example, Mazzei’s (2009) study explains how state actors mobilized both paramilitary 
groups as well as private citizens into defense against leftist insurgents. Similar 
institutional arrangements are furthermore well documented in Argentina, Brazil, El 
Salvador, Mexico and Peru.15  
Finally, though non-exhaustively, collusion between loyalist paramilitary groups 
(mainly the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Forces (UVF)) and 
the police and military forces in Northern Ireland is well accounted for—with the latter 
routinely having provided intelligence information (e.g. the names of confirmed or 
suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) members or supporters) and other material 
support to the former.16   
Although the use of non-state groups in developed contexts has declined relative 
to their use in the past, states continue to utilize sub-contracting coercion—though the 
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15 See for example: Campbell, B., & Brenner, A. D. (2000); Arias, E. D. (2006), Auyero, J. (2007) and 
Mazzei, J. (2009), among others. 




trend has moved predominately towards sub-contracting groups firmly within the state’s 
legally provided framework.17 Still, cooperation and collusion between states and non-
state groups which engage in criminal violence continues in varying levels in most 
states—yet the literature on modern state development largely obscures or outright 
ignores the multiplicity of roles these groups play in modern, developed polities. Indeed, 
recognizing such institutional arrangements necessarily complicates notions of strict 
dichotomously ordered boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate sources of 
violence and those that order both their licit and illicit services. Furthermore, recognizing 
that cases exist in polities which are both strong and democratic challenges the hypothesis 
that the phenomenon is merely relegated to weak or failed states. As explained by 
Campbell (2002), “Modern states have a habit of subcontracting and in certain situations, 
this subcontracting can occur even at the risk of diminishing the state’s legitimacy by 
violating the law, or by compromising its monopoly on the use of violence”.18 
2.2: Empirical Framework 
The following diagram and subsequent explanation will help to graphically depict 
the central focus of this dissertation: 
 
 
                                                      
17 For example, in the domestic, legal environment, private actors in the market for force can be found in 
the enforcement of contracts, torts and property law, where the role of the state is limited to essentially 
providing a court system. Other instances include the use of paid informers, private security for public 
spaces and bounty hunters. Internationally, the use of mercenaries and other illicit privateers has 
predominately given way to the utilization of legally sanctioned professional private military companies.  




Diagram 1: The Market for Public and Private Force19 
 
Diagram 1 shows the range of violence wielding organizations across both their levels of 
legitimacy and organizational relationship to states. Public institutions of enforcement in 
developed states are traditionally in the upper left hand zone—both high in levels of 
legitimacy (defined by their level of coercive supremacy) and subordinate, vertically 
organized relationship to civilian control (in democracies). Such organizations include 
professional militaries, police forces, prosecutors and judges. Next are non-state actors 
such as legally sanctioned security guard companies, private military firms and bounty 
hunters who occupy the upper right hand zone. Legitimacy to such groups is given 
through the state and are thus within its direct jurisdiction.20 Finally, groups, which 
engage in principally illicit violence, occupy the lower, right hand corner of the diagram. 
Actors within this category include for instance mafias, illegal paramilitaries and 
                                                      
19 A similar chart was used by Ahram, A.I., (2011) (p.10). I borrowed the chart’s framework and 
augmented it to fit the scope of this study.  
20 Yet a further complication is that often time’s states or state actors sub-contract force to licit groups who 
then utilize illicit means to bring about the goals they have been tasked with.  
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mercenaries, vigilantes and others who operate predominately outside the state’s legally 
defined jurisdiction and are often characterized as being in competition with it. They are 
thus by definition, illegitimate. It is specifically this ambiguous theoretical and empirical 
intersection between licit and illicit groupings and their relationship to the state which is 
of interest here. It is what Auyero (2007) identifies as the ‘grey zone of state power,’ an 
area “where the activities of those perpetrating the violence and those who presumably 
seek to control them coalesce.”21  
To sum up the discussion, state development, far from being a one-shot game, is 
an on-going process whereby the state seeks to gain supremacy, and thereby legitimacy 
over the means and use of coercion. States have utilized a range of methods with which to 
obtain such control vis-à-vis their competitors— of which one method includes the sub-
contracting of force to private purveyors of violence.    
 
2.3: The Market for Criminal Violence 
 Going back to diagram 1, we can see that both the licit and illicit markets 
for private force intersect. In other words, there are numerous instances in which licit 
firms engage in illicit behavior and other instances where illicit firms sell protection to 
legal markets. Said differently, both licit and illicit firms exist on a continuum of 
economic activity between the poles of licit and illicit acts.22 This fact in turn creates 
ambiguity when it comes to categorizing and labeling different types of organizations. 
Take for instance pirates and privateers. Thomson (1994) notes that “the distinction 
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between a privateer and a pirate is that the former acts under the authority of the state that 
accepts or is charged with the responsibility of his acts, while the latter acts on his own 
interests and authority.”23 The problem there is that a pirate could exist with little 
difficulty, as both a pirate and privateer. The distinctions between mercenaries, 
paramilitaries and private security companies as well can be confusing. Avant (2005) 
explains that “The term “mercenary” has been used to describe everything from 
individuals killing for hire, to troops raised by one country working for another, to private 
security companies (PSC’s) providing military services to their own country.24 The case 
of paramilitaries, militias and gangsters as well can cause confusion. In the period of 
early state development in Korea for example (as will be explained in detail in the 
following chapters), both state seekers and state actors were more than willing to 
collaborate with gangsters, effectively turning them into the coercive forces of ‘patriots’ 
and ‘nationalists.’ Furthermore, in contemporary Korea, one of the main income earning 
activities for mafia groups from a category of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office has 
designated as “Hired Thugs.” Mafiosi in Korea will register their ‘companies’ as legal, 
private security firms. Such firms then engage in both legal and extra-legal protection.  
Because of the issues explained above, this study concentrates less on the 
categorization of such groups, and instead focuses on the observable outcome of criminal 
violence—regardless of whether or not it comes from a legally registered private security 
firm, or a criminal, mafia type organization. That being said, it is important to note that 
the scope of this study is focused on explaining state-non-state collaboration in the 
market for domestic force. Thus, groups which operate on a transnational scale are not 
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included in this study. Furthermore, religiously based groups and/or those that seek to 
either overthrow their own or other governments are outside the scope of this study as 
well.  
Placing the issue of categorization aside however, to reiterate, this study is 
concerned with explaining state-non-state collaboration where criminal violence is the 
end result. Regardless of whether a firm is legally registered or not, the fact that they 
have engaged in illicit behavior makes them by definition, criminal and thus places them, 
at least theoretically, in a jurisdictional conflict with the state.  
Criminal groups which operate in the market with extra-force are often referred to 
generically as mafia-type organizations. As explained by Gambetta (1996): “Mafiosi are 
first and foremost entrepreneurs in one particular commodity—protection—and this is 
what brings the difference and other simple criminals, simple entrepreneurs, or criminal 
entrepreneurs.”25 Gambetta’s argument originates from his research into the Italian and 
Sicilian mafias where he contends that the phenomenon was an evolutionary product of 
the end of feudalism and the subsequent strife and violent conflict which characterized 
the era. He continues that such instability and distrust greatly increases the demand for 
protection—often in the form of contract enforcement, dispute settlement, and property 
rights among others.26 In addition to acting as a substitute for trust, Gambetta argues that 
lack of effective state intervention in such areas is an additional key explanatory variable 
which accounted for the spread of such groups who had a comparative advantage in the 
effective use of violence.27  
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With respect to Russia, Volkov (2002) suggests that demand for private protection 
and “mediators” stemmed from insufficient protection of private businesses by state 
police in the wake of the Soviet collapse and the subsequent rapid transition to a market 
economy. He adds that additional factors, which produced demand for “enforcement 
partnership,” was a high entrepreneurial risk caused by frequent non-payment of debts 
and failure to observe contracts, in addition to the spread of swindling and theft. Such 
outcomes were as a result of legitimate state institutions being incapable of reducing such 
risks due to poor definition of property rights, the inefficiency of the state courts of 
justice in resolving disputes, and their incapacity to enforce decisions.28  
Milhaupt and West (2000), in their analysis of organized crime in Japan add to 
this concept by arguing that the true origins of mafia-type groups can be found in 
dramatic increases in formal property rights and the weakness of legitimate enforcement 
mechanisms—as was the case in post-feudal Japan. In other words, they argue that 
inefficiencies in state property right structures and a shortage of state-sanctioned rights-
enforcement agents are the key causal variables for both the emergence and continuance 
of such groups.29  
With respect to American mafia-type groups, Varese (2001) notes that such 
groups can trace their origins to the Sicilian Mafia that flourished during the prohibition 
era of the 1920s and 30s. And, although there had in fact been criminal organizations 
running illegal prostitution and gambling markets before this period, the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution in combination with the Volstead Act, 30 resulted to a 
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30 The National Prohibition Act of 1919 (the 18th amendment of the US Constitution) prohibited the sale 




massive jump in the demand for, scale, sophistication, violence, and wealth of the groups 
protecting illegal markets.31  
In addition to the above arguments, the issue of corrupt ties between criminals and 
public and private actors at large is a paramount explanation for their origins and relative 
levels of success or failure.32 The general argument is this: a basic necessity for organized 
crime groups to operate is police and political protection. They also require the means 
with which to launder their earnings and bring them into the legal economic system. Such 
basic requirements then lead criminal groups to attempt to infiltrate and corrupt (through 
the payment of bribes or other services) both public and private organizations (at varying 
levels) so as to obtain the needed complicity and/or tolerance in order to engage in their 
activities.33 Indeed, the ways in which criminal groups link themselves (and extent to 
which they are able to do so) into the broader political, economic and social environments 
can profoundly condition their ability to successfully operate, avoid prosecution and 
otherwise buy and sell their influence and services—ultimately affecting (and structuring) 
the quality of institutions such as the rule of law and the capacity for its enforcement.34  
Holding the discussion on the origins and existence of such groups aside, we can 
see that mafia type groups in particular engage in activities quite similar to licit sources of 
protection—mainly: (a) contract enforcement; (b) dispute settlement, and; (c) protection 
of property rights—in other words, policing—a commodity which is traditionally viewed 
as being within the strict realm of the states. Given this, Varese argues that mafias, 
through their actions, directly impede on the state’s jurisdiction—essentially putting them 
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in competition with public sources of protection—with relationships characterized 
predominately as antagonistic. For example, Palermo’s chief prosecutor, Giancarlo 
Caselli, describes the mafia…as a state within a state, ‘with its own territory, population 
and laws’…the mafia’s determination to establish itself as a state within the state is what 
makes it unique” 35 Furthermore, Falcone (1993) writes “The mafia does not have to be 
combated because of its core values, which may seem warranted in a disintegrating 
society, but because of its very essence: there cannot be two systems of government in 
one society.36 Strict models of competition between states and mafias however are often 
based on the erroneous assumption of dichotomously ordered boundaries between 
legitimate and illegitimate sources of violence. In reality, as has already been argued, the 
distinctions are much more ambiguous in nature.  
Examples of cooperative/symbiotic criminal-political nexuses are not difficult to 
find. For instance, Hill (2003), in his study on organized crime in Japan provides 
evidence to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the organized criminal groups and 
police, in which such groups were utilized to “police” their own territories in addition to 
numerous instances of them being deputized as semi-official suppressors of various anti-
government movements. 37  With respect to pre-revolutionary China, Booth (1999) 
explains that the Kuomintang government utilized various mafia-type groups in order to 
suppress communist uprisings such as the infamous White Terror uprising of 1927 in 
which thousands of people were slaughtered throughout Shanghai.38 Similar accounts and 
evidence of cooperative criminal-state arrangements can be found in Bloc’s (1974) 
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influential study of mafia-state relations in Sicily in which he argues that state actors in 
effect harnessed mafia organizations in the suppression of banditry and other types of 
dissent.39  
What then accounts for such cooperative relationships? The conventional answer 
would be that cooperation between state actors and violent, non-state groups, as well as 
the not merely the toleration but at times promotion of their activities is largely a function 
of corruption. However, while corruption may in part be driving such symbiotic 
relationships, it is not a necessary nor sufficient explanation. To be sure, while corruption 
may in fact determine which actors are awarded contracts by the state, explanations based 
on corruption alone fail to account for the strategic logic determined by variance in levels 
of state capacity.  For example, beyond models of strict competition and relationships 
conditioned by corruption, a number of theoretical arguments by authors such as 
Schelling (1967) have posited that cooperation and regulation of mafia-type organizations 
is a rational response to deficiencies in enforcement capacity.40 Schelling proposes, 
through his analysis of black markets that while crime in itself can be considered a 
“public bad,” mafias can be effective in providing public goods both to the upper and 
under world. Mafias, he argues, can internalize much of the costs (e.g. regulation of 
conflict) that fall on the underworld but go unnoticed if crime is centralized. In other 
words, eradication of mafias—who have a collective incentive in restricting violence (so 
as to avoid punishment)—would have the same backward effect as removing third party 
regulators operating in licit markets—from civil society to anarchy. Implicit in his model 
is the assumption that crime can never be fully eradicated—and if the alternative to 
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organized crime is disorganized crime, the benefits of the former may outweigh the 
later.41 Thus, Schelling argues for a more practical approach to enforcement, with one 
method including the option for compromise and quasi-cooperation with mafia-type 
groups.42  
Much of my fieldwork findings fit well into Schelling’s regulatory framework. In 
short, police collaborated with gangsters, and continues to do so, because they have to. 
Because of reasons related to budget constraints, asymmetric information, the nature of 
different types of crimes, diminishing returns to enforcement, and in the post-
democratization period, institutional constraints on the amount of acceptable force, police 
often engage in cooperative arrangements with members of Korea’s organized crime. Of 
course, there is variance in the types of actors, instances and rationale for cooperation. 
Not all police cooperate with gangsters, just like not all gangsters cooperate with police. 
Although such cooperative arrangements and relationships will be briefly covered in 
                                                      
41 Becker (1968) argues that the issue of enforcement of laws and budget constraints goes deeper than 
simply recent government cut backs and an expansion of private property. The author argues that 
enforcement of laws becomes incrementally more costly and less efficient the more successful it is. The 
logic hinges on two variables: public enforcement budgets and damage of crimes to society (in monetary 
terms). Successful detection and enforcement require increasing investment in personnel and technology—
the higher the investment, the higher the probability of success. The more successful detection and 
enforcement becomes, the lower the total damage from crimes to society (though not essentially the 
individual or business), up to the point where budgetary costs overtake the damage to society as a whole. In 
other words, successful enforcement is subject to diminishing returns. If enforcement then is subject to 
diminishing returns, and budgets are constrained, state actors are forced into the question as to what the 
optimal level of enforcement should be. The strategic answer to this question obviously depends on the 
nature of the crimes themselves—for example, choosing between predatory and non-predatory types of 
crime and their effective levels of enforcement.  
42 Building off of Schelling’s analysis, Celentani, M., M. Marrelli, et. al (1995) (to be referred to as CMM) 
propose a game theoretic framework for how such models of cooperation might work. The authors argue 
that state actors can devise strategies aimed at reducing the potential rents (and assumedly negative 
externalities) of criminal organizations through selective enforcement as opposed to policies of strict 
suppression. State actors can threaten (and carry out) intervention for deviations from the state’s interest. 
They can do so by either intervening directly with the offending group, or working with a competing 
organization, or both. In sum, the game the authors propose is an implicit sub-contracting model of 
collusion and intervention through repeated iterations. It is furthermore a framework of 




chapter two, the regulation of illegal goods and service markets and the politics behind it 
are beyond the scope of this present study.43  
Cooperation between state actors and mafia type organizations however, extends 
beyond their involvement in black markets—for example, in their suppression of banditry 
and anti-government dissent. Such phenomena as well cannot be simply explained away 
as being a function merely of corruption. Rather, in order to understand the phenomenon, 
one must consider the institutional constraints—constraints shaped by political, economic 
and/or social dynamics—which can alter the strategic decisions of state actors. The 
following sections discuss such constraints and the subsequent sets of logic for state-non-
state cooperation in the market for force.  
2.4: Organization of Control: Vertical versus Horizontal Integration 
The question still remains as to why states, assumed to, in the words of Ahram 
(2011) “jealously guard” their hold over the means and use of violence would sub-
contract coercion to potentially less reliable sources.44 While not specifically related to 
the sub-contracting of violence, Donahue (1989) extends perhaps the most concise and 
logical framework for understanding this question in the most general sense and thus 
provides a sound starting point. Donahue argues first and foremost that the nature of the 
task determines whether private or public actors will be most effective—with 
‘effectiveness’ depending upon the range of intended goals. Furthermore, the case for 
sub-contracting public services becomes incrementally stronger if the state actors (a) 
know ex ante exactly what they want (so they can more accurately specify the terms of 
the contract); (b) have the capacity with which to penalize or otherwise replace 
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contractors who either deviate from the agreement or otherwise prove disappointing, and; 
(c) are concerned more about the end goals relative to the means with which those goals 
are brought about.45 As it will be shown, the phenomenon of sub-contracting public 
services to private actors in the market for force is largely consistent with Donahue’s 
argument. In order to fully appreciate this parsimonious model however, a number of 
theoretical steps will be discussed below.  
To begin with, transaction cost economists such as Coase (1937) and others for 
instance would argue that there is an overwhelming preference for single “firms” to trade 
internally at set prices rather than utilizing market prices which may be more costly.46 
Others such as Williamson (1975), building off of Coase’s theory of the firm, explains 
that vertically integrated organizations (defined as a supply chain with multiple units with 
a common owner) can alleviate many of the factors which lead to market-based failures 
(e.g. “getting the prices wrong”), including overcoming issues of asymmetric information, 
opportunism, and uncertainty.47 In a later piece (Public and Private Bureaucracies, 1999), 
Williamson extends the logic and argues that for the same rationale, there are 
circumstances where state controlled bureaucracies are preferable to private firms. This is 
especially in the case of tasks surrounding sovereignty, in which he notes that sovereign 
transactions—such as the use of violence—are particularly susceptible to the concerns of 
loyalty and integrity—issues which Thomson (1994) argued were major factors 
contributing to European shift away from the use of risky privateers.  
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While Williamson provides a strong theoretical argument for why state actors 
should have at least a preference for not sub-contracting sovereign tasks, others such as 
Cooley and Spruyt (2009) argue that there are a range of alternative institutional 
arrangements between the poles of vertical and horizontal integration—including quasi-
vertical integration (through the use of incomplete contracting).48 Such alternatives, they 
argue, can help overcome the contractual hazards which Williamson posited. Secondly, 
and especially important to this discussion, they argue that Williamson ignores issues of 
relative power and vulnerability between the contracting parties (whether they be private 
or public). Indeed, as argued by Avant (2005), and key to this dissertation’s position, 
strong states that are coherent with high levels of capacity are the best able to manage the 
potential risks of privatization and “harness” private forces to produce preferable 
outcomes.49 Furthermore, while under ‘ideal’ conditions we might expect state actors to 
prefer to maintain direct control of all public services and tasks within a single supply 
chain, realities on the ground are often the case that such “best-practices” are simply not 
available options or are otherwise less attractive. Simply stated, state strength affects the 
range of institutional options, preferences, and subsequent practices of state actors. 
2.5: State Strength and the Logic of Sub-Contracting: 
 This study argues that sub-contracting coercion is broadly a function of 
state strength. What is state strength? State strength in this study is defined as a function 
of both capacity and a polities’ relative level of autonomy from societal forces. This study 
follows in part the notion of capacity as defined by Migdal (1988) as follows: “the ability 
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of the state to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and 
appropriately use resources in determined ways.”50 A state’s level of autonomy then is 
defined as its ability to operate independently of societal forces. States which sub-
contract violence due to deficiencies in capacity are explained in this study as sub-
contracting under a logic of capacity. In other words, they do so in order to both boost 
their forces and extend their reach. Instances of sub-contracting in order to avoid 
punishment or sanction by societal forces then, is explained as sub-contracting under a 
normative framework.51  
When looking at the phenomenon of sub-contracting force in general, whether for 
domestic or international purposes, scholarship largely points to weak capacity as the 
main driving force. The argument in short is that states sub-contract coercion to boost 
existing or otherwise deficient forces. Furthermore, and specifically with respect to 
domestic settings, the literature points to the phenomenon as largely being relegated to 
weak and/or transitioning states which utilize the option to gain internal supremacy. This 
argument in part underpins studies of early state development in Europe and more 
contemporary investigations which look at sub-contracting to paramilitaries and other 
non-state specialists in violence in different parts of the world including Middle East and 
Latin America. As state capacity increases, ceteris paribus, we should expect that the 
probability of sub-contracting coercion will correspondingly decrease.52  
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 Although the capacity argument holds explanatory power for a significant 
portion of the type of state-non-state collaboration we see, and indeed explains much of 
the early collaboration in Korea as will be shown in chapter 3, this argument alone is not 
sufficient to explain such collaboration in developed settings. Indeed, in order to 
understand sub-contracting in states which exhibit high levels of capacity, this study 
argues that one must take into account the levels of autonomy a state has from its societal 
forces. In his argument as to why democracies fail in certain military conflicts, Merom 
(2003) argues that we must account for a variable he terms as the “normative difference”, 
defined as the distance between the position of the state’s preference and that of the 
society concerning the legitimacy and toleration for violence, in conjunction with the 
degree of influence societal forces (attributed to groups) have over policy choices and 
their outcomes. Both can have significant effects on the ability of states to wage war. He 
argues that when the normative gap is wide and societal forces against such conflict are 
strong, a state’s capacity and success in engaging in war is significantly diminished.53 
While his argument was made utilizing international conflicts as the units of analysis, we 
can easily apply this to domestic conflicts. The US’s “war on drugs” is an example. In 
this case, let’s assume a shared goal of “winning” the war, with a normative gap between 
state actors’ beliefs in the amount of coercion and resources deemed necessary to win (e.g. 
they differ on the means with which to bring out the shared goal) and the level of 
violence tolerated/accepted by the liberal forces of society. State actors (in this example, 
the policy makers) may be constrained due to their fear of being punished by society—
either in the form of electoral outcomes, reputation, or other negative ramifications. The 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 




following table marries both capacity and autonomy to come up with four categorizations 
of state strength:  
Table 1: State Strength54 
 Low Autonomy High Autonomy 
 
Low Capacity 
       QI. 
- State actors’ ability to enter 
in to a society, to ensure that 
all relationships in the 
society are regulated; get all 
the important resources in 
these societies; and 
appropriate or use resources 
in determined ways is limited 
and they are not able to wield 
power independently of 
societal forces.    
 
-Note: typically characteristic 
of failed states or enclaves. 
        QII.  
- State actors’ ability able to 
enter in to a society easily; 
ensure that all relationships in 
the society are regulated; get 
all the important resources in 
these societies; and appropriate 
or use resources in determined 
ways is limited, though state 
actors operate with high degree 
of independence from societal 
actors.  
 
-Note: typically characteristic 





       QIII. 
- State actors are able to enter 
in to a society easily; to 
ensure that all relationships 
in the society are regulated; 
get all the important 
resources in these societies; 
and appropriate or use them 
in determined ways, though 
they are not able to wield 
power independently of 
societal forces.  
-Note: typically characteristic 
of stable liberal 
democracies/enclaves  
 
        QIV. 
-State actors are able to enter 
in to a society easily; ensure 
that all relationships in the 
society are regulated; get all 
the important resources in 
these societies; and use them 
appropriately in determining 
ways with high levels of 
independence from societal 
forces.  
-Note: typically characteristic 
of strong authoritarian or 
illiberal democracies/enclaves. 
 
                                                      





Although such a parsimonious model cannot capture all of the complexity 
involved (e.g. it would be naïve to assume that states either have high capacity or not, or 
low autonomy or not), what is important about the table above is that it can, when 
speaking about state strength, help us to better understand what state actors are and are 
not able to do, and why. Furthermore, and quite importantly, variance in such indicators 
of state strength, whether cross-regionally, cross-temporally or cross-issue area, affect 
state actors’ decision over whether or not to sub-contract the services of, or otherwise 
collaborate with private actors in the market for force. The following table thus presents 
this study’s observable predictions:  
Table 2: Observable Predictions 
 Low Autonomy High Autonomy 
 
Low Capacity 
                      QI.  
- Probability of sub-
contracting coercion under 
both the logic of capacity and 
normative framework high. 
                     QII.  
- Probability of sub-contracting 
coercion under the logic of 




                    QIII.  
- Probability of sub-
contracting coercion under 
the logic of capacity low, 
high under a normative 
framework. 
                     QIV. 
- Probability of sub-contracting 
coercion under both the logic 







While sub-contracting is only one among many potential institutional arrangements 
which state actors have at their disposal, it is quite clear that this option has and continues 
to be a widespread response to institutional deficiencies.  
 
2.6: Conclusion 
Although ideal type definitions characterize states as holding a monopoly over the 
means and use of violence, empirically such control is variant. In the face of such variant 
control, states and state seekers alike are faced with the challenge as to how they can and 
should assert or re-assert their authority. Sub-contracting of force in the face of weak 
state strength, again, as a function of weak capacity and/or low levels of autonomy, is one 
intuitional arrangement which is far more ubiquitous than what the established literature 
acknowledges. The phenomenon of sub-contracting violence to illicit groups furthermore 
presents an inconvenient challenge to the notions of clear boundaries and distinctions 
between legitimate and illegitimate sources of coercion. And, despite its prevalence, this 
‘grey zone’ of state power is not readily studied, nor well understood—especially in the 
context of domestic, democratic settings. I argue that the logic presented in this chapter 











Korea’s Market for Force 
 
3.1: Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the market for both public and private 
force in Korea. Although almost entirely descriptive in nature, this chapter is key to 
understanding the subsequent empirical chapters focused on Korea. To reiterate the 
argument, this study posits that sub-contracting of force and/or state collaboration with 
non-state specialists in violence, ceteris paribus, is a function of capacity and/or 
normative concerns. This chapter thus lays out the institutional capacity of the state and 
its evolution from ‘rule-by-law’ norms to ‘rule-of-law’ beginning first in the late 1980s. 
Special attention will furthermore be paid to the origin and survival of the various state 
actors charged with enforcement.  
Public actors and institutions are however not the only players in the market for 
force. Private entrepreneurs of coercion as well co-exist, either peacefully or 
competitively with public ones and thus require special attention. The principle non-state 
actors this study is concerned with, in regard to Korea, are those which operate 
predominately outside of the state’s legally sanctioned jurisdiction. Few reliable studies 




organized criminals in the market for force (i.e. the Korean ‘mafia’), thus, this section 
relies substantially upon this author’s interviews and first hand observations. As with the 
section on public sources of protection, special attention will be given to these groups’ 
origins and incentives.  
3.2: Evolution of Public Sources of Protection 
The history of the Korean justice system, composed of the Judicial Branch, the 
Ministry of Justice and the Korean National Police, has been one in which the neutrality 
from successive governments, most authoritarian in nature, was virtually non-existent. 
Lacking legitimacy and public support through free and fair elections the military 
regimes under Park Chung-hee, Chun Do-hwan, and to a certain extent, Rho Tae-woo 
utilized the justice system in much the same manner as it had been used during the 
Japanese colonial period and subsequent US Military and Rhee Syngman interludes. The 
police and paramilitary units, backed by the court system and prosecutors, were routinely 
mobilized to suppress demonstrations to control or otherwise neutralize ‘disloyal’ citizens 
and political opposition alike.55 Indeed, from the earliest phases of the republic through 
the 1990s the justice system was used less for public security and more for securing the 
dominance of political powers with the police forces having a well-earned reputation for 
human rights violations and other ‘gangster-like’ activities, all under the twin 
legitimizing banners of state development and preservation of a polity which was, and 
remains to be technically at war with its northern neighbor. With the move towards 
democratic elections in 1987, calls for reform of the justice system became politically 
more salient and costly to ignore. This section describes the roles and methods of 
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operation of the respective actors within the Korean justice system and how they have 
changed over the course of democratic reforms.   
3.2.1: Judicial Branch 
The Judicial Branch, separate from the Executive, controls the courts and is 
comprised of the Supreme Court, the High Courts, the District Courts and their Branch 
Courts, in addition to a number of specialized courts, all of which are empowered to 
adjudicate administrative, civil and criminal cases, and others which are stipulated by 
legal statute. Moreover, the Constitutional Court, established in 1988, is charged with, 
upon request of a court, adjudicating the constitutionality of statutes and issues related to 
impeachment or the dissolution of political parties.56 
Judicial administration is controlled “de facto” by the Chief Justice, a 
presidentially appointed position, who in turn nominates Supreme Court Justices and 
exercises administrative control over the judiciary. Judges other than the Chief Justice 
and the Supreme Court are appointed by the Chief Justice with the consent of the 
Conference of Supreme Court Justices. The Chief Justice, who serves a 6-year single 
term, can, in the words of Ginsburg (2004) “either be a channel of political influence or a 
wall of insulation from such influence.”57 
3.2.2: Ministry of Justice and Supreme Prosecutors Office 
The Ministry of Justice, a system within the executive branch, is charged with 
investigating crimes, indicting suspects, and supervising the execution of criminal 
judgments. The Minister of Justice, the highest prosecutor, is appointed by the president. 
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Next in line is the Prosecutor-General, also presidentially appointed, who supervises all 
lower-level prosecutors through the “principle of uniformity of prosecutors,” which 
stipulates that lower-level prosecutors shall obey higher prosecutors. This principle in 
part has been subject to much criticism, especially in cases involving powerful politicians, 
high ranking bureaucrats or influential members of society, where prosecutors in charge 
have had to unwillingly quit their investigations due to pressure from the Supreme 
Prosecutor’s Office or from the ruling political party.58 In conjunction with the principle 
of uniformity, the prosecutors have discretionary power over whether or not to prosecute, 
giving them wide discretion. Because of this prosecutors have often been criticized for 
their reluctance or outright refusal or otherwise biased investigations of crimes related to 
influential people.59 As a result of pressures in the aftermath of the 1987 transition to 
democracy, a number of measures have been instituted to address the issue of undue 
influence, including the creation of the special investigation unit, a branch within the 
Prosecutor’s Office but not directly under the command of the Prosecutor General, and 
one which was established for the investigation of corruption cases involving high-
ranking bureaucrats, politicians and private-sector elites.60 This reform along with others 
will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.  
Despite the prominent role that police have played in the development of the 
Korean republic they are, by Korean law, in a subordinate position to the more powerful 
prosecutor’s office. In fact, while the vast majority of criminal cases are dealt with by the 
police, a police officer in reality has no legal right to carry out criminal investigations or 
the majority of arrests without prosecutorial approval. With minor exceptions, for 
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example, if the alleged crime carries a potential penalty of more than 3 years, police are 
required to apply for an arrest warrant with the prosecutor.61 In the cases where an 
application is made, the prosecutor in charge examines the request and decides upon 
whether or not to seek the issuance of a warrant from a judge. The same procedures are 
required for a warrant for inspections, searches or seizures. As noted by Kim (2002), “the 
relationship between the prosecutor and the judicial police officer is not one of 
cooperation, but one of order-obedience. Accordingly, the prosecutor directs and 
supervises the judicial police officers in conjunction with criminal investigation and the 
police should obey the prosecutor’s official order.”62 
3.2.3: Korean National Police 
Owing much of its current structure to the modernization of the forces during 
Japanese occupation, the Korean National Police, despite a number of recent reforms, has 
remained a highly centralized national system, separate from the military and organized 
into provincial police bureaus, police stations and sub-stations. With the end of the 
colonial period, the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) officially 
established the Korean Police in 1946 and at least on paper, abolished the practice of 
summary punishment and limited the police duties to the controlling of crime, 
preservation of peace and social order, in addition to the collection of intelligence on 
communist activities.63 In reality, as will be highlighted in the following chapters, the 
police played a prominent and brutal role in both the periods prior to and following the 
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Korean War.  By the year 2011, the number of police officers stood at 101,239, which 
translates into 1 officer for every 510 people, dispersed across the country in 428 offices 
and 1,517 substations.64 
In addition to the regular civilian force is a combat police section that includes 
both military combat and auxiliary police units. The combat police system was 
established in 1967, made up of military conscripts, tasked with the role of combating 
against North Korean spies and armies. The auxiliary police system, created in 1982 is 
made up of volunteers of people as an alternative to traditional military service. Despite 
the premise upon which they were created, both units have been routinely employed for 
suppressions of demonstrations and other anti-government activities. Similar to the 
regular police, both units had a penchant for aggressive tactics, with numerous accounts 
of violent confrontations with Korean society.65 
As noted by Pyo (2001 b.), politicization of the police starts with the appointment 
of ranking positions and the short life of commanding officers—with high-ranking 
officers seeking the patronage of powerful politicians.66 The Police Commissioner’s 
position for example is politically appointed and typically lasts for one to two years—
leading them to rationally seek not only political benefactors in order to obtain the 
position but often private sector support as well for their post commissioner positions 
leading to a form of Korean amakudari (decent from heaven).67 In addition to the 
political influence wielded through appointment, the KNP was within the direct auspices 
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of the Ministry of Home Affairs—the same ministry which controlled elections—
effectively making electoral manipulation by the respective regimes more efficient.  
3.2.4: KCIA/NIS 
 Two months following Park Chung Hee’s coup d’état in June of 1961, under the 
guidance of future prime minister and long-time political survivor Kim Jong Pil, the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was established as Korea’s main intelligence 
gathering organization. 68  Originally established to supervise both domestic and 
international intelligence operations, as well as high profile criminal investigations, the 
KCIA quickly became the most powerful repressive and coercive force in Korean 
political and economic environments.69 Numerous high profile cases including the 1973 
kidnapping and near murder of Kim Dae Jung, as well as frequent detainments and 
subsequent torture and other human rights abuses, the KCIA rapidly gained a reputation 
as being the most despised and feared institution during the successive authoritarian 
regimes, with such actions being justified as necessary under the on-going North Korean 
and Communist threats.70 
 The KCIA operated under secretive and vague parameters, predominately outside 
of any formal control and being accountable only to Park.71 Of the KCIA, Henderson 
(1968) commented:  
“The CIA replaced ancient vagueness with modern secrecy and added 
investigation, arrest, terror, censorship, massive files, and thousands of agents, 
stool pigeons, and spies both at home and abroad to its council powers…In 
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history’s most sensational expansion of council formation, it broadly advised and 
inspected the government, did much of its planning, generated most of its legal 
ideas and a large section of the study on which they were based, recruited for 
government agencies, encouraged relations with Japan, sponsored business 
companies, shook down millionaires, watched over and organized students, netted 
over $40 million by manipulating the Korean stock market through cover brokers, 
and supported theaters, dance groups, an orchestra, and a great tourist center.”72 
 
If the KCIA was at all restrained during the 1960s due to the façade of democratic rule, 
all restraints were lifted following Park’s institution of formalized authoritarianism in 
1972.73 The KCIA would furthermore go onto play a major role in labor control and 
suppression as will be discussed in chapter four.  
 
3.2.5: Reforms of the system: post-1987 Democratic Elections 
The move towards democratization in the late 1980s brought about a number of 
changes in the Korean criminal law and procedure. Criminal law had been a symbol of 
authoritarian rule in Korea and the successive authoritarian regimes made use of it to 
suppress dissidents and control the populace. One of the major tasks of the National 
Assembly, post-democratization, was to revise criminal procedure laws. The institution of 
the 1987 Constitution brought a change in the practice of Criminal Procedure Code 
(CPC), with the explicit stipulation for due process for suspects being a core value. 
Furthermore, the Bill of Rights included requirements for the right to counsel, right to fair 
and speedy trials, measures against torture, and other stipulations to protect human rights. 
The 1988 and subsequent 1995 amendments further strengthened suspect’s rights, with 
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the creation of the aforementioned Constitutional Court as the judicial oversight 
organization.74 
Prosecutors retained their full authority for both investigations and subsequent 
prosecutions, but as mentioned previously, the Central Investigation Department was 
created, against the opposition of the prosecutors, in order to investigate corruption cases 
involving politicians, high-ranking bureaucrats and influential citizens.75 Despite reforms, 
criticisms against the prosecutors remain centered around their close ties and proximity to 
presidential power leading to the real or perceived public perception of high levels of 
corruption with the Office.76 
Among the different organizations within the justice system, the KNP was the 
one where most reforms were carried out. That the police were the main domestic strong 
arm of whichever regime was in power was not lost on the opposition. Calls for reform 
were frequent, with several formal proposals for increased police neutrality and structural 
autonomy coming in 1955, 1960, 1972, 1980, 1985 and 1989.77 Following the 1987 
launch of democratic reforms, protests in favor of reform increasingly grew more salient, 
again from opposition parties and citizens, in conjunction this time with demands from 
graduates and students from the National Police College (now referred to as the National 
Police University) which culminated into the Police Act of 1991.78 The act created the 
Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) which removed the police out of the direct 
control of the Ministry of Home Affairs and additionally brought in civilian oversight 
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through the creation of the National Police Board, made up of citizens who advise the 
politically appointed Police Commissioner on issues related to budgets, equipment, 
allegations of human rights abuses and personnel matters.79 Further reforms were carried 
out in 1999 under newly appointed Commissioner Lee, Moo-young, selected by then 
President Kim Dae-Jung, who characterized the old police as “a totalitarian former USSR 
style police system.”80 Most important of the reforms included increased measures for 
civilian collaboration and oversight.  
In addition to the increased oversight and accountability measures discussed 
above, the issue of widespread corruption among the police has been addressed. Common 
place were instances of police officers receiving or demanding bribes from suspects in 
return for releasing them without further investigation and/or manipulation in favor of 
suspects. In response, police salaries were incrementally increased across the board and 
harsh penalties including but not limited to dismissal and criminal charges for both 
officers and citizens involved in bribery or other cases of abuse were instituted as policy. 
As part of increased oversight, the police established a separate unit at every station in 
order to receive and investigate citizen complaints of corruption, brutality or other forms 
of malpractice. Furthermore, in 2004, a police corruption financial award was created, 
with citizens who report instances of bribery receiving up to an equivalent of $10,000.81 
In addition to the revisions above, following Kim Young Sam’s election as 
Korea’s first civilian president since Rhee Syngman in 1993, as well as following purges 
of potentially subversive elements from the military, the National Assembly passed a 
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number of revisions on laws regarding the major intelligence agencies.82 The revised laws 
placed the KCIA’s successor, the Agency for National Security Planning, and the 
Military Security Command under congressional oversight which in turn had control over 
their budgets and personnel management, as well as their methods of operation. The laws 
furthermore forced them back to their original mandates and required them to disengage 
from politics.83 
3.2.6: Summary 
Korea’s modern justice system and coercive elements, since the colonial period 
through 1987 was largely a force charged with predominately maintaining regime 
survival. The history of brutal practices, summary sentences and vast occurrences of 
human rights abuses, all in the name of state building and national security is clear. While 
this study is not one which searches for the causal linkages of democratization, it is 
unambiguous that factors such as economic development, the rise of an increasingly 
emboldened middle class, as well as international factors all played a part in the move 
towards democratic reforms. Democratic pressure in turn, through the function of 
continued elections and increased citizen participation of other forms (e.g. through civic 
organizations) has made the brutal and repressive methods once utilized by the past 
regimes for state preservation and expansion of control increasingly politically costly.  
3.3: Evolution of Private Sources of Coercion 
Korea’s history with non-state actors in the market for force is an interesting one. 
Although accounts of state-non-state cooperation in the area of policing goes back as far 
                                                      





as the Ko-ryo Dynasty (A.D. 918-1392), the regularized practice of collaboration has its 
origins during the last century of the Joeson Period (1392 -1910). Similar to the tekiya, in 
part the predecessors to the Yakuza, itinerant peddlers in Korea, referred as ‘pubosang,’ 
banded together in close knit communities for mutual aid.84 Peddlers were the lowest 
among the social classes and were looked down upon by the larger Korean society as 
“low-born, homeless outcasts,” and were very much treated as such. Peddlers, especially 
itinerant peddlers, were often vulnerable to predation by higher classes. As explained by 
Pak (1965) “During the closing years of the Wang Dynasty in Koryo, in order to guard 
against the extortion of the local officials and the attacks the mountain robbers, the 
Peddlers who had scattered all over the country gathered in large groups and organized 
merchant guilds to protect their own interests under a united front.”85 In other words, 
demand for private protection stemmed from insufficient publically provided 
enforcement of the Peddler’s property rights and safety. 
In the nineteenth century, the peddlers formed an important relationship with the 
Joseon Government with the state calling upon them as semi-official tax collectors 
(collection of sales taxes from the markets), spies, information gathers and scouts, as well 
as recruiting them as auxiliary forces in times of armed conflict. Their close relationship 
and multiple roles made them one of the most important and powerful non-governmental 
organizations.  
In return for their loyalty to the state, the government provided them with monopoly 
control of commodities and other commercial rights as supervisors of such markets.86 
                                                      






Henderson (1968) noted that: “Korean guilds are an interesting example of the widely 
known function of organization as the weapon of the low and the despised, increasing the 
social connotation of “lowless” that already accrued to the organization function within 
Korean society. Thus guilds, which in Europe served to limit central tyranny, in Korea, 
served as its extension and arm.”87 With Japanese annexation of the Peninsula in 1910, 
the Peddlers’ association and privileged status was removed and they faced violent 
suppression and near eradication as an organized group.88 
Although the practice of sub-contracting violence is one which goes back to antiquity, 
the historical origins of modern day criminal, violence wielding groups is virtually 
indistinguishable from the history of paramilitary ‘youth groups’ which dominated the 
political and economic scene in the post-liberation period. Much of their history will be 
described in the following chapter, but suffice to say, such gangs did the ‘dirty work’ and 
loyally carried out the autocratic demands of their political bosses and power brokers all 
the while running protection and extortion rackets along the way. Moreover, connections 
between these groups and the society at large, were, and remain to be necessarily 
extensive and far reaching. For instance, following the arrest and killing of one gang 
leader, Ko Hui-du, General “Snake” Kim Ch’ang-yong of the a report by the US Counter-
Intelligence Corps (CIC) wrote:  
Ko Hui-du was the Chairman of the Wonnam-dong Association, the 
Chairman of the Tondaemun Branch of the Civil Defense Corps, the 
Chairman of the Supporting Society for the Tongdaemun Police Station and 
the Chairman of the Judicial Protection Committee. Such were the titles he 
had on his name card. Jo was the representative of the stall keepings 
operating along the bank of the Ch’onggyech’on streamlet under the 
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jurisdiction of the Tongdaemun Police Station. He was the virtual leader of 
thousands of young men. In some respects, the man who holds the control of 
Tongdaemun and Ch’onggyech’on can be regarded as the practical 
dominator of Seoul.89 
 
Through such extensive networks, non-state criminal groups played a tremendously 
influential role in the development of the state prior to the 1961 military coup d’état by 
Park Chung Hee. Through a number of campaigns carried out between 1961 and 1963 
however, the police under Park Chung Hee arrested over 13,000 members of criminal 
groups. The official reason for such campaigns was to rid society from the groups blamed 
for social disorder. 90  The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Report (2004) 
(hereinafter ‘TRR’) further notes on the rationale that in general such campaigns often 
prove successful in winning citizen approval.91 Public support would undoubtedly be 
useful, if not necessary in Park’s subsequent presidential bids in 1963, 67 and 71.92 It also 
didn’t hurt that such criminal organizations often formed the bases of Park’s opposition.93 
Following the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, Chun Doo Hwan came to 
power on the heels of the brutal suppression of the Kwangju Democracy Movement 
which had garnered the publics’ outrage and ‘spontaneous resistance.’94 In response to 
such outrage, the TRR noted that“…in consolidating their power, the new military group 
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the time undermining potential threats to his position (P1). 




used the dual tactic of striking terror into the hearts of the citizens, while at the same time 
currying public favor.”95 It was thus under the slogan of ‘realization of a just society,’ in 
which Chun’s administration attempted to legitimize his own military take-over. As part 
of this program, first under Martial Law #13 and then by the 1980 Social Security Act, 
criminals and dissidents alike were rounded up under the ‘social purging’ program. The 
police and military, working under region-wide arrest quotas, detained, without the need 
for warrants, as many as 67,055 citizens under the program, with 40,000 of those being 
sent to the infamous, military run ‘Samch’ǒng kyoyuktae” (purification/education) camps. 
Among those arrested and detained, reportedly 52 had died in the camps, 397 died 
following their release of causes attributed to the brutal treatment they had received while 
being ‘reeducated,’ 4 were missing, and 2,763 were left with physical disabilities.96 
In addition to the ‘purification camps,’ in 1980 Chun’s government instituted the 
‘Social Protection Law.’ This law made it possible for the Ministry of Justice to sentence 
those deemed likely to repeat crimes again, to imprisonment in concentration camps, in 
addition to the sentences handed down from the courts.7,500 of those convicted between 
1980 and 1987 were sentenced to an additional two years of imprisonment following their 
original sentences.97 
What such ‘social purging’ and various ‘crack-down’ programs did, in addition to 
signaling to society that the governments  (first under Park then under Chun) were in 
control, was to provide forums and avenues with which police and crime figures alike 
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increasingly became familiar with each other.98 Furthermore, with few checks on power, 
the police had extremely wide discretion over how to deal with any one individual.99 
Either extending leniency or sending them to labor camps was up to the prerogative of the 
police. Such powers thus became a major way in which the authorities gained leverage 
over criminals which further served as opportunities for police patronage of organized 
crime.100 
    Despite the hardline measures outlined above, the 1970s and 80s brought about easing 
social controls and a society with an increasing capacity for consumption and new 
opportunities for both licit and illicit profits to be earned. For example, ostensibly in 
response to the well documented 1980 Kwangju Rebellion, referred to by Cumings (1997) 
as Korea’s “Tiananmen nightmare,”101 Chun Do Hwan sought to placate public unrest 
and discontent by instituting his ‘3 S’ (sex, sports, screen).102 This policy included 
gradually removing restrictions on entertainment, censorship of lewd cinema and 
promotion of sports. As part of this policy was the removal of the midnight to 4 am 
curfew which had been in place for some 36 years. While various entertainment districts 
existed before this in some form or other, the removal of the curfew was key to expansion 
of the industry. Although it is unclear whether or not Chun’s ‘3 S’ policy benefited his 
regime in the way it was intended, the policy undoubtedly led to an explosion of nightlife 
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and the entertainment industry that fed it, leading to windfall profits for organized crime 
groups. The entertainment industry then, as it remains to today is the number one source 
of income for organized crime groups.103 
The growth of the entertainment industry as well led to an expansion of entertainment 
districts where such businesses remain to be concentrated in. The growth of such districts 
and implicitly tolerated illegal activities by the government in turn led to increased 
opportunities for police-organized crime collaboration in policing and maintaining order 
in such areas.  
In addition to the expansion of the entertainment industry, in 1981 the bids for the 
1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics were awarded to Korea which in turn led 
to a massive boom to the construction, redevelopment and private security industries 
which organized crime groups were effectively able to infiltrate into and contract out 
their violent services to both state and business interests.104 
Notorious organizations which dominated the market for criminal violence within 
Seoul during the 1980s and 90s—considered to be the ‘heyday’ of organized crime, 
included the Shin Sangsa Pa and the three groups which once comprised the larger Ho-
nam105 faction—the Sǒ Pang P’a, the OB Dong Chae P’a and the Yang Un Yi P’a, 
groups which still exist in some form or other today.106 The leader of the Sǒ Pang P’a, 
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Kim, Tae-chon, was made famous in part by popularizing the use of sashimi knives in 
violent altercations beginning in the 1970s.107 I was able to see his legacy firsthand 
through the numerous stabbing and slashing scars I saw displayed proudly by many of 
those who participated in the study. In addition to long knives, Korean gangsters typically 
employ iron rods, baseball bats, axes, swords and fire extinguishers as their weapons of 
choice, arguably the result of some of the strictest gun controls in the developed world.108 
3.3.1: Numbers and activities 
Although estimates on the number of groups and members vary widely, according to 
an internal Supreme Prosecutor’s study in 2006, there was an estimated 383 crime groups 
operating throughout Korea, with 47, 251 active numbers evenly spread out throughout 
the peninsula—a figure which translates into roughly 1 out of every 1000 Korean citizens 
in the same year.109 According to the same prosecutor’s study, the main activities and 
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Table 3: Main Sources of OC Income110 
 
Activity  Number of 
groups  
% of total  
1. Entertainment Industry 192 52.2% 
2. Hired Thugs 121 32.9% 
3. Illegal Speculation 101 27.4% 
4. Operation of Lewd 
Businesses  
63 17.1% 
5. Illegal Sex Trade111 37 10.1% 
6. Public Auction manipulation   26 7.1% 
7. Evasion of taxes 23 6.3% 
8. Narcotics production and 
distribution  
19 5.2% 
9. Human trafficking  12 3.3% 
10. Real estate speculation 8 2.2% 
11. Others  22 6.0% 
  Source: IBID (p. 173) 
 
It is on the second of these—that being “hired thugs” which this dissertation focuses on. 
However, it is important to note that the other activities for the most part either directly or 
indirectly depend on the threat and/or use of violence, in the same way in which legal 
markets depend on public sources of enforcement.  
 In addition to the operation of illegal activities organized crime groups engage in 
a number of legal businesses as well. A part from the usual suspects (for example 
operation of legal bars, karaoke establishments, restaurants, etc.) the growth of the private 
security industry has provided a niche market for those with specialties in coercion. 
Legalized in 1976 through the legislation of the Security Service Contract Act, the private 
security industry experienced rapid growth following the state’s move in the mid 1980s 
towards privatization of tasks such as forced evictions—once under the purview of public 
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sources of coercion.112 Such groups which focus on the specific use of coercion (as 
opposed to those which focus primarily on site protection or escort security) are referred 
to as ‘yongyeok-hwaesa,’literally ‘service companies,’ more but more widely translated 
as ‘construction thugs.’ While the companies utilized for the most part are officially 
registered and as such claim legal legitimacy, the tactics utilized are often criminal in 
nature. As recently noted by one journalist:  
In South Korea, they’re known as “errand men”: hired street muscle who play 
often-violent mercenary roles in property disputes that law enforcement 
agencies refuse to handle. Their ranks are filled by physically fit young men 
who, critics allege, lurk in the gray area of the law, using violence and fear to 
uphold the will of people like landlords, businessmen and even the 
government.”113 
 
In addition to forced evictions, ‘Yongyǒk-hoesa’ are heavily involved in strike breaking 
and labor issues. As will be explained in chapter four, the emergence of Yongyǒk-hoesa 
and their expanded involvement in both forced evictions and strike breaking 
corresponded to South Korea’s increasingly contentious society and democracy 
movements during the early 1980s.  
 
3.3.2: Structure of Criminal Groups 
When speaking with police or prosecutors, most denied that Korea had anything 
resembling an Italian or American style, nation-wide ‘mafia’ or yakuza type organization. 
The problem with that answer however is that the Italian, American and Japanese ‘mafia’ 
type organizations themselves do not resemble anything close to the myth of a monolithic, 
nation-wide organization. Korean mafia type groups are in fact quite similar to their more 
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famous criminal cousins in that they tend to be small in size, with their power stemming 
from a number of fragmented and sprawling horizontal linkages. In the case of Korean 
groups, this organizational formation is in particular the result of strict laws which 
prohibit the formation of groups and severe penalties for those that join. For instance, 
Article 4 of the Act on Punishment of Violence stipulates that: (a) the bosses of criminal 
groups shall be punished by death, imprisoned for life or ten or more years; (b) Its 
principle members shall be punished by imprisonment for life or seven or more years, and; 
(c) other members than the aforementioned shall be punished by imprisonment for a 
definite term of two or more years.114 
Further complicating the investigation of these groups is their ephemeral nature, with 
groups forming, splitting, disbanding, and coming together again as opportunities arise. 
As is the tradition of Korean political parties, the names of the groups frequently change 
which often signify leadership shifts. 
Although Korean gangsters themselves frequently reference the term ‘Korean Mafia’ 
or ‘hanguk mapia,’ what they are referring to are those groups which sit at the top of the 
criminal hierarchy in Korea. The ‘Korean Mafia’ then is made up of members who refer 
to themselves as ‘gǒntal,’ which translates into something along the lines of “good for 
nothing.” Gǒntal then refer to low-level thugs by derogatory terms such as ‘kkanpae’ 
(equivalent of gang member) or ‘yangach’i’ (bully/hoodlum). While this subject will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section, one of the reasons why Gǒntal are able 
to control younger thugs is in part due to not only their capacity for violence, but most 
                                                      





importantly due to the fact that young delinquents often want to eventually be recruited 
into the ranks of the Gǒntal elite.  
The organizational structure of individual Korean criminal groups resembles quite 
closely that of other criminal organizations such as the Japanese Yakuza or Russian Vory 
v zakone (“thieves-in-law”). At the top of each organization sits the boss, or “tumok.” 
While there are exceptions, money in Korean criminal organizations typically flow from 
top to bottom—with bosses providing money making opportunities to lower ranked 
members.115 The more money-making opportunities the boss has at his disposal, the more 
members he can recruit. The more members within his ranks, the more power he has to 
influence both political and economic markets in his favor. Often times the names of the 
true bosses themselves are unknown to even the captains and lower ranking members—
and especially important—unknown to public authorities unless otherwise associated. 
The prosecutor’s office refers to them as ‘maghu-saeyǒk-ch’a,’ literally translated as a 
“power behind the curtain.” They can be considered as a sponsor of sorts and although 
many have risen through the socio-economic ranks through early criminal behavior, 
typically engage in purely legitimate businesses—though with the backing of their 
criminal ties.116 Bosses and sponsors alike in turn often hold legitimate positions of 
influence, either as businessmen, politicians, or those within other government or non-
governmental organizations, a favorite being as leaders of various national athletic 
associations from which they recruit new members from. Sitting next to the boss are a 
number of advisers, or councilors, referred to as ‘ko-mun.’ Such advisers are often trusted 
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business people, political actors or otherwise members of the private elite. While not 
being officially part of the organization, they can hold significant influence over the 
group’s functioning. 
The case of President Chun Doo Hwan’s younger brother, Chun Kyung Hwan 
(referred to as “Little Chun”) for instance, illustrates the complexity of locating the 
predominate power behind certain criminal organizations. Little Chun had graduated 
from the Seoul Judo School, the army adjunct school and the Commerce College of 
Yongnam University, eventually going on to earn an MA in physical education teaching 
in the US.117 Upon returning to Korea, Little Chun worked as a bodyguard for Samsung 
Company and then within the palace security force during the Park Chung Hee regime. 
Following the power ascension of his brother, Little Chun rapidly became the man to see 
regarding issues such as receiving favorable tax decisions or breaks, or obtaining import 
licenses and government contracts. He was furthermore appointed the head of the scandal 
ridden rural works project ‘Sae-maŭl-untong,’ a program with an annual $115 million 
dollar budget and one which had been charged with shaking down rural citizens for 
‘contributions.’ As part of the program, Little Chun had reportedly awarded a land 
reclamation contract to a company headed by Chong Yu Sop, the tumok of the Mokpo Pa. 
After a bloody nightclub incident in which four rival gang members were killed in Seoul, 
newspapers reported that it had been carried out by Chong’s politically connected gang. 
After a list of suspects came to light it was found out that one of the leaders of the hit 
squad was the former body guard of Little Chun. Some of the other suspects as well had 
ties to Little Chung—having both graduated from the Seoul Judo School as well as 
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attending overseas events with him as part of his entourage.118 As this example illustrates, 
Little Chun could just as easily be considered a boss of sorts as he could be referred to as 
a maghu-saeyǒk-ch’a or ko-mun.’ Regardless of the title however, those at the top 
echelons of such groups are first and foremost power brokers and it is through such 
extensive networks in which both legal and extra-legal protection and influence is 
brokered.  
Below the tumok sits the underbosses, or ‘pu-tumok.’ The underbosses are often 
mistaken for being the actual boss, which is convenient for the true leader of the group. 
Underbosses typically direct and delegate the day-to-day operations with two or more 
captains under their leadership. Captains—referred to as “haengdong daechang” or 
“conduct leaders,” as their name implies, are in charge of discipline, training, recruitment, 
and on the ground activities. Below each individual captain sit the soldiers which can 
number typically anywhere from between 10 to 30 members. Members typically are 
recruited from junior high or high schools, athletic organizations, or the unemployed, 
often starting out as errand boys. To be sure, there is a high supply of potential recruits 
given Korea’s notoriously competitive society with few second chances for those that fail 
to succeed either in their academic or athletic pursuits.  
Upward mobility amongst Korean gangsters is largely based on merit and one’s 
ability to earn profits. As with the organization’s leadership, the more money one can 
earn, the more people they can employ under them. As they increase their earning 
potential they can be promoted to captain, underboss, and eventually to head their own 
                                                      






crew/organization which typically will remain loyal to their original group. Similar to the 
Yakuza, retirement, either forced or voluntary is common.  
 
3.3.3: Intergroup relations 
 
During the 1970s through the 1980s and early 1990s, relationships between violence 
wielding organized groups were both competitive and violent. It is also during this time 
period when a number of anti-organized crime “wars” were carried out by the Korean 
government, with subsequent arrests, prosecutions and prison sentences for the majority 
of influential players. Importantly, it was during these sequential waves of arrests and 
subsequent detentions in which the various crime players became increasingly familiar 
with each other—having the shared experiences of long and brutal incarcerations.  Such 
shared experiences formed the catalyst with which loose-knit cooperative fraternities, or 
‘brother-hoods’ were formed. These fraternities—protection racket in of themselves—
were organized in order to facilitate cooperation, collaboration, and importantly, to 
reduce inter-group conflict. 
Official meetings between elite bosses are referred to as ‘dumok haengsa’ (Boss 
Events). Such meetings occur frequently, typically taking place one to two times a month 
or more when needed. These meetings occur in various luxury hotel banquet halls for 
roughly two to three hours at a time. While other meetings occur at weddings, special 
anniversaries or similar type events, ‘tumok haengsa’ are devoted strictly to the 
syndicate’s business.119 Of the three events I attended, the first hour was devoted to 
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handing out event invitations and engaging in other, typically non-business related 
pleasantries. It was explained to me that both the invitations and events were critically 
important to the functioning of the organization. For one, if you’re provided with an 
invitation, you’re considered part of the group. Second, according to custom, when one 
attends the event, the member is expected to pay an honorarium—these fees are 
essentially the syndicate dues. The higher amount one pays, the more respect is shown. 
When I asked one of the bosses how much on average he spends on such events, he 
explained that it was roughly the equivalent of US $4,000 to $5,000 per month. He also 
explained that if he did not attend the events, he would be considered outside of the 
syndicate—and thus in conflict with it. Less frequent high-level meetings occur with 
bosses in other regions.  
The second halves of the meetings were devoted to settling disputes and/or 
organizing/coordinating activities. For instance, in one such meeting (the only one where 
I was allowed to stay during the second half), a member of one group had engaged in 
gambling and loan sharking activities in an area which was in another group’s territory, 
and did so without prior approval. The dispute was resolved by both a formal apology 
from the offending member and his boss, and the paying of a significant monetary fine.  
In addition to the settling of disputes, the bosses discussed their plans to begin 
collectively assisting different districts throughout Seoul, following the example of 
Yakuza groups who had helped during the then recent Fukushima disaster as well as other 
instances. The plans included providing scholarships, rent assistance, or other financially 
related activities. I was informed that this plan was in part intended to better relations and 
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thus garner support from the community, and most importantly, from the local police, and 
politicians.120 
 Similar to the tumok cooperative, each rank below maintain their own close 
networks with members of other groups. As hierarchy along both rank and age are strictly 
enforced, individual members of groups typically spend the majority of their time with 
either members of their own groups with the same rank and age, or with members of 
other groups in the same category. This cultural attribute greatly facilitated the expansion 
of my research contacts.  
3.3.4: State-Business-Criminal Nexus 
 
The following diagram, based off of and cross-checked by multiple sources maps 
out the basic relationship structure between politicians, business, gangsters, and 
police/prosecutors. It is important to reiterate that there is no single, monolithic 
organization referred to as the ‘Korean mafia.’ Similarly, the state and society at large is 
made up of multiple actors with varying interests and motivations. As such, there is 
variance with respect to the general relationship diagram and explanation presented 
below. Not all business people have relationships with gangsters, just as not all gangsters 
have close ties to police, prosecutors or politicians. The diagram is simply a depiction of 
how each are generally connected, when connections do in fact exist:  
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    Diagram 2: State-Business-Criminal Nexus 
 
The first relationship in diagram 2 depicts the direct linkages between politicians 
and violent entrepreneurs. As highlighted in chapter 2, such direct linkages were not only 
common but necessary for any political boss of consequence in the period preceding the 
rise of the military government under Park Chung Hee. Under such relations politicians 
provided money making opportunities, judicial protection and favoritism to such 
organizations. In turn, illicit groups provided protection, campaign finance, votes and 
other forms of support to which they proved quite proficient at. While this direct 
relationship between violent entrepreneurs and politicians has weakened overtime—
especially in the wake of increased transparency and accountability measures since the 
1990s, it still exists in limited areas, especially outside of Seoul, and/or among local, low 
level politicians and/or bureaucrats where relationships are predominately first developed. 
The dotted line simply indicates that this relationship has weakened substantially over 
time.  
 The second relationship focuses on the political-business linkage. In general, 
similar to other political-business nexuses, businesses of all types seek to associate with 
politicians in order to better their interests and seek to win favor through campaign 












legal and/or extra legal support, for example, favoritism in government project bids. 
Many of these business themselves are, on the face of them, legally enfranchised but run 
by criminal elements. With respect to violent entrepreneurs, such actors are often found 
as previously mentioned, in the forced evictions industry. Similarly, relationship 3 depicts 
the tripartite political-business-criminal nexus. In general, businesses will provide 
money-making opportunities (both legal and illegal in nature) to criminal groups. When 
politicians seek out the services of violent entrepreneurs, it is done predominately 
indirectly, through the use of business intermediaries. For example, in times of elections, 
politicians will contact their business connections who in turn mobilize their criminal 
contacts. Activities include intimidation of voters and political competition, protection of 
campaign events, and the organization of grassroots campaigns. Businesses not directly 
run by gangsters themselves can find relationships with illicit organizations beneficial for 
their organizations. Businesses with such relationships can for example utilize them for 
protection, mediation, competition suppression and labor-related issues. In similar ways, 
businesses often seek relationships directly with public sources of protection. Similar to 
extra-legal protection provided to businesses from politicians, protection can be provided 
through this route as well.  
 Among the various relationships, the criminal-police/prosecutorial linkage is 
perhaps the most resilient, in part because the police and prosecutors are charged with 
representing the state in fighting criminal activities, and thus are often in close contact 
with criminal elements—though more so the police and the prosecutors. 121  Police 
naturally seek out relationships with gangsters and the like in order to obtain more 
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information and better control. Police will often tolerate certain types of activities in 
return for regulation of predatory and/or non-organized crime. Much of the variance 
simply depends on the type of demand for such non-predatory type crime. Criminals 
gravitate towards areas where there is both demand and where they have police 
connections.  
 The final relationship exists between politicians and the police/prosecutors. In 
return for advancement and/or other opportunities police and prosecutors will often 
provide protection to politicians or their business/criminal network. Of course criminals 
themselves seek strong relationships to police and prosecutors for the same rationale as to 
why they would seek out political relationships. In kind, politicians seek strong 
relationships with police and prosecutors. This is often the way in which extra-legal 
protection is provided to both gangsters and businesses within the respective politician’s 
overall network.122 Police and prosecutors in turn seek out the association with political 
leaders due to their origin, survival and advancement in part being dependent upon such 
relationships.   
 
3.4: Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the evolution of criminal groups 
in Korea, with a focus predominately on the period after the 1961 coup-d’état by Park 
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Chung Hee. As will be explained in greater detail in the following chapter, the criminal 
groups operating prior to 1961 were overwhelmingly ideological in nature, and if not 
ideological, were utilized for such purposes. It was the era of the ‘political gangster.’ 
Once Park Chung Hee came to power through the military led coup-d’état in 1961, he 
quickly went about with the task of eradicating potential competitors, whose power bases 
were often violent, criminal groups. Although complete eradication of such groups is 
impossible, and indeed, many of the groups continued to collaborate in one form or 
another with state actors and those representing the state, Park was in fact successful in 
that he reduced any significant type of national level political influence such groups 
might have in the past. 
 Following the assassination of Park in 1979, Chun Doo-Hwan ascended to power, 
and similar to his predecessor, carried out a number of social purges, of which numerous 
criminal elements and dissidents alike were caught in the waves of. However, hard line 
measures and continued repression were met with increasing calls for social, political and 
economic change—especially in the wake of the Kwangju Uprising in 1980. Chun Doo 
Hwan was forced to find ways in which to placate the forces calling for reform. One way 
Chun attempted to reduce the building pressure, was to relax certain restrictions on 
nightlife and promote entertainment. This policy inevitably led to more opportunities for 
those willing to engage in illicit market behavior.  
 In addition to the expansion of the market for traditional illicit activities, the 
market for private coercion was opened up during the run up to the 1986 and 1988 Asian 
Games which produced a massive move towards redevelopment and beautification of 
Seoul, in addition to the on-going need to boost the housing supply in Seoul’s growing 




providing public goods in the form of development, a process often associated with its 
own social upheavals and politically costly backlash, led to a natural niche for state-
criminal collaboration. By privatizing the process the state was able to enjoy development, 
while at the same time avoiding being directly implicated in the violence that was carried 
























State Seekers, Nationalists, and Paramilitaries  
 
4.1: Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explicitly highlight the cross-temporal variance 
with respect to state-non-state collaboration in the market for force during the period of 
state development within the southern half of the Korean peninsula. In many respects this 
chapter and story line that follows fits well within existent explanations of state-non-state 
collaboration in coercion. Namely, state seekers and state actors alike utilized non-state 
specialists in violence in order to expand their forces and/or to extend their reach in order 
to gain internal supremacy. Once state capacity was greatly enhanced and supremacy 
obtained, state actors in turn attempted to either fully disband or enlist their non-state 
forces under their formal state sanctioned umbrella, which in turn fits within the 
traditionally held wisdom which posits that state actors overwhelmingly prefer public as 
opposed to private sources of coercion.  
Although highlighting the cross-temporal variance with respect to the dependent 
variable is the main point of this chapter, special attention is necessarily paid to the 
history of state-non-state relations during the early phases of state development within 
Korea, and how this history continues to affect the range of decisions available to modern 





4.2: Early Korean State Development 
State development, especially in its embryonic phases, is often disturbingly 
violent. The history of state development within the Korean Peninsula is certainly no 
exception. With the abrupt end of Japanese colonialism following the conclusion of 
WWII, the peninsula was thrown into a stateless period—increasingly chaotic, rife with 
crime, unemployment, inflation, and corruption.123 With surrender came an end to both 
Korea’s main export market, Japan, and the war time industries which had supported the 
economy, as well as the exodus of Korea’s administrative and technical know-how in the 
hundreds of thousands of Japanese who had managed the peninsula’s political, economic 
and social systems. In addition to the collapse of the economy and administrative systems, 
the volatile situation was exacerbated by massive influxes of refugees—either those 
returning from abroad or streaming down from the North with which the existing 
institutions hardly had the capacity to absorb.124 Henderson (1968) writes “Refugees and 
repatriates without jobs and without the social constraints of their home communities 
joined gangs that stole, black-marketed, or pimped in Seoul and Pusan’s alleys and 
marketplaces.”125 In addition, gangs which had origins in organized crime and violence 
during the colonial period were harnessed by competing political powers. Most famous 
were the gangs led by Kim Du-hwan and Chung Chin-yung—both of whom had been 
made famous for their anti-Japanese activities but were then hired by the Japanese to 
organize and run the Police Assistance Association—effectively making them legal 
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terrorists.126 With the end of the colonial period in 1945, both Kim and Chung hired out 
their services to political parties and power brokers—Kim taking his group to the 
Rightists and Chung working for the leftist South Korean Labor Party (SKLP). As will be 
explained in the following section, the two would eventually clash.127 In a similar fashion, 
politically oriented youth and student groups, not immune to the revolutionary 
atmosphere, quickly formed and became ubiquitous—tying themselves (as had Kim Du-
hwan and Chung Chin-yung) to power brokers and political factions which afforded them 
the opportunity to not only earn rents but perhaps as importantly if not more, to do so 
while taking an active role in shaping the direction of the peninsula. Indeed, these groups 
played a critical role in political socialization and the recruitment of political and military 
leadership—with many future leaders rising from their ranks. Such groups would then 
eventually form the basis of power for each political boss and factionalist grouping—to 
the point where a US Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) report noted that “Violence and 
terrorism on the part of political groups was an accepted technique for getting things done. 
Any political party which lacked a strong-arm youth group, fiercely loyal to the cause, to 
do its dirty work really could not be expected to worry any other political 
organization.”128 In addition to ‘dirty work’ in the form of violent political activities, such 
groups, largely dependent upon illegal funds, relied upon forced or ‘voluntary 
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contributions’—contributions which surprisingly amounted to roughly half of national 
revenues in 1949. Leftists initially dominated the scene which in turn led to the formation 
of Rightists groups with their own state seeking ambitions.129  
To be sure the Leftist-Rightist divide in the peninsula was principally the 
consequence of the colonial period in which the Rightists (made up of elitists with land, 
other forms of capital, and education) were the clear minority, having at least partially 
collaborated with the colonial power in order to enjoy their privileged status.130 That the 
elites, the basis for the Rightists (both during and following colonialism) were the 
minority and suffered from legitimacy concerns—both in terms of public support and 
initially, coercive capability—is somewhat of an understatement. The vast majority of 
Koreans were naturally left- leaning (politically that is), being poor, rural, and 
uneducated—having 95% of employed men and 99% of employed women working as 
laborers as late as 1944 and as little as 11.5% living in urban settings.131 Similar to the 
privileged class, the police force (staffed by and managed largely by those who had been 
trained by, served under, prospered and otherwise cooperated with the Japanese) was 
overwhelmingly viewed as illegitimate. 132 Indeed, police power had infiltrated and 
permeated throughout the lives of everyday Koreans during the colonial period and the 
utilization of brutal tactics, torture, and summary punishments, on the spot executions 
included, proved immeasurable to Japan’s successful rule of more than 30 years.133 
General distrust and animosity of homegrown Rightists was so much that in order to 
obtain at least some semblance of legitimacy they had to look outside of Korea—
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choosing exiled nationalists and staunch anti-communists such as Rhee Syngman and 
Kim Ku to lead their cause.  
In the wake of such turmoil, a number of both formal and informal protective 
institutions emerged—many of which were organized prior to and in preparation for the 
arrival of the Americans in the South. The most conspicuous was established by the 
politically inclusive Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI)—
headed by moderate Yo Un Hyung and anchored by left leaning People’s Committees.134 
The CPKI (later changing its name to the Korean People’s Republic)—formed the first 
de-facto government in the post-colonial era and had done so with surprising success. 
Paramount on the to-do list was restoring order. Untrusting of the then existing police the 
Committee harnessed existing youth groups (and recruited more from the vast supply of 
the unemployed) for security purposes, with the intended policy of utilizing the Corps as 
the main enforcement agency and the police as adjuncts.135 By August 25th, 1945, (just 
two weeks after the day of liberation), some 2,000 youths had been organized in Seoul, 
with over 140 branches in areas outside the capital—exercising de-facto sovereignty over 
the peninsula.136 Despite the organization’s effort to obtain official recognition, US 
officials openly opposed the Korean People’s Republic and opted instead to cooperate 
with the conservative and unpopular Korean Democratic Party (KDP)—a group which 
was led by exiled nationalists and conservatives and one which was aligned with the 
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tainted Korean National Police (KNP).137 Whatever order had been obtained by the CPKI 
was lost with the US Military’s refusal of recognition—a move which in no small part 
exacerbated the already tense relations between the Rightists and Leftists.138 
Presumably bolstered by the presence and support of American forces, the 
Rightists began to mobilize and consolidate their own paramilitary youth wings in order 
to compete with the more numerous and better organized Leftist groups. Compete is the 
key word there. Up to that point there were no real state actors, rather, a plethora of state 
seekers all vying for supremacy. Although the Rightists had the police at their disposal, 
they were significantly outnumbered. The Leftists in turn, without a ready-made police 
force at hand, had to recruit anyone ready and willing to join. By December of 1945, the 
umbrella organization referred to as the General Alliance of Young Men for Korean 
Association of Independence (GAYMKAI), comprised of 43 linked factions was formed. 
This was a group which posed a direct challenge to the Leftist’s own consolidated 
General Alliance of Joeson Youth (GAJY)—with staunch anti-communist, Rhee 
Syngman, and nationalist Kim Ku (leader of the Korean Provisional Government), as the 
president and vice president respectively.139 By 1947, 34 young men’s associations—of 
Leftist and Rightist political orientations—had officially registered before the Joint 
Commission.140 While officially registered, the violent activities these groups engaged 
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in—both protective and offensive—remained unofficially sanctioned (albeit not 
inconspicuously) by their respective political leaders.  
Under the US military occupation of the South, the buildup of Rightist 
paramilitary forces went hand in hand with the buildup of the Korean National Police and 
other forces tasked with the responsibility of bolstering the anti-Communist agenda. 
While the exact numbers are unclear, accounts have the police force prior to the Japanese 
surrender at 23,000—with 40% having been staffed by predominately low ranking 
Koreans. Japanese personnel were eventually replaced by Koreans and by mid 1946 the 
overall numbers had increased to 25,000. By the change of guard to Korean control in 
1948, the KNP numbered an estimated 34,000.141 While the KNP were the main official 
elements of coercion the violent youth groups, supported and recruited by various 
Rightist factions (and at times directly by the USAMGIK), were far from insignificant. 
To suggest that the recruitment of militant youth groups was merely a function of a weak 
(but politically partisan police force) would however be incorrect. Based on his research 
on the American occupation in Cholla Nam Do (South Cholla Province), an area known 
for having especially strong Leftist support, Meade (1951) notes that the two Rightist 
political parties—the Democrats and the Unification Party—pooled their efforts with the 
paramilitary youths adopting the Unification label, so as to be able to continue their 
terrorist activities with the “odium falling upon only one of the rightist groups.”142 Such 
strategic games were employed throughout the peninsula. Although there were numerous 
youth organizations of varying sizes and political orientations arguably the most 
notorious factions were the Korea Democratic Young Men’s Association (KDYA)—led 
                                                      
141 IBID. 142-143.  




by future assemblyman and well known and aforementioned political gangster Kim Du-
hwan, the Northwest Youth Corps (NWYC) and the USAMGIK funded Korean 
National/Racial Youth Corps.143  
Rightist youth bands were largely free to utilize brutal tactics against the leftists 
and suspected communists. For example, the gangster turned nationalist, Kim Du-Han, 
unleashed his youth faction on April of 1947 and captured, beat and tortured 13 leftists 
who had been distributing anti-Rhee Syngman literature (working on behalf of the South 
Korean Labor Party (SKLP) and under the direction of Chung Chin Yung). With one 
member eventually escaping and notifying the Seoul District Offices, officials soon 
arrived in order to investigate—finding two leftists dead—with Kim Du-Hwan and his 
followers readily admitting the murder. So great was the public outcry that the police 
were forced to act and arrest those deemed responsible. However, despite Kim Du-
Hwan’s own confession as well as the accounts of the surviving victims, the Seoul 
District Court found insufficient evidence for a murder conviction, and instead fined Kim 
Du-Hwan 200,000 yen—the equivalent of two cartons of cigarettes on the black 
market.144Although Kim was eventually re-tried by the US Military Government and 
handed out a death sentence in March of 1948 (commuted to life in prison), by August of 
1948, after the end of the US occupation, Kim was given amnesty by the newly elected 
President Rhee.145 Following the Korean War, Kim would eventually go on to serve as 
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the Chief of the Investigation Section of the Korean Youth Corps, Rhee’s personal body 
guard and as a member of the National Assembly in the 1960s.146 
Of course, the same lenient treatment did not extend to the leftists who were 
handed out hard sentences for crimes much less brutal than Kim Du-Han’s. Leftists for 
example were often handed out multiple year sentences, some accompanied with hard 
labor for attending rallies, giving unauthorized speeches, or in other instances, being 
suspected of going against the provisional government.147 Furthermore, Meade (1951) 
reiterates that “Leftist terrorism was punished by fines and imprisonment, while rightist 
goon squads were gently chided and warned not to repeat their offenses.”148 
To suggest that the USAGMIK and other state actors (the KNP included) merely 
afforded Rightist youth bands preferential treatment, or otherwise couldn’t control them 
because of they lacked capacity, would be incorrect. Rather, such ‘paramilitary’ youth 
groups acted largely as auxiliary forces to state forces—with many of the groups having 
their headquarters either adjacent to, or directly inside police stations.149 For instance, 
according to Henderson (1968), “gang and boss were less dominators compared to their 
role as the instruments of domination in government’s confrontation with the masses.”150 
In a similar fashion, CIA reports stated that: “The enforced alliance of the police with the 
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Right has been reflected in the cooperation of the police with Rightist youth groups for 
the purpose of completely suppressing the Leftist activity”151.  
Cases that illustrate the collaborative relationships between the Rightists 
paramilitary youth squads, the KNP, and the USAMGIK are numerous. This was 
especially so following the 1946 Fall Riots in which, initially, railway laborers (voicing 
opposition to the daily wage system), followed by electric, printing, postal, and those 
working in other industries, went on strike. Students as well as a number of government 
workers soon joined the protests that occurred throughout the South. In response, the 
Military Government (initially believing the riots to have been agitated by Leftists and 
Communists groups) ordered the suppression of the strike by force—in which members 
of the KNP and Rightist paramilitary squads worked side by side. For instance, in 
Yongsan Railway Station in Seoul, 3,000 armed policemen and 1,000 members of youth 
squads were deployed to suppress the activities of the strikers and protect right-wing 
union members returning to work—ultimately arresting 2,000 strikers while injuring 60 
through the use of gunfire, clubs, and rocks. For example, Robinson (1960) noted that 
Yongsan and the surrounding areas had the appearance of a battlefield—with armed 
gangs of hired thugs (operating with the complicity of the KNP) roaming the streets and 
industrial areas with the “announced purpose of breaking up any Leftist agitation”152. 
Among the hired thugs was Kim Du-hwan’s KDYA group, with rifles and hand grenades 
supplied by the KNP. Besides suppressing strikers, they led attacks against various Leftist 
organizations—such as ransacking the headquarters of the Joseon Communist Party, the 
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executive offices of the Central People’s Committee, and the Jayu Shinmun (Free News) 
building, while beating the staff and destroying (as well as confiscating) property and 
documents along the way. Moreover, 3,000 KDYA members, again supplied with 
weapons and other materials by the KNP and the US Army, were dispatched to locations 
outside of Seoul—helping to recapture and suppress further riots in areas such as 
Goryeong, Seognju, Waegon, Yecheon and Yeongcheon.153 
Arguably the most violent, or at least most notorious of paramilitary youth groups 
was the anticommunist Northwest Young Men’s Association (NWYMA)—a group 
established officially (though with earlier roots) in November of 1946 and one which the 
CIC established liaison with (among other established rightist organizations) in order to 
capitalize on their unique comparative advantages. Indeed, the links between the US 
Military and the NWYMA are quite clear, with the CIC going so far as stating:  
“The CIC could not perform its counterespionage mission alone, for reasons 
attributed in part to language hurdles and absence of professional agents. Of 
particular value to CIC were members of the North West Young Men’s 
Association, NWYMA, a youth organization composed of men who had fled 
from North Korea. All members had had to have suffered personally at the 
hands of the Communists. Unfortunately this organization was heavily inclined 
towards brutality in its attempts to even the score with its enemies; but the 
members knew enough about the top North Korean Reds to make it imperative 
that they be utilized in counterespionage operations under strict CIC 
supervision.”154 
 
Both independently and under the auspices of the CIC, the NWYMA—an organization 
which the CIC themselves labeled as a top terrorist organization—conducted a range of 
anticommunist activities including counterespionage missions throughout the peninsula, 
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censoring refugees from North Korea, arranging for jobs for refugees, broadcasting 
anticommunist messages to the North, and jointly policing areas with the KNP.155 In one 
instance which highlights the types of activities carried out under the auspices of the 
Military Government, the CIC reported that:  
“When WOJG Browing was in charge of the Special Squad, an informant came 
to him with the news that he could pick up some SKLP (South Korean Labor 
Party) documents if Browning was interested. The Korean was given enthusiastic 
approval and went on his way. A few hours later he backed up a truck to CIC 
offices and deposited two safes, still locked and full of documents. The Korean 
had rounded up an untold number of strong-arm specialists from the North West 
Young Men’s Association and barged into the SKLP Headquarters to seize the 
documents. Of course, the SKLP had much to say about American police tactics, 
but the documents and the safes were never returned.”156 
 
 Perhaps the most egregious pre-war actions taken by the NWYA occurred both 
prior and during the Cheju Insurgency. Cheju-do, an island roughly 60 miles (100 km) 
southwest of South Cholla province, of which it was once administratively part of until 
1947—was controlled from 1945 until early 1948 by the left leaning People’s 
Committees—having consolidated power on the island through armed clashes with 
Rightists groups in the aftermath of liberation. If the Rightists had legitimacy concerns on 
the mainland, with roughly 80% of the island population supporting or at least 
sympathizing with the Leftists and Communists—they had a full-blown legitimacy crisis 
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on their hands on Cheju-do.157 Furthermore, the island had a long history of insurrection 
and rebellions against mainland rule.  
Initially peaceful between 1945 and 1947, sporadic violence soon ensued, 
precipitated by a number of factors including: a poor economy with increased tax burdens, 
a once cooperative US occupation forces whose attitude towards the leftists hardened in 
the wake of insurgencies throughout the peninsula, and quite significantly the arrival of a 
newly appointed ultra-rightist military governor, Yu Hae-jin, who was un-sympathetic to 
the committee, dictatorial, and ruthless.158 Indeed, Governor Yu—a staunch supporter of 
Rhee Syngman, staffed the already unpopular KNP with mainlanders and unleashed the 
NWYA, a group which operated according to Merrill (1980) “without even the minimal 
constraints that, in theory, limited the police.”159 Further exacerbating the tense powder 
keg-like situation were low police salaries and a “volunteer” rightist terrorist group 
whose livelihood was dependent upon shakedowns, blackmail, protection rackets, and 
other “gangster-like” activities which put the KNP, the NWYA, the locally-recruited 
constabulary, and the islanders in an on-going cycle of terror and counter-terror.160 
With conditions apt for rebellion, full-scale insurgency was ignited shortly following 
the March 1st, 1948 announcement of unpopular separate elections in the South and 
subsequent rightist crackdowns on demonstrations. Violence on the part of both the 
Rightists and Leftists was extreme. For instance, Cumings (2010) for notes that “In Hagui 
village, for example, right-wing youths captured Mun, a pregnant woman aged twenty 
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one and who faced allegations of being married to an insurgent, took her away from her 
house where they stabbed her severally, an act that made her lose her pregnancy in the 
end. She was left to die with her baby half-delivered. Other women were serially raped, 
often in front of villagers, and then blown up with a grenade in the vagina.”161 In one 
instance, four American advisers witnessed the execution of seventy-six villagers—
among them five women and numerous children—by the NWYA and supervised by the 
police.162 The guerrillas perpetrated their own anomic retribution through the raiding of 
villages and the capturing and killing (at times by hanging or beheading) of Rightist 
youth members, police and suspected collaborators.163 
Insurgent forces alone were estimated to be anywhere between 3,000 to 4,000 
members in strength, and were more so bolstered by popular support. Government forces, 
at the outset ineffective, consisting of roughly 450 KNP, hundreds of Rightist youth 
members, and an ‘understrength’of sporadically unreliable constabulary. Reinforcements 
from all southern provinces were quickly mobilized and sent to bolster the weak 
government forces—with as many as 1,700 police and 800 constabulary troops being 
sent. 164  As the insurrection ensued, the recruitment of mainland forces for the 
counterinsurgency proved in part disastrous—with the well-documented Yosu Rebellion 
being sparked by the violent refusal of the elements of the 6th and 14th Regiments to 
participate in the suppression campaign—a rebellion which quickly spread throughout the 
South.165 By April 1949, resistance forces were curtailed and order essentially restored—
with estimated causalities across the island being anywhere between 30,000 to 80,000 
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people—substantial by any measure but especially so when you consider the total 
population to have been as low as 300,000 in the late 1940s.166 
 Where the US Military capitalized on the pre-existence of the NWYA and other 
Rightist paramilitary groups, the Korean National Youth Corps (later the Racial Youth 
Corps) presents a case in which the USAMGIK specifically (though secretly) sponsored, 
financed and supplied a non-state paramilitary youth group—modeled after Chiang Kai-
shek’s “Blue Shirts” and one which was loyal and directly accountable to the Military 
Government.167 The Military Government in 1946 selected Yi Pǒm-sǒk as the head of the 
organization—a former commander within the Korean Restoration Army in China and 
one who had worked closely with American Intelligence and the Kuomintang forces. As 
head of the training facilities Dr. An Ho-sang, a German educated admirer of Hitler’s 
paramilitary Youth (Jugend) was chosen. Based on the fact that it was ostensibly created 
in order to have an anti-Communist force in place in the event the negotiations with the 
Russians failed, Henderson (1968) notes that secrecy and the youth association title were 
employed to avoid protests.168 Along with other Rightists youth associations (and the 
KNP) they were active in terrorism, strike breaking, suppression of uprisings and other 
anti-Communist activities throughout the southern peninsula.169 
 Having established himself as the uncontested leader of the Rightists, Rhee 
Syngman assumed the pinnacle of formal power after the May 10th separate elections—
elections that took place under significant security measures. One measure was the 
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creation of Community Protection Associations—police auxiliary forces composed of 
Rightist youth members tasked with maintaining order:  
Armed with clubs and axes, they patrolled the villages, proud of the 
government’s “favor” to them and anxious to display their new status by 
interfering in the lives of ordinary citizens. Cases of police or youth groups 
beating, threatening, robbing, blackmailing, and removing the ration cards of 
those who would not register were reported to UNTOK.170 
 
In addition to bringing about a transfer of power from the USAMGIK to Rhee Syngman 
(through a nearly unanimous National Assembly vote), Communism was officially 
outlawed under the National Security Law, which provided the KNP and their auxiliary 
forces virtually unlimited power to root out opposition.171 According to Henderson 
(1968), the bill was “…so vague as to encourage utilization of the judiciary by the 
executive to eliminate political enemies. The judiciary as an instrument of executive 
predominance, not defender of rights or instrument of balance of powers forthwith 
became even more active than under colonial rule.”172 The arbitrarily employed Security 
Law and domination of the Judiciary by the executive (through intimidation) proved 
especially valuable to Rhee given that factionalism and competing loyalties was and 
continues to be resilient characteristic of Korean politics. Through it, Rhee was able to 
effectively purge or otherwise threaten into compliance a number of National Assembly 
members with divided loyalties and thus dominate the legislature. Furthermore, Rhee 
attempted to consolidate his power by absorbing all Rightist youth associations into a 
single national group termed the Korean Youth Association (KYA)—a group which was 
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accorded official government status and public funds.173 When the National Youth Corps, 
a group characterized as ‘clearly loyal’ to and under then Prime Minister Yi Pǒm-sǒk 
(who was simultaneously made the minister of defense), delayed in joining the KYA, 
Rhee asked Yi to either dissolve the organization or resign from power. Yi chose the 
former option, with the KNYA formally disbanding in 1949.174 In the same year, the 
recalcitrant Kim Ku, (then in opposition to Rhee) was assassinated by an army lieutenant 
who was initially convicted of the murder but was shortly thereafter pardoned and 
promoted to lieutenant colonel by Rhee Syngman.175 Despite Rhee’s moves, in addition 
to the expansion of forces, control was tentative at best; with on-going guerrilla actions, 
eventual fraternal war erupted in June of 1950.   
4.3: Consolidation of Power and Rise of a Contentious Society: 1952-1960 
Having been re-elected in 1952 Rhee Syngman survived the war politically intact 
as the republic’s first president and continued to rule in an increasingly difficult and 
competitive environment. In 1951, Rhee called upon Yi Pǒm-sǒk to set up the Liberal 
Party (Chayu-dang)—a party which penetrated deeply into Korean society through its 
various core social organizations, one of which was the KNP which remained key to 
Rhee’s machine. Their loyalty being ensured through the Liberal Party’s having control 
over police personnel’s origin and survival.176 In order to further consolidate Rhee’s 
power, he ‘rewarded’ Yi and his followers by purging them through various methods 
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between 1952 and 1953. Furthermore he formally dissolved all officially sanctioned 
youth groups on September 10th, 1953—effectively ending them as significant 
independent political players. Rhee additionally instructed the Liberal Party to ensure that 
no former member of the National Youth Corps, a group still loyal to Yi Pǒm-sǒk, would 
ever gain office in the assembly.177 Through such measures and the façade of democratic 
rule, Rhee was able to dominate the political scene from his initial election triumph in 
1948 through 1955—with virtually no social institution effectively being able operate 
without providing him and his Liberal Party unconditional support.178 
With little room for doubt however, Rhee continued to utilize his autocratic and at 
times, brutal style of governance, and increasingly so, given a number of factors which 
ratcheted up the competitiveness of South Korean politics following the war. To begin 
with there was a gradual process of urbanization coupled with increases in mass 
education. In 1952 roughly 17.2% of the population lived in cities of 50,000 or more. In 
1955 this increased to 24.5 % and by 1960, the year in which Rhee and the Liberal Party 
collapsed, urban residents accounted for a significant 28% (7 million) of the 
population.179 With respect to education, from 1948 to 1960 Korea’s university level 
institutions rose from 31 to 62 with enrollment increasing from 24,000 to 97,819. 
Secondary schools expanded as well, with 97 institutions in 1945 soaring to 357 in 1960. 
Furthermore, feeding the increasingly anti-government populace was a massive 
expansion in communications and mass media, with 600 newspapers and periodicals 
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being registered by 1960, and up to 1,444 by 1961—staffed by roughly 100,000 
reporters.180 
As if growth in urbanization, education and expansions in communications were 
not enough, further pressure was put on Rhee’s political machine through the 
development of a stronger, more united and coherent ‘grand coalition’ of opposition 
under the Democratic Party (Minju-dang) banner in 1955 which offered the population a 
clear choice of who or who not to vote for and thus exacerbating the polarization of 
Korean politics. That the urban populace favored the opposition was clear given both 
Rhee’s and the Liberal Party’s poor electoral results—despite widespread intimidation 
and electoral manipulation. In the executive election of 1956 for example, Rhee Syngman 
received only 33.8% of the Seoul vote compared to 56% in the nation. In the 1958 
National Assembly elections, only 13 out of 126 seats gained by the Liberal Party came 
from cities of 50,000 or more, while the Democrats received 43 out of 79 seats from the 
same cities.181 
On the heels of political gains over the course of a number of elections, Assembly 
opposition members and budget conscious economic-aid authorities were able to reduce 
the inflated police force—having reached a peak of 75,000 during the war—down to 
40,000 in July of 1955, and despite continued Liberal Party objections, down to 39,000 in 
1958. While the KNP was reduced, the state’s war-expanded military became the 
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preeminent public source of force. This was a key development given that the military 
was able to maintain semi-independence from the central government.182 
As in the pre-war election, the KNP and now unofficial (though Rhee sanctioned) 
Rightist youth groups were mobilized and present in voting booths during the 1960 
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections (with two separate voting tickets) ensuring 
that voters cast their ballots for Rhee and members of his Liberal Party. In addition to 
outright intimidation and coercion, ballot counts were manipulated or openly fabricated, 
which was made easier due to the election centers being located within provincial 
headquarters.183 Of the election, the Korea Report noted:  
Democratic rallies were prohibited throughout the nation. Specific 
instructions were sent by the Home Ministry to police chiefs throughout the 
nation specifying the exact plurality by which Dr. Rhee and Mr. Lee were to 
be elected. Hundreds of thousands of pre-marked ballots accompanied these 
instructions, and these were dutifully stuffed into the ballot boxes on election 
day. Hoodlums smashed up Democratic Party offices and beat up 
Democratic election workers and sympathizers. In the country areas, voters 
were compelled by the police to go to the ballots in groups of three, one of 
whom was an arm-banded “Supervisor” whose duty was to check 
supposedly secret ballots before they were cast.184 
 
The results of the election were unsurprising with Rhee receiving 88.7% of the 
votes185 while Yi Ki-bung—the Liberal Party’s Vice-Presidential candidate received 
8,225,000 votes compared to the Democratic Party’s Chang Myǒn receiving 1,850,000.186 
That the election was manipulated was not lost on the vast majority of Koreans. Viewing 
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the results as illegitimate, citizens began demonstrating against the illegal elections in 
mass, especially so following the killing of eight protesters by the KNP in Masan on 
election day and the subsequent discovery of a 16 year old victim with a police tear-gas 
shell lodged in his skull floating in Masan Harbor the following day. Both acts sparked 
three days of virtually uncontrollable rioting and, yet again, leading to more casualties in 
the same city.187 Newspapers—the vast majority of which condemned the killing of 
students and other protestors—quickly spread information on numerous cases of electoral 
violations. Other demonstrations occurred, many of which targeted police officers and 
their stations, as well as the burning of the offices of government propaganda agencies, 
Rightist youth organizations and other government-aligned organizations such as the 
Seoul Sinmun (Seoul Newspaper).188 
In one significant instance (among many similar type actions) the Ich’on Pa—a 
police-protected organized crime group which operated the lucrative Dongdaemun (East 
Gate) market in Seoul was mobilized to attack protesting Korea University students on 
April 18th.189 The following day, the date from which the uprising derives its name, “Sa-Il 
Gu” (April, 19), some 200 demonstrators were killed by government aligned forces thus 
precipitating further demonstrations with which the Rhee and the Liberal Party, having 
exhausted their coercive forces, were unable to contain. Despite having called for martial 
law the military (under United Nations Command) stood by, merely protecting against 
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destruction of property and further bloodshed. On April 21st, in response to the continued 
chaos, Rhee’s Cabinet resigned. It only took five days from that point for Rhee to 
capitulate—handing over power to an interim government under Hǒ Chǒng, followed by 
a short but tumultuous flirtation with democracy under Prime Minister Chang Myǒn’s 
parliamentary government, who was in turn overthrown in the 1961 coup d’état led by 
Park Chong-hee.190 
4.4: Conclusion 
 In August of 1945 Japan’s 35-year colonial rule of the peninsula abruptly ended, 
sending Korea into what can be largely described as a stateless period. State seekers, 
including the USAMGIK, supplemented their weak forces through the recruitment and 
training of private citizens able and willing to utilize violence means. Although Rhee 
Syngman had attempted to consolidate all groups into one large institution loyal and 
subservient to his cause, state capacity at that time, coupled with an increasingly powerful 
society in favor of change, limited his ability to do so. The era of collaboration between 
political gangsters, nationalists, paramilitaries and state actors to varying extents would 
thus continue through the post-Rhee period, though to a much less degree. As the 
following chapter will explain, although Park Chung-hee was able to largely enhance, 
and thus dominate the market for force through his public sources of coercion, he was 
nonetheless forced to operate under at least the promise of democracy during the first half 
of his tenure, lest he ignite the societal forces which plaid a significant role in bringing 
about the end of Rhee Syngman’s regime. The logic driving collaboration between 1961 
and 1970 is argued thus to be a function of normative concerns given the state’s high 
                                                      




level of capacity yet low level of autonomy. Once formal authoritarianism was instituted 
by Park Chung-hee however, state-strength in Korea shifted to one which was both high 
in capacity and autonomy. In short, the state no longer needed such collaborative 
relationships to the extent they had in previous periods of Korean history—such 
relationships were thus severed until they were re-connected in the mid-1980s by Park’s 






























As elucidated in the previous chapter, between 1945 and 1960, collusion between 
state seekers, state actors, and non-state specialists in violence alike occurred largely 
under the logic of capacity. In short, that tumultuous period was the big push towards the 
development of what is today the Republic of Korea. Similar to the myriad of European 
and Latin American cases, aspiring state seekers in Korea utilized a number of mixed 
strategies which included buying, subjecting and outright eliminating private powers.  
That period, although not theoretically puzzling, paved the way for continued (though not 
linear in time) state-criminal collaboration.  
It is the intent of this discussion is to anchor the following two chapters, which 
focus on two of the main areas were state-non-state collaboration in the market for force 
occurs in the present, Korean context. This chapter first includes a brief but important 
description of the political dynamics during the two military dictatorship periods of Park 
(1961-1979) and Chun (1979-1987), with careful attention being paid to the issues of 
state-capacity and state-civil society relationships that evolved over the course of their 




junctures’ in Korea’s move towards democracy will discussed. Such junctures it will be 
argued, have significantly shaped the then, and currently decision-making options and 
choices of Korea’s political elite, and thus warrant careful inclusion into the explanation 
for the state’s turn towards the market for private coercion.  
As will be explained, once Park Chung-hee ascended to power following his 
successful coup d’état in 1961, he went about quickly consolidating his power through a 
number of campaigns aimed at his opposition. Such campaigns included massive police 
raids on the once powerful organized crime and paramilitary groups which had helped to 
secure the previous regime. Although the Park regime continued to utilize non-state 
sources of violence as his power expanded, following the implementation of formal 
authoritarianism in 1971, the systematic use of such groups largely ceased to exist, as the 
theory put forth in this study would predict. In other words, wary of the same societal 
forces that forced the capitulation of Rhee Syngman, and under the façade of democratic 
rule, Park Chung-hee relied on non-state forces under both a normative framework, and 
to a less degree, under a logic of capacity.  
Once both high levels of capacity and autonomy had been achieved in 1971, Park 
Chung-hee effectively broke the state-non-state collaborative relationship. The 
relationship remained in large part severed until the practice was renewed by Chun Doo 
Hwan in the areas of labor protest suppression and forced evictions. Chun Doo Hwan’s 
revitalization of the collaborative practice, despite inheriting a state which boasted a 
highly developed coercive capacity, as will be argued, was the result of the state’s rapidly 
declining autonomy.  Most critically, Korea’s population had rapidly transformed from a 




and able to impart significant pressure when deemed necessary. In short, although 
Korea’s move towards free and fair democratic elections would have to wait until 1987, 
the forces in favor democracy had already begun to shape the decisions of the political 
elite. The move back towards state-non-state collaborative relationships in the market for 
force then, reflects the state’s need to specifically provide public goods in the form of 
cheap labor and redevelopment (goods which the growing middle class demanded), while 
at the same time conveniently avoiding punishment from Korea’s societal forces (and 
international condemnation) for the use of coercion needed to provide those very goods 
that were demanded. 
5.2: The Park Chung-Hee Regime: 1961-1979 
 Despite having dominated much of the political scene since 1948, Rhee 
Syngman’s regime (1948-1960) faced growing social pressures due in no small part to an 
increasingly urbanized, educated and contentious populace and relatedly, the growth of a 
more powerful opposition party (Minju-dang). In the face of expanding protests and 
having lost the support of the police and military, Rhee was forced to step down from 
power on April 21st, 1960. Rhee’s regime was followed by a short interim government 
period under Hǒ Chǒng which saw the transfer of power to Prime Minister Chang Myǒn. 
In 1961 Park Chong-Hee carried out a successful coup d’état and led the country between 
then up and until his assassination in 1979.191  
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 Park Chung Hee effectively took control and established an emergency 
government, and in doing so, promised to rid Korea of corruption, spur economic growth 
and instill national pride.192 In June of 1961 the military regime declaring itself the 
‘Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), proclaimed the ‘Law Regarding 
Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction’. The proclamation included the 
following six pledges: (1) “oppose communism”; (2) “support the United States”; (3) 
“reunify the country”; (4) “eliminate corruption and eradicate other social evils”; (5) 
create a “self-sustaining economy”, and; (6) “return to our proper military duties.”193 In 
other words, Park promised to instill order and answer society’s demands for democratic 
rule, their preference for such rule having been vociferously demonstrated in the process 
of forcing Rhee to step down from power in 1960.   
 In carrying out the first and third pledges, within days following the coup the 
police arrested the ‘highest profile’ gangsters and leaders of criminal groups, 167 of 
which were paraded down Seoul’s main avenues under military escort, wearing nametags 
and carrying signs stating “I am a gangster, I will accept the people’s judgment.”194 
Within weeks nearly 14,000 gangsters and other types of criminals were arrested. The 
official reasons given for the campaigns were to rid society from groups blamed of social 
disorder.195 The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Report (2004) (hereinafter ‘TRR’) 
notes in general that such anti-criminal campaigns have often proven successful in 
winning citizen approval.196 Public support would undoubtedly be useful, if not necessary 
in Park’s subsequent presidential bids in 1963, 67 and 71 given the façade of democratic 
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rule during that time period. Furthermore, although Rhee had been ousted, his Liberal 
Party cronies were still around, and given that they had widely utilized such criminal 
groups to maintain their grip on the state, going after their power bases was not a bad way 
to undermine potential competition to Park’s regime.197  
Over the course of successive campaigns carried out by the military junta the 
once notorious “political gangsters” (chongch’i kkangp’ae) which had once played such a 
prominent role in Korean politics; they were largely removed from holding any 
significant national level influence. And, although there are various accounts of state-
gangster collaboration during election times prior to 1972 (when authoritarianism was 
officially promulgated); such accounts remain few and far between.198  
Among the ‘criminals’ were elite businessmen charged with illegal profiteering. 
Woo (1991) notes that essentially anyone who had profited during the Rhee regime could 
be considered as “illicit profiteers,” which were defined as the following: those who had 
(1) “Illicitly earned profits totaling more than 100 million by either purchasing or renting 
publically owned properties”; (2) “Obtained loans or purchases of more than $100,000 
worth of government or bank owned foreign exchange”; (3) “Provided political funds of 
more than 50 million in return for bank loans”; (4) “Earned profits of more than 200 
million in the process of contracting or bidding for public works or commodity trade in 
an illegal way”; (5) “Earned profits of more than 200 million by monopolizing the 
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purchase or allocation of foreign exchange”; (6) “Avoided taxes of more than 200 
million,” and; (7) “Illegally transferred their wealth abroad.”199  
On the rationale for such business leader targeting, Woo explains that Park had 
summoned the 10 major business elites and struck a ‘historic compromise.’ In lieu of 
criminal prosecution, the business leaders would be obliged to set up industrial firms with 
which a portion of the profits would be ‘donated’ to the government. Thus, according to 
Woo, the ‘compromise’ occasioned the creation of ‘Korea Inc,’ where the state and big 
businesses would “share the same destiny; prosper or parish.”200 
Although ‘criminals’ and business leaders alike took a hard hit, the target was no 
only them. By proclaiming “anti-communism” as the state’s main priority, roughly 3,300 
pro-Communists were additionally arrested. The following year the Political Purification 
Law was promulgated, under which 4,367 persons were barred from political activity for 
six years unless they underwent further screening—of which only seventy-four were 
cleared. 201  The bureaucracy was furthermore affected, with roughly 35,000 of the 
240,000 civil servants being dismissed.202 Similar purges affected the police and military 
as well.203 
 In further consolidating the military junta’s power, the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was formed under the leadership of future Prime Minister 
Kim Jong-Pil. Beginning with a corps of 3,000 officers, by the late 1960s, their numbers 
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would reach 370,000 employees.204 Along with the military, the KCIA would go on to 
play a tremendously influential role in the Korean social, political and economic arenas 
throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s.   
 In 1963, owing in part due to the pressure of the US, the SCNR under Park’s 
leadership was disbanded. Lie (1989) argues that given the large amount of aid flowing 
from the U.S., the military government could not afford to jeopardize its relationship with 
its chief benefactor (which tied aid to the holding of elections) and thus bowed to the U.S. 
demands for an electoral democracy.205 Although South Korea was hardly a liberal 
democracy following the 1963 elections, Chang (2008) notes that there was at least the 
‘semblance’ of civilian rule with the establishment of democratic institutions, including 
separate and independent three main arms of government; executive, legislative, and 
judicial.206  
Notwithstanding the accounts of Park and his supporters having manipulated 
both the 1963 and 1967 elections in his favor (and presumably the 1971 elections as 
well),207 in addition to having a tremendous advantage over his opposition, the margins of 
victory for Park were slim.208 In other words, despite Park’s tremendous amount of 
coercive power under his fingertips, repression, having been justified as being necessary 
due to North Korea’s on-going threat, was not enough to ensure victory. Thus, according 
to Lie (1998), economic growth and anticommunism became the “twin ideological pillars” 
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with which Park’s power and thus, legitimacy, depended upon.209 As will be discussed in 
further depth in the following case studies, such economic growth in large part depended 
upon maintaining low wages and massive investments in infrastructure improvements. 
Through a series of 5-year economic plans, South Korea averaged 7.8 percent gains in 
GNP between 1962 and 1966. By the end of 1971, GNP growth reached 10.5 percent.210  
Between 1963 and 1971, Korea did in fact operate under the façade of 
democratic rule. This changed however, with Park’s move towards full-fledged 
authoritarianism with the passing of the Yushin Constitution in 1972. The new 
constitution provided Park (who had already amended presidential term limits in 1971) 
with the power to appoint one-third of the National Assembly as well as central and local 
judges, not to mention his cabinet and prime minister. Although formal laws were 
arguably a mere formality, the National Security and anticommunist statutes were still in 
effect and were utilized to deal with any form of dissent. Emergency decrees were 
furthermore a favorite tool. Significant to this study, an emergency decree in 1973 made 
all work strikes illegal. Declaration no. 9 furthermore made any criticism to the 
government a national security violation.211 
 The obvious question stemming out of the discussion above is why would Park 
return toward autocratic rule? In the wake of economic decline, Park’s political 
competition had been gaining ground (Kim Dae Jung nearly won the 1971 election) and 
labor disputes were up to 1,656 in 1971.212 In addition to the rising protests not only by 
labor but also by students as well, there existed intra-party factions ‘centered around four 
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“bosses,” of which some were in favor of pushing power over the Kim, Jong Pil. 
Furthermore, in the summer of 1971, there was a mutiny of twenty green berets who 
demanded an end to Park’s talks with North Korea. The situation was described by Woo 
as being “a crisis from below and incoherence at the top,” which in turn created doubt 
over whether or not the bureaucratic authoritarian system could continue as it stood.213 
Woo further notes that “In that confusing moment, business was the pivotal force that 
finally tipped the balance in favor of a full-fledged authoritarian system.” The turn, then, 
stemmed the inability of a liberal political regime to respond to the demands of business 
which were seeking to be bailed out while shifting the financial burden elsewhere.214 Park 
gave in to business and in August 1971, he announced the bailout by proclaiming an 
immediate moratorium on all payments of corporate debt owed to the private domestic 
market—of which the moratorium was to last for three years. The result was that Korean 
business was “resuscitated overnight.”215 As noted by Cumings (1997), “It was a short 
move from August 3rd, 1971, to the garrison decree of October and to the Yushin system 
that evolved over the next year.216  
The decades long transition then, from the military junta (1961-1963) to quasi-
democratic rule (1963-1971), and back to full-fledged authoritarianism in 1972 resulted 
in, again according to Woo (1991), a “state that was iron-fisted at home and, therefore, 
capable of restructuring domestic economy and supporting sustained growth.”217 Between 
1971 and 1978 (the year preceding Park’s assignation), the regime maintained an 
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impressive average of 9.8 percent GNP growth rates. Over the same time period, GNP 
per capita furthermore rose from US $288 to US $1392.218  
In addition to the economic gains, mass education was positively affected as well. 
From 1960 to 1980 for instance, the middle and high school student enrollments 
increased from 802,000 to 4,169,000. College level enrollment as well expanded from 
101,000 to 602,000 over the same period. 10 years later the number of college students 
would surpass one million.219 This is quite imperative given that students had played a 
major leading role in the movement which in no small part helped to topple the Rhee 
Syngman regime in 1960.220 Furthermore, according to Chang (2008), students were the 
most salient group in the democracy movement during the 1970s, having accounted for 
32% of all protests during that time period (followed by laborers/workers at 17%).221  
  Although the move towards democratic reform would have to wait until 1987, the 
pro-democracy movement didn’t just appear miraculously in the late 1980s. Indeed, 
Chang (2008) argues that while there were pro-democracy cycles during the 1960s, the 
1970s democracy movement became increasingly powerful with the entrance of a range 
of new and expanding social groups, one of which was a progressively politicized and 
enlarged middle class. And although each group had their own issues and grievances, 
much of the dissent focused on Park’s constitutional amendment which removed his term 
limits, the subsequent promulgation of the Yushin Constitution (which formally instituted 
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authoritarianism) and continued repression.222 As argued by Shin and Chang (2011), the 
‘seeds of democracy’ were planted in the repressive context of the Park regime, seeds 
which would eventually grow and work to galvanize social groups from a variety of 
sectors in their collective push towards democracy.223  
 Arguably, the most significant event prior to the assassination of Park Chung Hee 
occurred as a result of the brutal suppression of female workers of Y.H. Trading 
Company, a garment manufacturer in Seoul. The workers began protesting against their 
sweatshop conditions and in response the government promptly sent in the police to 
suppress the demonstration, of which 200 workers were brutally beaten. 190 of the 
workers then fled the factory to the headquarters of the opposition National Democratic 
Party; the party led by future president Kim Young Sam, and held a hunger strike. Three 
days later, the state responded predictably again by sending in 1,000 riot police in the 
middle of the night, killing one worker and injuring 100 others.224   
 As a result of the criticism waged by Kim Young Sam against the Park regime in 
response to the strike suppression, the government, on October 4th, 1979, stripped Kim 
off his Assembly seat which in turn prompted the resignation of the 69 opposition 
Assemblymen in support of Kim Young Sam nine days later. The significance of this 
event was exacerbated given that it ignited further protests throughout the peninsula, 
beginning first in Pusan (in Kim Young Sam’s legislative district) then spreading to 
Masan, Seoul, Taegu and Chongju following the government’s “garrison decree.”225 
Twenty-two days after stripping Kim Young Sam off his assembly seat, in a meeting 
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intended to discuss ways in which to handle the riots, Park Chung Hee was assassinated 
by Kim Jae Kyu, head of the KCIA. Kim had later claimed that he had orchestrated the 
assassination in order to “save the nation from a blood bath that Pak intended to rain 
down upon Masan and Pusan.”226 Regardless of the motives (which are still debated), the 
one shot on Kim Jae Kyu ended the eighteen-year rule of one of South Korea’s most 
controversial leaders.227 
5.3: Post-Park Chung Hee and the Ascension of Chun Doo Hwan 
 Although Kim Jae-Kyu had violently ended the tenure of Park Chung Hee, he 
additionally paved the way for yet another brutal period of dictatorship, this time under 
Chun Doo-hwan. After Park had been killed, power formally transferred to Prime 
Minister Ch’oe Kyu Ha who became acting president of the transitional government 
which in turn declared martial law. Despite instituting martial law however, in November 
of 1970 Ch’oe declared that the constitution would be amended in order to ‘promote 
democracy.’ In the process of doing so, many of the rights which had been stripped off 
several hundred citizens, including professors, journalists, students and other political 
actors (one of which included future president Kim Dae Jung) were reinstated.  
Ch’oe’s administration did not last long however, with General Chun Doo-hwan, 
head of the Defense Security Command, seizing power on December 12, 1979. Chun 
quickly went about suppressing ‘fierce’ demonstrations by students and political leaders 
who demanded the fulfilling of the democratic promises which had been made by the 
government just a few months earlier. By May 1980, Ogle (1990) notes that 
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demonstrations quickly spread across the country, including 200,000 students, 50,000 of 
which were in Seoul.228 Students, as discussed in chapter 3, were largely responsible for 
the ouster of Rhee Syngman in 1960. This fact could not have been far from the minds of 
Chun and his military backers.  
 In consolidating his power, Chun appointed himself Acting Director of the KCIA 
on April 14th, and led a military coup d’état a month later, on May 18th. This move by 
Chun in turn led to further demonstrations, many of which began in Kwangju, located in 
southwest Korea. Initially consisting of 500 people ‘taking to the streets,’ violent 
repression by ‘elite paratroopers’ spurred a widening of those willing to risk their lives in 
protest. Three days later, hundreds of thousands of locals had effectively pushed the 
soldiers from the city. On May 27th, the soldiers again responded with indiscriminate 
violence.229 Although the officially reported casualties, of what is now referred to as the 
“Kwangju Democratic Movement” are 161 deaths, 2,948 injuries with 64 missing, 
Cumings (1997) notes that the there were 2,600 more deaths in that month of May than 
Kwangju’s monthly average of 2,300 deaths per month.230 About the uprising, the 
Presidential Truth Commission Report noted:  
“The citizens sacrificed themselves in an effort to end the Yushin regime and 
block the takeover by the new military group, with the aim of establishing a 
government based on democracy. And indeed, the Gwangju Democratic 
Movement became a turning point in the Korean democratization movement, 
manifested in the confrontation between people who tried to publicize the 
movement to restore democracy, and the authorities who sought to repress 
such efforts. The Gwangju Democratic Movement, recollected by the 
movements that followed it, became a great source of energy for the Korean 
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people as they struggled against the new military regime in the 1980s, and 
eventually led to the Great Civil Resistance of June 1987.”231 
 
According to Woo (1991), repression under Chun was greater than that during the Park 
regime (1961-1979). 232  Of course, the initial conditions that Chun faced were 
significantly different from what Park had to address at the beginning of his tenure in 
1961. Park had effectively moved to Korea from a poor agrarian society to a largely 
urbanized, educated and increasingly contentious one in favor of democracy in just 
eighteen years. And, although Park had died at the hands of the KCIA director he himself 
appointed, his success at engineering the ‘economic miracle’ was at the same time his 
undoing. In the course of his tenure, Park moved to Korea from a weak capacity low 
autonomy state to one which had a tremendous amount of coercive capacity at its 
fingertips. The state’s coercive forces however had to be employed at an ever-increasing 
rate in order to suppress society’s forces in favor of democratic concessions. In other 
words, the balance of power was incrementally tilting towards those in favor of reform. 
Such was the state that Chun Doo-hwan ‘inherited.’  
 As evidenced by the discussion of the Kwangju Democratic Movement, as well as 
the subsequent crackdowns on protests and dissidents (e.g. the “Samch’ǒng kyoyuktae” 
program), Chun was not afraid to unleash violence in order to maintain his grip on power. 
As will be discussed on the following section, civil society activities between 1980 and 
1983, as well as dissent by various subsets of society, although not completely eradicated, 
was largely suppressed through the implementation of Chun’s Machiavellian-style of 
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governance. Once order was restored however, the Chun government began a process of 
incremental liberalization, which in turn led to a resurgence of anti-regime activities.233  
 Beginning in late 1983, Chun’s repressive measures began to be lifted, starting 
first with allowing anti-regime professors to return to their faculty posts, the permission 
for over 1,000 students to return to university, and again focusing on academia, removed 
the military police from all campuses. Liberalization furthermore saw the release of 
roughly 300 political prisoners, and in 1984, the regime removed the ban on just over 200 
politicians who had been removed from power.234 Within this same time period, Chun 
lifted the 36 year long curfew, which, as discussed in chapter two, led to an explosion in 
night-life.  
 This line of events begs the question as to why the regime, which had been so 
successful at the suppression of dissent over the course of three years, would make moves 
towards liberalization. Kim (2000) argues that the rationale can be boiled down to a 
misperception of the regime regarding the state of affairs at that time, as well as due to a 
number of external factors. 235  To begin with, Kim suggests that the regime had 
overestimated its ability to control societal dissent through its existent institutional power. 
Oberdorfer (1997) further notes that it was Chun’s intention to eventually step down. For 
what it’s worth, Chun had noted to the U.S. ambassador at the time, prior to his ascension 
to power, that: “If I were to become president, I would like the history books to say that I 
was the first one in Korea to turn over power in a legitimate and constitutional 
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manner.”236 With the upcoming legislative elections in 1985, Chun very well could have 
been attempting to increase the popularity of his party and thereby improve his power 
base’s electability.237 In addition, the Asian Games were coming up in 1986, to be 
followed by the 1988 Summer Olympics, which meant increased international scrutiny.238  
 Whatever Chun’s motivations were, someone should have told the emperor he 
had no clothes. Chun’s relaxation of the draconian political tools with which he utilized 
to suppress anti-regime sentiment ultimately backfired and paved the way for yet another 
resurrection of boisterous calls for political reform.   
 With the kindling already set, the spark that set off Chun’s collapse was the 
‘torture death’ by police of a Seoul National University Student, Pak Chong-ch’ol, in 
January of 1987. In response, demonstrators, fueled by demands for democratization, 
reform, and human rights battled for months with riot police.239 On June 10th, Chun 
partially capitulated with the announcement of his handpicked successor, General Rho 
Tae-woo, to be elected by the Electoral College, which Chun controlled. Chun’s 
announcement spurred yet more protests that led to Chun mobilizing the military to 
suppress the rioters. Chun’s lieutenants however warned against this, for fear of military 
insubordination as had happened during the waning period of the Rhee regime in 1960. In 
addition to domestic forces, through Gaston Sigur, a special envoy and assistant secretary 
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of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the U.S. government applied diplomatic 
pressure and warned Chun against the use of the military for political purposes.240  
As Chun’s appointed successor, Rho announced on June 29th the “Declaration 
for Democratization” which entailed constitutional amendments allowing the first direct 
presidential election by the full electorate.241 Avoiding political fallout and defusing 
further significant violence, elections took place in December the same year, with Rho 
surviving the contested election, garnering 36.6% of the popular vote, having won out in 
large part due to a split between the opposition’s two main liberal candidates, Kim Young 
Sam and Kim Dae-jung—both of whom would eventually have their turns at wielding 
presidential power over Korea.  
While the introduction of an electoral democracy, again, did not automatically 
bring about a liberal, consolidated democracy to South Korea (as we should expect),242 it 
did introduce a set of formalized mechanisms with which society could utilize in order to 
hold their elected leaders increasingly accountable and in the process of doing so, 
incrementally consolidate democracy.  
5.4: Post-Chun Doo Hwan 
 That Roh’s regime had benefited from the previous authoritarian governments is 
without question. As evidenced by the regime’s lack of initial involvement and reluctance 
to mobilize the police in the labor riots of July and August 1987 (as will be discussed in a 
following section), Roh was well aware that he did not enjoy the same level of autonomy 
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that Park and Chun had. The period following Chun’s capitulation and direct, democratic 
elections then is one in which the subsequent governments increasingly sought to 
distance themselves for Korea’s authoritarian past by introducing various reforms of the 
legal and political system. According to Kim, SH (2000 b.) the most serious attempts to 
break away from past came with the installation of Korea’s first civilian president under 
Kim Young Sam.243 
 Following Kim’s inauguration, as had occurred in previous new administrations, 
he began to purge the government (non-elected officials), bureaucracy, police and 
military off those who had been involved in coup by Chun Doo Hwan or corruption. Kim 
furthermore declared the December 12th take-over as “a coup-like event” and pledged 
further investigations into both the power-grab as well as the Kwangju Uprising.244 
Following a year of investigation in October of 1994, the government announced that 
both Chun and Roh had engineered the military take-over, but prosecuting them for such 
crimes had the potential for damaging national unity. In July the following year, the 
government, citing statute of limitations, made its final decision to not prosecute Chun 
and Roh.245 
 The government’s announcement of non-action in the case of Chun and Roh 
instigated a round of significant mass protests, which included professors, students, 
workers, and middle-class citizens throughout October and November. The protests in the 
wake of the announced decision included more protestors than had participated during the 
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June 1987 uprising, and ultimately culminated into a national crisis.246 The government in 
response yielded to the social pressures generated by civil society, and in November 1995, 
promulgated a special law to retroactively punish those who had been involved in the 
1980 Kwangju Massacre. As a result of the law, eleven former generals, including Chun 
and Roh were arrested on charges of various charges including bribery, treason, and 
insurrection.247 Additionally, the Kwangju Uprising Special Law decriminalized activist 
leaders, and prompted the creation of a number of memorials to the victims, including the 
Mangwol-dong Cemetery, the burial site for the victims of the uprising, which was in 
turn designated as a national cemetery.248   
 Although Chun and Roh were eventually provided with amnesty in 1997, the 
prosecutions of the former generals provided a clear demarcation between the 
authoritarian past, and the period in which democracy ruled the day.249 Both Kim Young 
Sam and subsequently, Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), in the words of Kwon (2011) 
“actively pursued policies and projects to build a “new Korea” and distance their 
governments from the authoritarian past.”250  
5.5: Growth of Civil Society 
  The core argument this dissertation makes is that state-non-state collaboration in 
the market force, in the period following the end of the Rhee Syngman administration, is 
largely explained as being a function of the relative levels of state autonomy from 
societal forces. In Koo’s (1993) widely cited “Strong State and Contentious Society,” the 
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author argues that at the core of the historical process towards Korean modernity and 
industrialization has been the state-societal relationship. Koo notes that:  
“Although the state has played a critical role in setting the dominant 
direction and framework of social transformation in Korea, concrete 
processes of social and political change have been intimately shaped by 
the specific ways in which individuals, groups, or social classes have 
reacted to state actions and to their experiences of social change.”251  
 
Further, Koo explains that civil society in Korea has had a short history, and has had 
‘relatively underdeveloped institutional features,’ it has always contained characteristics 
of being both vehemently resistant to state power, and subject to ‘violent eruptions.’252 As 
summed up by Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim (2011), “the simultaneous presence of a strong 
state and a contentious society set the stage for anti-government mobilization and state 
repression of dissident movements.”253 
From Korea’s short contemporary history, we can easily see patterns of state-
civil society relationships which are both expansionary and reactionary. In explaining 
Korea’s incremental move towards democracy, Kim SH (2000) identifies three main 
periods, or ‘critical junctures’ which have occurred since 1948: 1956-1961, 1973-1980, 
and 1984-1987.254 In explaining the role of civil society, I will follow the critical 
juncture timeline set up by Kim.   
 
                                                      
251 Koo, H. (1993). 231 
252 IBID, (232). 
253 Shin, G., and P. Y. Chang, et al. (2011). 21 




5.6: First Democratic Juncture: 1956-1961 
The first juncture saw the overthrow of Rhee Syngman’s autocratic regime (1948-
1960) as a result of a number of predominately student led protests, referred to as the 
April Uprising.255 Choi (1993) argues that the main issues leading to mass protests were 
pervasive government corruption and ineffectiveness, with the spark being Rhee’s 
announced scheme to continue his rule through ‘rigged elections’.256 Although the 
protests proved successful in that Rhee was forced into exile, radical students tried to 
both continue the movement, and expand its scope by including the issue of North-South 
reunification, in part by inviting North Korean students to join their movement. The anti-
communist response, as noted by Choi, came in the form of Park Chung Hee’s May 16th 
military coup.257 
5.7: Second Democratic Juncture: 1973-1980 
The second juncture saw the institution of Park’s Yushin Constitution, which 
effectively legalized authoritarianism, the assassination of Park in 1979, a brief period 
of democratic hope, and the ascension of yet another military dictator in Chun Doo-
Hwan. Where students had led the way in the toppling of the Rhee regime, the 1970s 
saw an expanded set of actors which while still encompassing students, also witnessed 
the introduction of, and cooperation between urban laborers, intellectuals and religious 
organizations and journalists which was in turn fed by a growing, class conscious 
middle class.258 Cooperation between the different groups often focused on labor issues. 
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For instance, during what Koo (2002) identifies as South Korea’s export-oriented, 
authoritarian industrialization period (1960s to 1987), church organizations and students 
viewed laborers as helpless ‘victims of exploitation and repression,’ and thus targeted 
them for assistance.259 Of the religious-labor linkage, Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim (2011) 
note that progressive religious organizations such as the Catholic JOC (Jeunesse 
Ouvrières Catholiques, or Young Catholic Workers) and the Methodist Urban Industrial 
Mission offered night schools and counseling sessions, as well as assisting them with 
the development of labor unions.260 Koo (2002) notes that through such activities, both 
union and ‘class-consciousness’ was first born.261 
Beyond assisting industrial workers, religious organizations acted as brokers and 
bridge builders between the various social groups and advocated for human rights 
through protests and other advocacy activities.262 Chang (2008) notes that between 1975 
and 1978, Christians in particular, staged more protests than any other group following 
the decline of students protests in the face of state repression.263   
Although the ‘church’ played a prominent role during the 1970s, college students 
began to take their place in the late 70s through the 80s. During this time, factory 
workers as a whole had grown to roughly three million, constituting the largest 
workforce group in Korea.264 The first to recognize their potential as a tool for social 
change most clearly, according to Koo (2002) were student activists.265 In the 1980s, 
thousands of students dropped out of school and worked in factories, motivated by the 
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chance to bring labor to the frontlines of the pro-democracy movement.266 Inside the 
factories, they proselytized the tenets of worker organization and class struggle in 
making a democratic society. 267  Through such activities, industrial labor would 
eventually be organized to play a major role in the democratic move in the late 1980s.  
The 1970s ushered in an era in which various networks of dissidents composed 
of the groups discussed above, developed and expanded in depth, culminating into a 
powerful political alliance in opposition to authoritarianism and class-based issues. 
Towards the end of the decade, Korea’s loose alliance of dissident civil society groups 
would eventually connect to political society, through the joining of the main opposition 
party—then called the New Democratic Party, under the shared leadership of Kim 
Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung.268  
With the conditions ripe for uprising, the YH factory labor dispute incident of 
1979 and subsequent repression (discussed in the previous section), proved to be the 
spark which set off yet another round of mass protests in favor of political transition. 
Where civil society in the previous juncture (1956-1961) led to the forced exile of Rhee 
Syngman, mass protests in 1979 would lead to the assassination of Park by his former 
ally, Kim Chae Kyu.269 The brief authoritarian breakdown following Park’s death 
however, did not lead to a reduction in protests, but rather intensification thereof. In 
response, the interim government under Choe Kyu Ha removed certain elements of the 
Yushin Constitution, released various dissidents from prison or their house arrests (e.g. 
former President and anti-Yushin activist Yun Po Son), and revoked the emergency 
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decree No. 9 which had criminalized criticism of the Yushin Constitution. This brief 
period of reform however, changed with the introduction of military hardliners, led by 
Chun Doo Hwan.270  
In response to increased protests throughout the Peninsula with significant levels 
in Seoul, many of which was led by students and labor groups, martial law was extended 
to include the whole country. Rather than quelling unrest, this move by the military 
hardliners ultimately led to the aforementioned Kwangju Uprising, beginning on May, 
18th, 1980, a day following the announcement of extended martial law. The Kwangju 
Uprising was eventually suppressed, along with the vast majority of significant civil 
society activity between then and 1983. Korea would enter yet another period of iron-
fisted rule under another military junta.  
5.8: Third Democratic Juncture: 1984-1987 
 In terms of the scope of this study, this final period prior to the move towards an 
electoral democracy is particularly important. Prior to 1983, with respect to forced 
evictions, the state had played the main role in virtually every aspect of the 
redevelopment process. This changed with the privatization of the process in the midst of 
mass protests during the Mokdong redevelopment project. Further, with respect to labor 
suppression, the move towards allowing private security firms and other non-state actors 
(e.g. kusadae or “save the company” militant forces) began in 1987 during the period 
referred to as the Great Labor Movement (1987-1989). Through severe and unforgiving 
repression, civil society was effectively suppressed, though not eliminated, between 1980 
                                                      




and 1983.271 Starting in 1984 however, as previously discussed, civil society would 
emerge yet again following a miscalculated relaxation of civil society controls which 
proved to backfire against the military regime.272 In particular, Kim (2000) notes that 
underground networks of pro-democracy students, workers and churches would yet again 
emerge. Organizations such as the Youth Coalition for Democracy Movement (YCDM), 
the Korean Council for Labor Welfare (KCLW) and the Catholic Priests’ Association for 
Justice (CPAJ) would not only expand in scope, but additionally lead to the formation of 
national associations acting as umbrella organization which formed alliances among the 
various groups. In 1984 for instance, the Council of Movement for People and 
Democracy (CMPD) was created in 1984 (made up of ‘sectoral movement groups’), to be 
followed by the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NCDR) (composed 
of religious leaders and intellectuals).273 Both the CMPD and the NCDR would later 
merge in 1985 to form the People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and 
Reunification (PMCDR) which was made up of 24 individual groups, consisting of urban 
labor, intellectuals, writers, journalists, religious activists, and others.274 The period of 
authoritarian relaxation furthermore paved the way for the strengthening of genuine 
political opposition, in the form of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), led by Kim 
Dae-jung and Kim Young Sam which would garner 29.25% of the legislative seats in the 
1985 National Assembly elections.275 
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 As previously noted, the torture death of SNU student Pak Chong-ch’ol in January 
of 1987 ignited civil society once again, which ultimately led to the turning of power over 
to Rho, Tae-woo and further ushering a move towards an electoral democracy. Choi 
(1993) explains that Rho’s June 29th declaration of constitutional reform largely 
demobilized the urban middle class, which in turn reduced the power of other, more 
radical populist forces from reaching their goal of ‘maximalist reform’ of complete 
democracy and just-redistribution.276 In other words, by providing the middle-class hope 
for some modicum of democracy in the form of direct presidential elections, allowed the 
then ruling party, now under Rho, to remain relatively intact and unscathed from the 
crisis. The socioeconomic conditions of labor however, remained unchanged, which 
brought them to the forefront of political protest once again, albeit this time, without the 
support of Korea’s middle-income strata.277  
 The schism between the middle-class and more radical, contentious elements of 
Korean society is evidenced by protests in the wake of economic decline beginning in 
1989. As a result of increasing international competition (partly due to rising wage prices 
in the domestic market) and productivity drops, Rho’s government was hit with, what Oh 
(1999) terms as a “double-whammy” of both economic and political crises. In 1991, 
students began to demonstrate yet again after a fellow student had been killed by plain-
clothed police officers. Roh responded quickly by sacking his Minister of the Interior 
who assumed responsibility, but the protests ensued, with estimates of roughly 200,000 
students and works in eighty-seven cities demonstrating. The middle-class however, as 
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reported in both domestic and international news sources, were conspicuously absent.278 
One report by the New York Times noted that “the middle classes appear fed up with 
unyielding attitudes of students and militant workers.”279 A number of the students, well 
cognizant of their need to bring in the middle class into their cause, went so far as to 
douse themselves with paint thinner and immolate themselves in order to shock the 
middle class into action. The students died, the middle class did not react.280 
 Prior to 1987, the alliance between the middle class and various sectors of civil 
society, labor included, had the shared goal of removing authoritarianism as the method 
of governance. After the political side of the equation had been solved, the middle class 
de-mobilized—viewing the more radical elements of labor and students as potentially 
being detrimental to both the state and, importantly, to their status. This schism in turn 
has proven to be one of the key factors allowing the successive governments, most often 
though not exclusively through private proxies, the ability to promote economic 
development and maintain order. In short, as will be shown, the government utilizes 
proxies so as to avoid the middle-classes’ reemergence and alliance with other less 
powerful sub-sets of Korean society.  
5.9: Conclusion 
As will be illustrated in the following two chapters, in the face of increasing 
social pressures, the state during the mid 1980s leading up to democratization, began to 
employ different strategies to avoid political backlash while still maintaining order and 
meeting the demands of Korea’s increasing middle class. One of those strategies was to 
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collaborate with non-state specialists in violence—private security firms, which, although 
often legal in nature, employ criminal violence as part of their normal operations. To be 
sure, the police, and by extension, the state, never retreated. Instances of the police 
working hand in hand with private security thugs in forced evictions and strike 
suppression are still not uncommon as is evidenced in a number of cases. What has 
changed then? The answer to that is that private security firms have taken point in such 
actions, with the police only intervening when violence escalates to a point where they 
are forced to mobilize, for fear of losing legitimacy in terms of their ability to maintain 
order.  
That the state has not ‘retreated’ entirely however does not detract from this 
study’s hypothesis. Why? Although the state has shown a willingness to intervene, and 
thus risk the political backlash that it has and continues to entail, the state’s involvement 
has been minimized to a point where state intervention lasts for typically only a few days, 
which is what society in general has tended to focus on, as is evidenced by the 2009 
Yongsan Redevelopment tragedy (to be discussed in detail in the following sections). 
What is generally not covered however, are at least not to the same extent as when the 
state is involved, are the months of violent clashes between private thugs and whichever 
group they are charged with suppressing, removing, or intimidating to compliance.  
 
 








                  The Politics and Processes of Forced Evictions 
                                                 
6.1: Introduction 
Over the course of 20 years, from roughly 1960 to 1980, Korea transformed from 
a largely rural, agrarian society to one that was predominantly urban and educated. Rapid 
growth of the metropolis’s population in turn brought demand for cheap housing and 
redevelopment. If private security firms (more specifically, those specialized in forced 
evictions), otherwise termed yongyǒk-hoesa, had always taken care of forced evictions, 
locating the rationale for such state-non-state collaboration in this niche market would be 
made undeniably more difficult. There is however variance across time and space with 
respect to this phenomenon, with state forces initially taking point in coercive action in 
the early 1950s through the 1980s. The point of this discussion is to explain the changed 
tactics, from state to non-state sourced coercion. The case of forced evictions thus 
presents us with a situation in which the state is faced with the difficult task of providing 
public goods in the form of redevelopment, yet challenged by being punished for the 
means in which those goods are brought about. The move towards the private market for 





6.2: Rural to Urban Migration: the issue of shantytowns 
Many poor migrants made their first step into the city by moving into the 
cheapest illegal housing, finding homes on predominantly government, but occasionally 
privately owned land, amongst other squatters in the so called p’anjach’on which literally 
means ‘plank villages,’ named after the materials used in their make-shift homes. Other 
descriptive names included ‘pinal-chip’ (vinyl house), ‘tal-tongnae’ (moon village) and 
‘san-tongnae’ (mountain village)—the latter two names referencing their proximity to 
hillsides, the first being that vinyl was yet another popular material used for the houses. 
They were also often located next to riverbeds and other unutilized property.281  
 Shantytowns dotted the metropolis’s landscape and more often than not, they 
were without electricity, running water or mechanisms for removing garbage and human 
waste. Such conditions in turn exacerbated the spread of infectious disease.282 The fact 
that the shantytowns were located next to hillsides and riverbeds did not help their 
situation given that they were subject to mudslides and annual flooding during monsoon 
season and fires during the dry periods. Regardless of the conditions and varying 
government opinions however, such settlements provided cheap and relatively convenient 
housing options to Korea’s poor.  
 Not only were shantytowns prone to various hazards, they were ascetically 
unpleasing and presented a challenge to the government’s drive towards modernization 
and at the least the perception of a prosperous state. They were furthermore illegal and 
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posed an affront to the government’s ability to control social forces. From its inception in 
1961, the regime under Park Chung Hee viewed unlicensed housing as a problem for 
social order and sought to limit if not out rightly eliminating the squatter settlements. 
While Seoul’s City Hall, under the direction of the presidentially appointed mayor took 
the lead in formulating and implementing housing policies the central government played 
a heavy handed role, often providing resources to city projects.283  
 The standard procedure for clearing shantytowns in the early 1960s was to 
demolish them and if need be, forcefully remove the residents to locations outside the city. 
In response evictees would build the same or other forms of substandard housing, or 
simply return to the city to rebuild. The same removal policies occurred as a result of 
frequent natural disasters, to which, as mentioned above, such shantytowns were 
particularly susceptible to. The government then attempted to rectify the problem by 
providing low income housing, but with over 50,000 illegal shacks throughout the city in 
1964, simply demolishing the slums and building new subsidized apartments was viewed 
as increasingly unrealistic—especially so given that public housing was still too costly 
for many of the squatter residents. By July of 1969, 407 so called “Citizens’ Apartments’ 
with 16,000 units were completed which had been designated for evictees, more were to 
be completed throughout the year. Only the most economically successful shack dwellers 
were able to afford the deposit and rent. The remainder of the units was often occupied by 
Seoul’s urban middle-class who had illegally bought the rights to the apartments. 
Widespread plans for public housing by the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) were 
                                                      




subsequently dropped, instead opting to demolish the slums and deal with the residents in 
different ways.284  
 In addition to simply re-building in the same or different locations, residents 
responded to evictions by protesting City Hall and bribing officials in return for not 
destroying their homes. In May 1968, 44 city officials and police were fired for taking 
bribes from over 300 households so that their homes would not be targeted.285  More 
common was outright physical resistance. Police and district administrators were charged 
with the work of carrying out the demolitions and forced evictions. Scenes of bulldozers, 
water cannons and tear gas utilized by police against residents, reminiscent of the civil 
rights era in the US South, were common. Kim Hyon-ok, the mayor of Seoul between 
1966 and 1970 was known as ‘Mayor Buldozer’. Thugs were intermittently utilized, 
especially during times in which they had difficulty handling large numbers on their own, 
but police were unquestionably at the forefront.286  
Early in 1972, the SMG announced that it would not destroy any shacks which 
had been constructed prior to November the previous year. At that time, Seoul had taken 
aerial footage and distributed the photographs to the various district offices. Some 
173,900 shacks had been identified, of which ownership over the property was de-facto 
legalized. This essentially created two types of shantytown residents—squatter-owners 
with at least some rights, and squatter tenants without rights. 287  Following this 
development, in 1973, the SMG adopted the Housing Redevelopment Act. Under this 
policy the city planned to demolish all illegal shacks, and force the legally recognized 
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squatter-owners to renovate by 1982 or face eviction. 196 areas had been designated as 
redevelopment areas.288 While district policies varied, squatter-owners were offered a 
mix of cash and/or housing loans in exchange for licensing conditional on improvements, 
or for vacating, while squatter tenants were not provided any compensation. Thus, 
redevelopment policies affected the two groups in different ways. Not only did the 
owners stand to gain compensation for simply vacating, they actually stood to gain 
significant profit given that redevelopment and upgrading of the area was highly 
correlated with increasing land prices. Squatter-tenants however, were left with the 
choice to either self-vacate, or be forcibly removed. The policy effectively aligned the 
squatter-owners on the side of government, pitting the tenants against state forces, land 
speculators, construction companies, businesses which called for more commercial space, 
and Seoul’s increasingly expanding middle class who themselves were faced with rising 
prices due to the acute housing shortages. 289  
6.3: Role of Civil Society 
Although forced evictions as part of redevelopment and beautification projects 
had been occurring since the 1960s, it had not attracted as much of the attention of civil 
society as did labor issues. Still, labor issues were intrinsically linked to the issues of 
housing. Korea’s rapid push towards development for example, relied upon, at least in the 
early phases, a huge supply of cheap, unskilled labor to produce the goods necessary for 
Park’s export-oriented industrialization. This in turn spurred massive urbanization, of 
which a large number of migrants settled in the shantytowns described above. Thus, 
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many of those who slaved under the horrible working conditions (an issue of which the 
overwhelming majority of civil society was focused upon), were additionally residents of 
the slums subject to redevelopment.  
 While the role of civil society groups in housing issues would increase rapidly in 
the 1980s, various student and religious organizations to be sure were involved in the 
early stages of redevelopment. As part of various student-led social justice movements 
for instance, housing issues fell under what is referred to generally as ‘pinwal’ (“urban 
poor activities).” Under such programs students played an important role in helping those 
poor families who lived in slums, were homeless, unemployed or otherwise victims of the 
state’s myopic push towards development, organize against such government policies 
during this period.290 Religious groups such as the Seoul Metropolitan Community 
Mission (SMCM) and the Urban Industrial Mission as well assisted with advocating for 
the victims of forced evictions. They additionally were involved in building hospitals and 
health clinics, schools and churches, and assisting with procuring tax-breaks for small 
businesses.291 
6.4: Mok-dong Redevelopment Project: Protest and a changing of Government 
Tactics 
In 1981, having won the bids to host the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics, 
the Korean government was further given incentive to modernize its infrastructure and 
housing situation, and did so on an unprecedented pace. As noted by Davis (2007), much 
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of the redevelopment was carried out under the category of “city beautification,” a phrase 
which came to be understood widely as the removal of slums.292  
 While numerous redevelopment projects were carried out in the years leading up 
to both international sporting events, the most significant project in terms of the scope of 
this study (as it marked a shift towards privatization of the process) took place in Mok-
dong in 1983. Prior delving into this case, a brief note on the timing and political 
environment in which this project took place is warranted. To remind ourselves, the start 
of this project began only 3 years following the Kwangju Uprising. Subsequent to 
massive suppression of the uprising, civil society had largely gone underground. The 
Chun regime furthermore, through a gross miscalculation of the status quo, began to 
liberalize some of the draconian controls they had utilized in order to instill order. With 
the mega sporting events rapidly approaching, increased international scrutiny was an 
additional issue that Chun’s regime had to consider. Thus, Chun’s administration faced 
the challenge to prepare for the Olympics, maintain economic development, increase the 
housing stock for Seoul’s growing middle-income strata, increase the popularity of his 
party, and do so all the while being cognizant of presenting a favorable international 
reputation.  
Under a newly designed redevelopment scheme referred to as the Public 
Management Redevelopment Model (PMR), designed specifically to speed the process of 
development for the mass sporting games, the city assembled the land tracks, and then 
contracted with private construction firms. The SMG would then sell the redeveloped 
properties in order to generate revenue for the Olympics. The SMG initially utilized this 
                                                      




scheme in Mok-dong, a highly visible and underutilized district located in southwestern 
Seoul on the side of an arterial road leading to and from the Kimpo International 
Airport.293  
In 1963, Mok-dong was predominately farm land with 82% being devoted to the 
agriculture sector, with a small population consisting of 451 households and 2,611 people. 
By 1984 however (when Mok-dong was arranged into 3 sub-sections), households had 
increased to 19,405 with a population of 82,610.294 Many of the residents of Mok-dong 
themselves had been resettled there by the SMG following squatter clearance programs 
carried out in the mid 1960s. The residents were furthermore initially allotted small plots 
of land upon which they built their makeshift houses on.295 Lee (1990) argues that 
although the majority of residents were residing in the area technically illegally, and 
without property rights, because many had been resettled there by the SMG they had a 
sense of de-facto legitimacy and a right to be there.296 According to one survey, only 38% 
percent of the residents were squatter-owners.297  
Redevelopment was initially announced by the SMG in April of 1983, plans of 
which the Mok-dong squatter-tenants would protest over the course of 2 years. According 
to Lee (1990) protests ensued in four distinct phases. Phase one entailed 5 months of 
going through official channels, either by directly petitioning the district, or through 
intermediaries working in their behalf such as the Catholic Church and other religious 
organizations. Having failed to obtain concessions, the residents switched to the second 
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phase of their protests, which included radicalized “mobilization for direct, non-
institutional action” for a period of 3 months. As part of phase, on August 11th over 1,000 
citizens joined an on-going rally and surged toward the Mok-dong development office in 
order to protest the development project. Subsequently, they attempted to go to City Hall 
in central Seoul, but were met with riot police which attempted to block their paths. In the 
process of battling with the police, some protesters employed the use of firebombs and 
rocks. In sub-doing the protest, police ended up arresting 500 participants.298  
Although the March 11th protest was subdued, it did attract the attention of the 
Korean Church Social Ministry (KCSM), an influential ‘social action’ organization 
founded by prominent Catholics and Protests which attempted to negotiate with the 
government on behalf of both squatter-owners and squatter-tenants.299 Such negotiations 
and protests continued through January of 1984 and proved largely ineffective, and 
although there instances of protests moving beyond Mok-dong, during phase-two they 
were predominately stayed within the confines of the redevelopment area. 
Phase three specifically focused on protesting beyond the boundaries of Mok-
dong in order to generate increased public visibility, support and solidarity with other 
anti-government actors and causes. Accordingly, over the course of 15 months, protests, 
often violent protests were held frequently at City Hall, the Myongdong Catholic 
Cathedral in downtown Seoul, and on the campuses of top universities such as Ehwa, 
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Yonsei and Seoul National University. The final phase included five weeks of further, but 
intensified protests.300 
With the fast approaching 1986 Asian Games, a growing size of both general 
anti-eviction and anti-regime protests, in conjunction with increased international 
attention and media coverage, in March 1986, the government finally capitulated and 
awarded both the squatter-owner and squatter-tenants concessions and compensation.301 
The major affect of the Mok-dong project however went beyond squatter concessions in 
that it represented the last major project in which the government took the lead.  
In the place of the Public Management Redevelopment Model, which had been 
implemented in Mok-dong, the Joint Redevelopment Project (JRP) system was developed. 
Under this scheme the redevelopment process was for all intents and purpose privatized. 
The plan went as followings: a redevelopment co-operative, a group consisting of at least 
two-thirds of pro-redevelopment owners, was organized. The construction company was 
then selected by the co-operative. The construction company was then tasked with 
providing compensation to the homeowners, either through some form of monetary 
payment, buying or leasing rights to the new homes, or some combination thereof, as well 
as ensuring the vacating of the land (the last of which was in reality the duty of the home 
owners). Whatever profits were leftover after redevelopment was left to the companies. 
Non-owner tenants were not guaranteed compensation under the scheme.302  
The system proved effective. A fact finding report carried out by the Asian 
Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) notes that between 1983 and the time of the 
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Olympics, an estimated 48,000 buildings which had housed 720,000 people had been 
destroyed.303 The same study cites that between 1982 and 1988, 250 sites had been 
designated as “redevelopment areas,” and by 1989 at the time of the study, 100 had been 
carried out. While different studies cite slightly varying statistics, the fact that Seoul 
underwent a massive and violent transition during the period leading up to the Olympics 
is clear. 
The JRP did a number of important things. First, it expanded the amount of 
recognized squatter-owners, which had previously been restricted which further led to 
breaks in solidarity between existing squatter-owners and tenants—this in turn effectively 
reduced in part the level of potential resistance. Second, and importantly, it removed the 
financial burden which had previously been placed squarely on the government. Not only 
was the government removed from the financial burden, they additionally stood to gain 
from the increased property taxes, while at the same time expanding the market for the 
domestic business sector which at that time had been hit hard due to reduced overseas 
construction in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis.304 Third, it reduced the role of the 
government to one which was responsible for merely indirectly managing the process and 
selling parts of unutilized government properties—effectively removing city officials 
from directly carrying out unpopular actions such as forced removals.305 On this last point, 
Kim (1998) notes that “The government could also [in addition to providing the least 
amount of financial support] minimize the political costs of discordance with the 
residents, because, with the new plan, the conflict was between the cooperative and the 
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residents.”306 This point was further emphasized by Davis (2007) who commented that 
privatization of the process “paved the way for increased extralegal hiring of private 
eviction companies who employed thugs and criminal elements to assist with getting rid 
of existing residents.307  
That the hired thugs, replacing the police, became the unofficial strong arm in the 
government’s push towards redevelopment is virtually undeniable. Where there are 
accounts of hundreds of tenant activists who have been detained, arrested, or otherwise 
harassed by government authorities, the same is not true for the construction companies 
or their hired specialists in violence. This fact was not lost on same ACHR report cited 
above which noted that because the main actors are the private home owners and 
construction companies, both local and central governments are afforded the ability to 
deny responsibility and thus, culpability. The violence surrounding Korea’s 
redevelopment projects was furthermore noted and condemned by the UN sponsored 
Habitat International Coalition (HIC) which in 1991 listed Korea’s housing policies 
second only to South Africa’s township system in its physical violence and brutality.308  
 While various laws, revisions and other measures having to do with compensation 
levels and protections for home-owners and tenants alike have been instituted both prior 
to and following the move towards democratic, direct presidential elections in 1987, the 
methods of redevelopment under the JRP, including the use of yongyǒk-hoesa 
(construction thugs) for forced evictions, have remained virtually the same since it was 
initially designed in 1983. Then, as it is now as of 2013, the methods utilized in forced 
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evictions are illegal, yet the practice continues in the face of democratic consolidation.309 
In order to highlight this, I focus on two recent projects, the 2009 Yongsan 
redevelopment project and the 2011 campaign to evict illegal street vendors operating in 
Insadong.  
6.5: Yongsan Redevelopment Project 
 As part of a campaign referred to as the “New Town Project,” an on-going 
government driven program of city beautification and modernization, Seoul’s Yongsan 4 
district was scheduled for urban redevelopment in order to transform it into an 
international sub-center of the city, the Yongsan International Business District (hereafter 
YIBD).310 Located north of the Han River and adjacent to the US Army Garrison 
Yongsan, this location is known for its red light districts, brothels and bars, illegal street 
vendors, and small stores which stock both low and high quality counterfeit goods, all 
which cater to the large presence of US military personnel, other foreigners, and Korean 
alike.  
 In 2007, after forming the Joint Redevelopment Association, consisting of 300 
owners of real estate in the area, the Samsung Construction and Trading Corporation and 
POSCO E&C were chosen as the managing underwriters of the project. The project is to 
include the building of a landmark 100-story tower along with six forty-story 
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multipurpose buildings, as well as other retail shopping centers, residential offices, and 
urban parks which are scheduled to be completed by 2017. Demolition of the existing 
outdated and dilapidated buildings and construction was to begin in February 2009 which 
was, like similar redevelopment projects in the past, delayed by tenant protests.311  
 What has come to be referred to widely as the ‘Yongsan Tragedy” (Yongsan 
Chamsa) in which five protestors and one police officer died, along with 23 others 
injured, occurred on January 20th 2009.312 The events on January 20th however followed 
months of harassment and violent tactics by hired thugs against the recalcitrant merchant-
tenants who refused to vacate due to protests over low levels of compensation and 
vaguely defined rights. Some of these tactics and issues were explained to me by a former 
tenant involved with the Yongsan development project. This tenant had operated a small 
bar in one of the buildings which was scheduled for demolition. After refusing what she 
believed to be an unfair level of compensation, she stated that the thugs started showing 
up in her bar. They (usually about 4 of them) would arrive as soon as they opened, order 
one bottle of beer or soju in between them (so as not to avoid “breaking the law”) and 
intimidate customers to the point where they would either not enter, or if they already had, 
promptly leave. Other tactics such as starting fires, breaking windows, blocking pathways 
to the business, throwing dead cats other animal carcasses in the vents (in order to create 
strong odors) and, sexual harassment were common place. When she went to the district 
office and police she was informed she needed proof, of which she then provided them 
with her CCTV coverage. Nothing on the matter was done. She further stated that 
“there’s no difference between the police and thugs—they work for the same people” 
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(VC1, VC2). Other victims in both the same Yongsan case as well those involved in 
different redevelopment projects noted similar experiences. One journalist who works for 
a prominent media group with close ties to the then current ruling party under Lee Myung 
Bak, noted that such occurrences are so common place that only in extreme cases will the 
top news services cover such events. In her words “people don’t want to hear about it.” 
She further explained that the majority of Seoul citizens stand to gain from city-wide 
redevelopment projects and that most people view the protestors as overly militant and 
greedy (R1). When I asked my police contacts about this case, they informed me that 
even if they had wanted to do something about it, they would not have had the support of 
their superiors or the prosecutor’s office. They explained that the reason why the 
Yongsan case was so highly covered was that violence between the protestor-merchants 
and those charged with evicting them was so great that there had to be police intervention 
(P1, P3, P8). Similar to other cases, the protestors rather than those involved in the forced 
evictions bore the force of the legal system. On June 1st, 2010 the Seoul High Court 
sentenced 9 of the protestors involved to 4 to 5 years in prison on the charges of killing 
one police officer and injuring citizens who had been nearby. 15 Police officers however, 
accused of excessive force were acquitted.313  
 The case of the Yongsan chamsa however is decidedly different than the vast 
majority of instances of redevelopment projects for one particular reason. The protestors 
were effectively able to endure the onslaught of private violence, to the point where the 
police were forced to intervene. That the state ultimately utilized public sources to quell 
the protests however does not detract from this dissertation’s principle hypothesis. Indeed, 
the state has not fully decentralized violence, nor should we expect them to. To reiterate, 
                                                      




the dependent variable this study is seeking to explain is state-non-state collaboration in 
the market for force. Just because the state, through the police, intervened on January 20th, 
2009, does not mean that collaboration did not occur. Rather, private thugs had for 
months been engaging in extra legal violence against the residents within the Yongsan 
district. The residents however were able to endure such measures, and escalate the 
conflict to the point where had the state not intervened; they would have run the risk of 
losing legitimacy in terms of the citizenry’s perception of their ability to instill order. 
Even though the police and government have largely come under fire and increased 
scrutiny as a result of their heavy-handed crackdown, the focus remains on the single day 
in which the police intervened. That the state has faced such a tremendous amount of 
political backlash for the intervention, and in turn has been forced to make concessions to 
the residents and victims of the Yongsan tragedy, actually strengthens the argument. That 
the same type of concessions and political backlash largely do not occur in situations 
where the state does not intervene, leads credence to the argument that it truly does 
matter which groups are doing the repressing. Furthermore, where the case of Yongsan 
has received a tremendous amount of journalistic coverage and civil society focus 
(protests, vigils and even two popular documentaries on the subject), the same is not so 
for the victims of the overwhelming majority of cases in which the police have not had to 
intervene.  
6.6: Insadong Street Vendor Removal 
 As private security groups are utilized for redevelopment projects outlined above, 
so too are they often utilized for removal of street vendors and other similar type actions, 
with a common set of rationales affecting the state decision to outsource. The only 




projects, and that of street vendor evictions is that contracts in the later are directly 
between the district offices and the ‘demolition’ companies themselves.  
 Making up one of the largest portions of Korea’s informal economy, street 
vendors in Korea exist in virtually every district to one extent or another throughout the 
country. Owing to the fact that the vast majority of street vendors are not recognized due 
to their informal status, obtaining exact accounts of their numbers is impossible. However, 
one 2005 study estimated that in Seoul alone there were roughly 800,000 such street 
vendors.314  
The relation between the state and street vendors has historically been one of 
toleration, despite their informal status. The first crackdowns against such actors occurred 
as late as 1986, along with Seoul’s other citywide ‘beautification’ and development 
programs instituted in preparation for the Asian Games and Summer Olympics. Similar 
crackdowns occurred during the run up to Seoul’s co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World 
Cup.315 
As part of the President Lee Myung Bak’s aforementioned ‘new town project,’ 
sites throughout Seoul were designated for such ‘beautification’ programs. One of the 
sites was located in Insadong, a famous historic district and tourist haven located in 
Jongno District, central Seoul. The street vendors are, in the words of both police and 
business owners in the districts they occupy, a nuisance. Business owners specifically 
complained that they were paying high rents and taxes, while the street vendors were 
there illegally, not paying rent, nor taxes. Furthermore, they were often selling the same 
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or similar goods for lower prices. Police in turn argued that they often crowd the streets 
and sidewalks, making for an unsafe environment (P1, P4).  
 Of the street vendors I was able to interview, the main argument was that vendors 
in this district was a long established institution in of itself—street vendors they argue, 
have been there since the nascent days of this district, with such stalls often passing from 
family member to family member. For most of the street vendors, the operation of these 
small businesses represents the only source of income. While they freely admit that what 
they are doing is illegal, they argue that it is the only way in which they can survive. And, 
while the district office offered to move them to designated locations, they explained that 
those locations were away from tourists and that those who had already moved in the 
previous year from different locations throughout the same district had suffered 
substantial financial losses. They further complained that while the Jongno-gu District 
office had promised to provide them with financial aid, the aid had not materialized. 
Because of these conditions, in one respondent’s words “they were ready to fight until 
they received better conditions.” They further explained, and this was confirmed by 
district sources, that they were fully prepared to start paying taxes if they were allowed to 
remain in the location (SV1, SV2, and SV3). The district office however remained 
recalcitrant.  
 Protests by the street vendors have been occurring frequently since the Jongno-gu 
district office announced their intent to remove them in 2009. Between then and May of 
2011, there had been over 30 minor and major altercations, many of which involved 
physical violence.316 On May 24th and the 25th of the same year I was able to witness two 
                                                      




such protest and subsequent street vendor “sweeps.”317 Prior to the protest I was given a 
call by a member of Jongno-gu’s Street Vendor Association who informed me that the 
district office was going to take action on that day. After hearing this, I promptly arrived 
to find police in riot gear, on each side of the street, and a street full of locals and tourists. 
Two ambulances were on standby as well, situated at the opposing entrances to the 
roughly 700 meter long street. The street vendors themselves, identifiable by red 
headbands were prepared and well organized, having locked their carts with chains so as 
to prevent removal. Then came the thugs, 150 of them as I was later informed, both 
young men and women clad in yellow vests so as to identify them. The “street sweepers” 
as one business owner referred to them as, started going from one street vendor stall to 
the next, destroying carts, taking the goods, and beating the street vendors, regardless of 
their age or gender, if they confronted them, which they did. The police simply looked on, 
with seemingly little interest. One elderly street vendor approached what appeared to be a 
ranking police officer, with blood streaming down her face asking him why they were not 
protecting them—stating that “they were citizens as well.” She was ignored. On that day, 
two street vendors were taken to the hospital for serious injuries. The violence I directly 
witnessed that day and others, while tame compared to what they and others go through 
when myself or the public isn’t watching, was disturbing. Similar actions in Insadong 
continued to occur on and off for months, and as of August of 2011, only 16 out of the 
original 76 stall operating have agreed to move to designated spots. The remaining street 
vendors continue to be harassed. Importantly, although the clashes between the street 
vendors and the police have been widely covered by the media, the street vendors have 
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overwhelmingly been portrayed as overly militant. Furthermore, on the first day, the 24th, 
the riot police, as noted, had a very visible presence. The media however, did not cover 
this day. The following day however, a number of national news services were ready with 
their cameras. The events of the day were aired during the national prime time news. The 
difference between the 24th and 25th however, was that on the 25th, the uniformed police 
were conspicuously absent.318  
 Although I was unable to interview officials from the Jongno-gu District Office, 
the rationale for the use of private security as opposed to the police was explained to me 
over the course of a number of interviews with both current and retired police officials. 
The police, it was explained to me, were there to ensure that violence did not get out of 
hand, did not spill over into the shops or affect those beyond the street vendors. Although 
the street vendors were in fact breaking the law, the logistics of obtaining arrest warrants 
or handing out citations was not only overwhelming, but counter-productive in that they 
had in the past failed to work. The use of Yongyǒk-hoesa was in fact, more efficient and 
socially acceptable (P1, P4). A different officer at the same meeting explained that in the 
past, the police were the “kkanp’ae,” (thugs) and as such their threats were much more 
credible then, but since democratization the same methods once utilized during the 
authoritarian period were no longer available to them. Seoul citizens wanted the same 
things now as they did in the past (development and progress), but didn’t understand or 
accept the methods necessary to bring them about. The use of private companies allowed 
them to get the job done without having to deal with accusations of police brutality (P1).  
 
                                                      







 Based on the historical analysis with respect to forced evictions, both in 
redevelopment and city clean up projects, we can see a clear demarcation between the 
early 1960s and 1984. Park clearly preferred the use of public sources of coercion. The 
same preference was shown by Chun, until the switch towards the market in 1984. What 
was Chun’s rationale for doing so? Obviously Chun needed to maintain economic 
development—this legitimizing factor is not unique to Korean politicians—authoritarian 
or otherwise. One argument may be that the market simply provided a more efficient 
method of redevelopment, not to mention reducing the economic burden on the state. 
This makes sense. The state was in fact forced to induce massive redevelopment and 
increase the housing stock, both in preparation for the then upcoming international 
sporting events as well as providing for Seoul’s booming, and increasingly middle-class 
populace. That argument alone, while still holding explanatory power, is not sufficient. 
We have to remind ourselves that not only was the construction, planning and financing 
of such projects privatized, but so too was the coercive aspect of it. By privatizing forced 
evictions, the state effectively made it so that the conflict was between the redevelopers, 
the tenant-owners, and those being forcefully removed (through shear intimidation and/or 
violence).  
 The question still remains as to why society would not punish the state for 
‘allowing’ such violent practices to occur? Although redevelopment is carried out by 
private firms, the state is still charged with enforcing the very laws against violence that 
itself promulgated. In the case of forced evictions, although the direct, formal contracts 




thus providing the government a level of plausible ‘deniability’, the argument that the 
government ‘doesn’t know’ fails to hold water when we bring in the case of forced 
evictions of street vendors. The contracts in those cases are formally between the district 
offices (i.e. the ‘state’) and the thugs which make up the eviction crews. This fact is well 
known, yet civil society, and importantly, the middle-class, still remains, for the most part, 
ambivalent. The short answer as to why is that history matters. The direct involvement by 
the police conjures up images of the old Korea. In other words, the relative level of 
interest in any one event is a function of its level of politicization. The direct involvement 
of the police in turn, acts a politicizing multiplier—as evidenced by the variance in level 
of society’s response in the Yongsan and Insadong cases. The following section will 
























In general the issue the labor has long attracted the attention of social scientists 
from a variety of backgrounds, disciplines and approaches. The case of labor issues in 
Korea is no exception, and especially so regarding scholarship focused on explaining 
Korea’s rapid economic ‘miracle.’ When Park assumed power following the 1961 coup 
d’état, as already explained throughout the preceding chapters, he did so under the pledge 
to instill economic growth and order. Moving away from the Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) approach which had been adopted, much to the detriment of the 
economy by the Rhee regime, Park first focused on the development and promotion of 
labor-intensive export oriented industrialization (EOI) (1961-1972). 319  This move 
towards EOI was rewarded with remarkable growth until the end of the decade when the 
GNP began to decline, coupled with rising inflation and wages among other worrisome 
economic conditions. In conjunction with an economy in decline (and thus Park’s 
legitimacy), politically, Park’s regime was increasingly being challenged by opposition 
                                                      




seeking to capitalize on the weak economic performance.320 Park was able to solve both 
the economic and political challenges through the implementation of the Yushin 
constitution and the ‘big push’ towards the heavy and chemical industries (1973-1979).321 
In the process of creating ‘Korea Inc.,’ a handful of Korea’s conglomerate firms 
(chaebols) dominated the economy, with the top 50 accounting for 43% of GDP in 1978 
(thus giving them greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the state).322 The price of labor as 
well began to increase yet again which further threatened to limit the international 
competitiveness of Korean firms. Thus, between 1981 and 1985, the Chun regime 
focused on the restructuring of the economy and instituting stabilization measures.323  
Why does the above discussion matter for this section? It matters because the 
largely successful policies mentioned have been determined by not only a strong 
government-business relationship, but additionally by the tight control of labor.324 
Although there is debate on how effective the state was at engineering and/or maintaining 
certain factors which led to growth related to labor (e.g. controlling the price of labor), 
there is no doubt that they tried their upmost. 
This chapter traces the ways in which the Korean state, beginning in 1961 has 
attempted to address the challenges of collective action and protest by labor. As will be 
shown, from the beginning of industrialization in the early 1960s through the mid 1980s, 
suppression of labor was the business of the state. In 1987 however, in the midst of the 
democratization movement and what has become to be referred to as the Great Labor 
Uprising (1987-1989), strike suppression, often times violent suppression, was largely 
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privatized and remains as such throughout the contemporary period. Though again, as 
with forced evictions, the state has not completely retreated. However, it has drastically 
minimized its direct role in managing labor disputes. The purpose of this discussion then, 
is to explain why, in the case of labor disputes and strike suppression, the state yet again 
turned towards the private market for force.  
 
7.2: Control of Labor 
 
 During the 1960s, 70s and 80s, labor, as a collective, was to be sure, weak vis-à-
vis the ‘state.’ The state utilized and or supported a number of public and private methods 
in which to insure the control of workers and prevent ‘upstart’ collective action, including 
the legal system, management, monopoly control over all legal unions, the police, the 
KCIA, and finally, beginning in the 1980s, thugs which were either ‘company men’ (e.g. 
kusadae “save the company” squads) or privately sourced ‘service companies (yong-yeok 
hwaesa).’325  
 As highlighted in chapter two, the justice system, from the courts to the rank-in-
file police during and up until the reform periods beginning in the late 1980s and early 
90s was one in which neutrality from political power was virtually non-existent. Indeed, 
the state controlled nearly every aspect of the origin and survival such actors and it is thus 
not surprising that they were the go-to tool for enforcing the state’s interests.  
 Beginning in 1963, workers were in fact allowed to unionize—though they would 
have to apply for official permission at the Office of Labor Affairs. Only upon approval 
however were they allowed to begin negotiations with the company. Although collective 
                                                      




bargaining was permitted, if there was a break-down in negotiations, the union was 
required to enter into a ‘cooling’ off period in which mediation was intervention by the 
Labor Committees was available. If negotiations following the cooling off period were 
still not successful, the union might be given ‘permission’ to strike. More likely than not 
however the government would intercede, declare an endangerment to national security 
and institute a settlement.326  
 In 1971 Park instituted the Yushin Constitution and with it, created the Special 
Law in Labor and Foreign Invested Firms which made it illegal for the overwhelming 
majority of union activity to occur.327 Furthermore, in 1973 through emergency decree, 
Park made all work stoppages illegal.328 Such was the legal situation until 1981, when 
Chun Doo-hwan, while lifting the Emergency decrees, created laws which further made 
unionization difficult—laws such as requiring at least 30 workers or 20 percent of the 
work force agreeing in order to being even allowed to apply for recognition. Additionally, 
the Chun regime made it illegal for any outside, third party to interfere in negotiations—
thus, collective bargaining was restricted to the local union and the firm.329 Furthermore, 
legally, only one union per firm was allowed.330  
 Setting aside the legal system, members of management were the ones on the 
front lines of controlling labor. Managers oversaw the day-to-day actions, gathered 
information on suspect employees and had the ability to lay-off or outright fire 
individuals, ‘educate’ them or otherwise persuade those under them. Management in turn 
worked closely with the unions, which were furthermore utilized for controlling workers. 
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Because there was only one union per firm allowed, companies often surreptitiously had 
a union formed by hand-picked representatives. If other workers sought to organize their 
own union, they would often be denied because one already existed.331  
 Rightist labor organizations were yet another tool to control the emergence and 
activities of Leftist organizations. Having its origins in the period following the end of 
colonialism, backed by the USMGIK, Rightists created the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions (FKTU) in 1946. Koo (1993) notes, that the FKTU’s main objective was not just 
the promotion of workers’ rights but also to crack down any leftist union formation and 
activities. Ogle (1990) further explains that the KCIA kept the FKTU ‘under its wing’—
having the ability to even appoint its leadership. Through the FKTU then, the KCIA was 
able to control other nation-wide industry-specific unions which further enjoyed 
hierarchical control of local unions within individual firms.332 The KCIA would often 
take point in carrying out investigations, intimidation and torture.333  
 In addition to the layers of control above, the police played a direct role in the 
control of labor. In every precinct located in an industrial area for instance, was an office 
in charge of labor issues. Management again would report suspect workers or un-
authorized union activities to the police, who would then, under the auspices of either the 
KCIA or the prosecutor’s office, investigate. If work stoppages or strikes did occur, up 
until the late 1980s they were the main suppressors. Among the police was a special riot 
squad made up of martial arts specialists called the paekkol-tan (‘white skeleton squad’), 
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referred to as such for their dark padded clothing (without name tags) and white 
helmets.334  
 Finally, groups of anti-union ‘company men’ referred to as kusadae (‘save-the-
company squads’) came to the scene in response to massive strikes in the late 1980s. 
Although there are accounts of firms hiring trained specialists or even thugs for the 
outright purpose of suppressing labor, most came from within the company. Still, the 
majority of men in Korean society have had to undergo at least a modicum of military 
training due to conscription requirements.335 The first accounts of organized kusadae 
came from the Hyundai conglomerate. Chung Ju Yong, the founder of Hyundai, in the 
midst of mass labor unrest in 1987, reportedly called upon his employees who had served 
in the ROK Marine Corps, declaring union riots to be a part of a communist plot and 
appealing for the Marines to once more “come to the defense of the motherland by 
defeating the labor union at Hyundai.”336 
 Yongyǒk-hoesa (as well as other private security firms) additionally have their 
start in the same tumultuous period which gave kusadae their start.337 Although there are 
a few accounts of private security involvement prior 1987, between 1984 and their move 
towards labor suppression, they were primarily involved in forced evictions as discussed 
in the previous section.338 
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7.3: Role of Civil Society 
 
 Koo (1993) notes that, although accounts of unionized workers during the 1960s 
was not much lower than in the 1970s (11.2 percent in 1965 versus 12.4% in 1970), 
towards the end of the 1960s a number of factors including but not limited to a shifting 
economy, massive layoffs, and poor, intolerable work conditions led to a spike in 
spontaneous, unorganized protests.339 However, as explained by Koo (2000), “the labor 
movement at that time (1960s and early 1970s) basically focused on economic and 
welfare issues and did not challenge the political legitimacy of the Park regime.”340 One 
widely covered and written about dramatic act by an individual however, would bring the 
issue of human rights and the plight of labor to the forefront of civil society’s 
consciousness.341    
 In protest of such intolerable conditions and a recalcitrant government force 
suppressing calls for labor reform, in November of 1970, Chun Tae Il, a young worker in 
a garment factory immolated himself during a demonstration. While on fire he held onto 
a booklet describing the Labor Standard Laws, screaming “Let us rest on Sunday!” 
“Abide by the Labor Standard Laws!” We are not machines!”342 Chun Tae Il would die of 
his burns, but in doing so his act of defiance would prove to be the force that ‘awakened’ 
intellectuals, students and church leaders to begin organizing within the ranks of South 
Koreas’ growing labor force.343 
                                                      
339 Koo, H. (1993). 138-139 
340 Kim, S.H. (2000). 55 
341 Ibid. (139); Kim S.H. (2000). 55 
342 Ibid. (139) 




 As already discussed, Christian organizations began to be actively involved in the 
labor movement during the 1970s and helped to organized workers’ night schools; 
facilitate discussions and other class-conscious creating/galvanizing activities. Students 
as well began their involvement in labor issues during the 1970s.344 The institution of the 
Yushin Constitution as well galvanized civil society in general and enmeshed and brought 
the issues of labor, Christian organizations, intellectuals and students alike into a larger 
group of anti-regime activists.  
 Following the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, labor activism 
skyrocketed—new unions were organized, deepened and carried out more labor disputes 
during the first five months of 1980 than had occurred over the course of the entire 
Yushin period (with 900 disputes).345 The following year, labor dispute incidents declined 
to 186 and then to only 88 in 1982.346 In the midst of labor crackdowns, the Kwangju 
Massacre was carried out, in addition to the implementation of the infamous re-education 
camps and other social ‘purges.’  
 Chun Doo Hwan’s relaxation of the various political controls yet again led to a 
resurgence in unions and labor disputes. In 1984 the Economic Planning Board (EPB) 
recorded 113 disputes, in 1985 there were 265, and in 1986, 276.347 Following the June 
29th declaration of the state’s move towards democratic elections there was a massive 
increase in unions—with the creation of 1048 more unions than the previous year. 
Furthermore, in July and August, there were 3,337 recorded labor strikes which ushered 
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in the Great Labor Struggle, and in turn, the state’s move towards the private market for 
force.348 
 Although the middle class had been supportive of the early labor movement 
during the authoritarian period, its growing militancy and on-going labor disputes created 
a schism between the two. While the move towards democratic elections largely placated 
the middle class—the regime’s declaration had not addressed the socioeconomic 
concerns of labor. On-going, often militant, violent labor clashes following democratic 
elections began to create a negative image of labor and the perception that the movement 
has lost its ‘moral authority’ in the minds of the middle class.349 Furthermore, Oh (1999) 
notes that there was a visible shift in the middle classes’ attitude toward labor in the face 
of real or perceived threats to economic or political stability—events which could easily 
be spun by the government friendly media as being a result of frequent labor disputes.350  
 Importantly, although labor disputes and correspondently, labor militancy was on 
the rise, as already explained, the middle class had largely been de-mobilized through 
political liberalization. However, one key civil society group would emerge in 1989. 
Made up of Korea’s educated elite (e.g. academics, religious leaders, journalists, doctors, 
lawyers, etc.), the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), as its name implies, 
focused on economic issues such as income distribution, real estate speculation, 
inadequate tax and financial systems, as well as agricultural, environmental and labor 
issues. Starting with 500 initial members, by 1993 it had exploded to 7,000. The CCEJ 
from its beginnings stated that it would be committed to peaceful, non-violent means of 
“non-political” social change and advocacy. Although other civil society groups would 
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emerge, the CCEJ was characteristic of the new wave of civil society groups which 
espoused non-violence means.351 It was furthermore clear that the middle-class would not 
tolerate overt militancy—either by political activists or the government. Thus, there was a 
stark difference in the political environment following the 1987 move towards direct 
presidential elections. The observable implications of this political shift can be seen in the 
changed tactics of labor suppression which will be discussed below.   
 
7.4: Labor Suppression following Authoritarianism: 1987 to the Present 
 
 As already stated, Rho Tae Woo’s statement that promised democratic elections 
largely placated much of the civil society protest and turmoil—and importantly, 
demobilized the middle class. The same statement however, provided labor with the 
window with which to organize on a massive scale. On July 6, 1987, less than two weeks 
after Rho’s declaration, employees at Hyundai quickly came together, organized and 
registered their union with the Office of Labor Affairs—making it the first union at the 
plant. Initially consisting of just 120 employees, membership increased by more than 10 
times to 1,400 almost immediately after it was created. The union formation at Hyundai 
engine then quickly precipitated the attempted formation of unions at Hyundai Shipyards 
and Hyundai Motors. Prior to their registration however, Hyundai Group had already sent 
company men to register their own respective  ‘unions’ so as to co-opt the legal formation 
of the workers’ organizations—this move by Hyundai’s management in turn resulted in 
mass demonstrations within the Hyundai group and reached other industrial areas in 
                                                      




August 1987.352 Hyundai’s labor issues soon spread to other conglomerates—with 69 
percent of firms with one thousand or more employees being affected by work stoppages, 
and 38.5 percent of firms with less than one thousand being affected as well.353 
 The demands of workers went beyond the largely economic concerns which had 
dominated the rationale for strikes and labor disputes during the 1960s, 70s and early to 
mid 1980s. In particular, strikes were focused on the right to establish democratic and 
independent unions, and a removal of the state-corporatist unions which had been utilized 
not for workers’ concern, but for the suppression of collective action. In other words, 
union activities were focused on the democratization of the workplace. 354 
 The state’s response is interesting. Up to until early August 1987, the regime had 
stayed on the sidelines of the labor dispute. Kim, S.H. (2000) for instance explains that 
the then existing regime did not want to ‘tarnish’ its new image as the progenitor of 
democracy through the visible mobilization of police forces the subsequent suppression 
of labor resistance.355 The last general-come-president Rho, as the greatest beneficiary of 
the past authoritarian regimes, was in fact limited in what he was able to do.356 
On September 2nd one incident however, in Ulsan (ground zero for the movement) 
occurred. Demonstrators took their protest to the streets and were met by an outnumbered 
regiment of riot police—one splinter group went so far as to storm City Hall, smashing 
windows and destroying furniture. Two days later, in the face of escalating violence and 
                                                      
352 Ogle, G.E. (117-118) 
353 Ibid. (116) 
354 Kim, S.H. (2000). 94 
355 Ibid. (94) 




continued appeals from Korea’s conglomerates, the police were finally mobilized, 
cracked down and instilled order.357 
 Although the state was able to effectively suppress the strikes, initial inaction by 
the state prompted Chung Ju Yong (of Hyundai Group) to add two additional layers of 
protection. First, the kusadae squads were formed as noted before. Second, Chung 
recruited thugs to be utilized as needed against unruly labor and strikes. Other firms 
would follow suit, making kusadae and hired ‘security’ the main coercive elements on 
the front lines of labor suppression.358 One early case which exemplifies the business-
state-criminal nexus involves yet again the Hyundai Group. At least one executive within 
Hyundai Heavy Chemicals (headed by Chung Ju Yong’s son) learned about a meeting 
among nineteen union chiefs within several of Hyundai’s companies. Having learned of 
this information, the executive (Han Yu Dong) contacted James Lee (a Korean-American) 
to act as a ‘union-buster.’ Lee planned the raid while Han contacted the police 
superintendent to inform him of Lee’s planned attack, of which the superintendent agreed 
not to intervene.359  
 Lee had amassed and trained a group of one hundred ‘company’ men, obtained 
communication equipment, iron rods and three company busses. They then proceeded to 
the location. After being stopped by a police road block which would not allow them to 
pass, a call was made to the superintendent who informed the sergeant in-charge to allow 
them to pass. Once reaching their destination they started to ‘educate’ the union men by 
beating them badly. Once through with the union members, they then drove to the city 
and broke into offices of the ‘Association of Dismissed Hyundai Employees’ and 
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destroyed whatever they could find while beating five more people in the office, and 
dragging them outside—reportedly forcing them to chant, “Our father is Kim Il Sung.”360 
 Although it was intended for the raid to remain a secret, when word was leaked 
that a foreigner was involved in organizing the incident, the press reported the incident 
which prompted members of the National Assembly to go to Ulsan to investigate.361 The 
investigation in turn led to the arrest of James Lee and others. Lee and Han Yu Dong both 
received light punishment with one year sentences, while one other received a one year 
and 6 month sentence. Thirty one other assailants received suspended sentences and were 
released.362 Although some of the perpetrators of violence in this case were prosecuted, 
the vast majority of instances fail to reach the news and/or generate significant interest. 
The fact that James Lee was a foreigner most assuredly influenced the publicity of the 
case, and thus, the response by the state.  
 Beyond the introduction of Kusadae and other private actors in the market for 
force, further measures were taken by the state to distance themselves from the 
authoritarian past. As discussed in chapter two, through a number of reforms of Korea’s 
justice system—including the coercive element of the system, significant measures were 
implemented to increase civilian collaboration and oversight—and in doing so, 
significantly decreased the amount of autonomy such groups once enjoyed. Tactics as 
well changed, and especially so during the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2003).  
 Under Kim Dae Jung, Police Commissioner General Lee Moo-Young launched 
his “Operation Grand Reform” which included two tactical changes. First, the use of tear-
gas as the previously go-to-weapon of choice for the police was removed as an option 
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under the “No CS-Gas policy.” The frequent use of tear-gas had a long history in Korea’s 
authoritarian past.363 If we remember back to 1960, the discovery of a 16 year old victim 
with a tear-gas canister lodged in his skull had set off the waves of protest which 
ultimately culminated in the ouster of Rhee Syngman. Of the rationale, Police 
Commissioner Lee stated in an interview with the International Herald Tribune in 
February of 2000 that when tear-gas is fired, “Molotov cocktails always follow”.364 In an 
interview with police officials and representatives of the Korea Employers Federation 
(KFF), it was explained to Kwon (2011) that democracy in Korea could be measured by 
the amount of shot tear-gas canisters.365 In 1996, 210,000 canisters were shot; in 1998, 
only 3,400 and in 1999, zero.366  
 In place of tear-gas was the implementation of an ingenious tactic—referred to as 
the “lip-stick” line. Unarmed policewomen in their pressed uniforms with white gloves 
were sent to protest venues. They would stand at the front lines of the protest, effectively 
creating a cordoning-off barrier between the protesters and the civilian line. Ahn Pong 
Sul, international director of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, was cited in the 
same International Tribune article listed above, as stating that: “They’ve placed these 
female police officers on the front lines…of course, they are unarmed. How can we 
attack females?”367 
 The “lip-stick” line, while helping to reduce the militant image of the police, has 
not replaced the riot police, kusadae corps or private security. Indeed, behind the women 
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police officers are often those very actors—in place and ready to act if violence in fact 
erupts. In preventing violence from spilling over pre-determined areas (e.g. into the view 
of non-protesting civilians), the “lip-stick” line has proven invaluable. Furthermore, as 
Kwon (2012) notes, “In highly populated public settings the police have to be careful to 
conceal their violence, or its potentiality, embodied in the black-clad riot police…The 
police did not generally intrude into the contained space of specified protest venues. 
Violence occurred, rather, during the march through the streets, as the large throng of 
laborers and activists threatened to break containment.”368 
 As we can see from the discussion above, the state has not retreated but has rather 
sought to contain the violence which occurs out of the view of society—in an ‘out of 
sight out of mind’ sort of rationale. Violence perpetrated by kusadae thugs or private, 
yongyǒk-hoesa as well often occurs away from the site of the public—with the police 
assuming the role again of preventing escalations of conflict.  
 The recent case of labor suppression highlights the continued role of private thugs 
in strike-breaking. In July, 2012 workers at the SJM auto parts factory in Ansan, 
Gyeonggi Province (just south of Seoul) were protesting for higher wages and the 
company’s response by locking them out. In response to the on-going protest, SJM hired 
Contacus—a private security firm with close ties and connections to both Lee Myung Pak 
and members of his ruling Saenuri Party—to suppress and disperse the demonstrators.369 
The same firm furthermore was in charge of President Lee Myung Pak’s personal 
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security during his presidential run, as well as being involved in redevelopment 
projects.370 
 In the morning of July 27th 200 men from Contactus, donning helmets, shields and 
wielding clubs, arrived on scene and began assaulting the 150 unionists. In addition to 
clubs and shields, the ‘security’ force lodged pieces of metal at the demonstrators as well 
as spraying them with fire extinguishers.371 At 4:30 am, according to the SJM labor union, 
one of its members reportedly phoned the 112 Emergency Call Center. One hour later, 
the police arrived and remained outside the plant, taking no action against the security 
thugs while the conflict lasted for hours.372 The police were cited as stating that 
“everything was already under control when they arrived at the scene an hour after 
receiving the report.”373 This statement was contradicted however by the NPA who stated 
that the commanding officer of the riot police on scene “did not take any action as he 
mistook the security guards for policemen in the dark as they were wearing helmets and 
protective gear.”374 In the process of suppressing the demonstration, thirty-four workers 
suffered injuries—ten of which were reportedly serious.375  
 The Korean Metal Workers Unions (KMWU) publicized this event, in large part 
helped by the fact that the scenes described above were captured by video, and called for 
an investigation into both the firm Contactus, Moon (as its president), and police’s non-
action. In response, Kim Ki-yong, commissioner general of the NPA ordered the police to 
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conduct an internal investigation and take disciplinary actions against those responsible, 
which included the commanding officer of the riot police. An unnamed police official 
further noted that “A private security firm can intervene in protests and strikes but it must 
report to us in advance for us to keep an eye on any possible violent acts. Contactus 
obvious failed to do its duty.”376 Officials at Contactus as well offered a quasi-apology 
but in doing so stated that “they [the workers] are not innocent people, but a brutal group 
that must be inevitably suppressed.” They further explained that “Without us, business 
activity will wither and there will be a burden on government authority.”377  
 What we can see clearly from this case is that the ‘state’ has largely moved away 
from active engagement in strike suppressions (as well as in other cases of protest) 
towards managing and containing the violence. In place of the riot police, who remain 
mobilized and present, are private security firms and kusadae who carry out the 
suppressions. By operating under the façade of de-militarization, in term helps the state 
avoid politicizing any one action. In the events where the police are forced to intervene, 
their involvement is limited—thus reducing the overall level of politicization.  
 
7.5: Conclusion 
In establishing the military junta’s power, we can see a similar trajectory of state 
development in Korea, which was followed by European state makers. State seekers 
come state actors utilized a range of mixed methods with which to establish dominance, 
including ‘eliminating,’ ‘subjugating,’ and ‘buying’ as the ‘occasions presented 
themselves.’ Rhee’s political machine relied upon non-state groups largely under logic of 
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capacity during and following the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Bowing to 
growing societal pressure, Rhee was forced to step down from power, thus opening the 
door for the military under Park’s leadership to take power via coup over the toothless 
government that had come into power following the Liberal Party’s collapse.  
Although Park came to power through coup, he was cognizant that he could not 
rule by iron fist alone, and assuredly not without the support of US aid. Thus, the military 
junta came to the scene with the immediate goal of eliminating any potential rival, which 
included going after the once powerful set of criminal organizations that had helped prop 
up the Rhee’s Liberal Party. This in turn proved popular with society which had blamed 
such groups for much of the state’s failings under Rhee. Between 1961 and 1963, the 
military junta was effectively able to break the back of ‘political gangsterism.’ And, 
despite my not being able to locate reliable, easily-triangulated evidence linking criminal 
groups to high level political power during Park’s ‘democratic period’ (1963-1971), there 
are varying accounts that such organizations were utilized, albeit, sparingly, as the 
occasions presented themselves (e.g. during elections). Although this is an area which 
admittedly requires more study, I can surmise that given Park’s low levels of popularity, 
and the semblance of democracy that he was attempting to maintain, the use of such 
groups helped to avoid the odium of coercion that would have fallen on to his regime’s 
shoulders had the police been used in such instances.  
That Park had a preference for public as opposed to private sources of coercion is 
evident. When asked why gangsters were not utilized during the authoritarian period 
under Park and the early period of Chun Doo-hwan’s regime, one police respondent 




they didn’t need to use such non-state, violence wielding groups—there was no façade of 
democracy and they had the iron fisted capacity with which to instill order.  
Through economic development came an increasingly urbanized, educated 
populace—a necessary component of Park’s rapid industrialization plan. Although Park 
was killed in 1979, the seeds of a growing, contentious society had been planted—the 
consequence of which Chun Doo Hwan would have to deal with. Repression of dissent, 
specifically repression by state sources, was met with more protest. The specific actors 
carrying out repression in other words, as it has been shown, matters. Chun’s backward 
move towards the use private actors in the face of yet another authoritarian crisis in the 
form of widespread protests and pressure mobilized by an expanded civil society is 
observable implication decreased government autonomy.   
Although I was unable to witness firsthand, the violence carried out in the cases 
of forced evictions (of tenants) and labor suppression, I did witness it in the case of 
forced removals of street vendors. Seeing the riot police idly standing by, I asked myself 
the same questions which motivated this study. Namely, why would society allow such 
things to occur? Such violence, I had assumed, should not be occurring in a 
democratically developed society, as South Korea in 2011, was and remains to be 
characterized as such. If the street vendors, laborers, students, or anyone else is breaking 
the law, why can’t the state simply mobilize the police to arrest or otherwise sanction 
such actors through the legal system engendered to ensure order? The answer as already 
stated, is that history matters.  
Years of autocratic, corrupt and brutal rule coupled with rapid economic 




a strong state with a contentious society. Park engineered, through a mixture of sheer 
genius and heavy-handed repression, rapid industrialization. One of the reasons he had 
succeeded, where others had failed, is that he was able to accumulate the necessary 
coercive capacity with which to shape the direction of the economy while suppressing 
any and all challengers. Park was able to do so under the semblance of democracy 
between 1963 and 1971. Society over that brief period of time however shifted to become 
largely urbanized and educated. Such a transition, while necessary for South Korea’s 
move away from light to heavy industry, created a situation in which governing the 
masses, became incrementally more difficult. In other words, the state’s autonomy from 
society forces was rapidly decreasing. Park’s capitulation to the demands of business was 
no doubt unpopular—and if we believe Woo’s (1991) argument, impossible under the 
disguise of democratic rule—prompted the move towards full-blown authoritarianism. 
Why didn’t we see the move towards the private market for force during this period? This 
is because Park’s regime didn’t need to. They had a tremendous amount of coercive 
capacity and no need to follow the semblance of democratic rule.  
The political environment that Chun ‘inherited’ following the assassination of 
Park and a brief interlude was vastly different than the one which Park had initially 
started with. Chun thus faced an environment in which he had to increasingly utilize 
repression on an unprecedented scale. Chun’s measures indeed proved successful, so why 
the move towards the market in 1984 with forced evictions and 1987 with respect to labor 
suppression? The reason why is that Chun was attempting to ‘have his cake and eat it too.’ 
Chun’s regime had first miscalculated the status quo and began to lift his heavy 




measures to bring them about, all the while attempting to increase both the domestic and 
international popularity of his regime. By privatizing redevelopment projects, Chun 
effectively removed the state from the vast majority of direct forced evictions.  Despite 
Chun’s changing tactics, civil society’s power, something he ostensibly underestimated, 
proved to be his downfall.  
1987 not only saw the removal of Chun, but additionally the promulgation of 
direct presidential elections. Political liberalization however neither addressed the 
socioeconomic concerns of labor, nor the maximalist demands of some of the more 
radical elements of civil society. The middle-class, happy enough with direct elections, 
were effectively demobilized. However, cognizant of the middle-classes’ power, the 
government, first under Roh, were careful not to provide them with galvanizing images of 
Korea’s authoritarian past—enter in the kusadae and involvement of yong-yeok 
companies in the area of labor suppression. As in the case of forced evictions, Korea’s 
police have shifted from being the perpetrators of violence and coercion, to managers of 
it. The state has to extremely careful not to provide the middle class a reason to mobilize. 
As long as forced evictions and labor suppression remain de-politicized, the middle class 
has shown a tremendous amount of toleration.  
The legitimacy of the state in Korea, and thus the success and survival of 
political actors then, has become dependent not only on sustaining economic growth and 
maintaining security, but also dependent upon insuring the growth, expansion and 
protection of democracy. While we generally expect that most governments within 
democracies should derive their legitimacy from such tasks, Korea, because of its recent 




distancing itself from the history of autocratic and brutal rule, following (at least the 
appearance of) the rule of law, while at the same time instilling order. Instilling order 
then, has become a tightrope walk for governments during the post-authoritarian period. 
As the police under Japanese rule had become symbols of colonialism, the police 
following Japan’s surrender became symbols to corrupt, authoritarian rule and the state’s 
numerous broken promises of democracy. As argued by Kwon (2011), the use of 
coercion by state actors (i.e. the police) in the contemporary era, runs the risk of 
conjuring up recent memories of Korea’s authoritarian past. “State violence has 
significant symbolic valance in post-authoritarian Korea, constituting an interpretive 
frame by which political legitimacy is evaluated, for both the state and civil society 
groups.”378  
As noted by Koo (1993), although the state has played a tremendously influential 
and critical role in setting the trajectory and framework of Korea’s economic, social and 
political transformation, social and political change have come as a result of the ways in 
which various sub-sets of society have reacted, either individually or collectively, to state 
actions.379 Society in other words, has shaped, and continues to shape the institutional 
capacity of the state. The institutional capacity of the state in turn has varied over time, 
thus influencing the preferences of state actors. Contemporary state-non-state 
collaboration in the Korean market for force then, is the observable implication of the 
state’s decreased ability to ignore the society’s own preferences. The phenomenon of sub-
contracting of force, in other words, is the state’s calculated attempt to distance itself 
from actions deemed authoritarian, and thus punishable by society’s liberal forces.  
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Conclusion and Extension of Argument Beyond Korea 
 
8.1: Summary of main argument 
The goal of this dissertation was to examine the practice of collaboration and 
collusion between state and non-state actors in the market for criminal violence, and 
specifically offer an explanation for why this occurs in developed, high capacity settings. 
Using the case of Korea in order to develop and refine this study’s guiding hypotheses, 
we can clearly see that the process of state-non-state collaboration in early Korean state 
development followed closely the same trajectory as explained by conventional wisdom. 
Namely, state seekers and state actors mobilized whatever forces were available, criminal 
or otherwise, to assist them in gaining coercive supremacy. Such collaboration in turn 
occurred under logic of weak capacity. Once Park Chung Hee ascended to power through 
his 1961 coup d’état he further went about establishing a clear demarcation between the 
legitimacy of the state’s coercive power and its use, and the illegitimacy of non-state 
competitors. That there was ambiguity between state and non-state sources of violence 
prior to Park is clear. It is also clear that the ‘grey zone’ of violence—although not 
completely eradicated—was significantly reduced during Park’s 18 year tenure.  
 If we looked no further than the 1945 to 1960 period of early state development in 




existent, weak-state explanations. Collaboration between state actors and private 
specialists in violence, however, would emerge through the early Park period, be 
squashed following his move towards explicit authoritarianism, and yet again emerge in 
the wake of declining political autonomy during the 1980s. The conditions with which 
such collaborative arrangements flourished in the post-Rhee regime however were 
decidedly different. Namely, the state at that time had a tremendous amount of coercive 
power. Park’s early regime between the early 1960s and 1970 was constrained through 
the need to pretend that Korea was at least moving towards a democracy. Over the course 
of his tenure Korean society experienced rapid economic development, became urbanized, 
and increasingly educated and contentious. The Korea that Chun inherited was thus vastly 
different than at any period in Korea’s long history. Indeed, Chun faced uncooperative 
students, labor, intellectuals, and the new middle class, which formed into a powerful 
anti-authoritarian alliance. In order to deflect certain societal forces, the state, first under 
Chun, turned towards the private market for forced evictions, thereby removing 
themselves from not only domestic criticism and forces, but international as well. 
Coercion and violence did not end to be sure, but the actors perpetrating it changed. With 
this move the grey zone of violence once again expanded. It would expand even more so 
following massive labor riots in the wake of the move towards direct, democratic 
elections, in which successive governments’ legitimacy depended upon their distancing 
themselves from Korea’s authoritarian past. The ambiguity between public and private 
violence wielders in turn helps the state to avoid direct political backlash.  
Although the middle class stands to gain from projects which increase the 




actors, as Kwon (2011) explains, has significant symbolic valence which threatens to 
mobilize the middle class actors against the state. The state in turn enlists the coercive 
forces of non-state actors in order to avoid increasing the probability of such action. The 
potential for middle class mobilization, in short, is the mechanism which pushes the state 
towards collaboration with private actors in the market for criminal force.  
8.2 Beyond the case of Korea 
  State-non-state collusion in the market for criminal violence to be sure is not 
unique to Korea. It is furthermore not merely a function of something unique to ‘Korean 
culture,’ but rather a response to a particular set of political conditions and calculations 
on behalf of state actors. Although more study is needed, we can clearly see at least the 
possibility that the same logic was at work in the former slave-owning states of the US 
south, where lynch mobs and thugs collaborated with the landed aristocracy, police and 
political powers in carrying out extra-legal coercion and mass intimidation. State-criminal 
collaboration in Japan is furthermore well documented by historians and journalists, but 
remains largely understudied by social scientists. The following section briefly covers 
both the US south and Japanese cases.  
8.2.1:Lynchings, the KKK and state collaboration 
Following the end of the Civil War much of the legal control whites had over 
southern blacks had been lost with the passage of the Thirteenth amendment. Through 
various attempts at regaining control via legal means, principally over African-American 
labor, southern governments instituted what were referred to as the “Black Codes.” South 




employed as anything other than a farmer or servant unless they paid a significant tax.380 
Louisiana’s Labor Contract Law further required that freed men employed as laborers 
sign binding one year contracts during the first 10 days of each January.381 Other laws 
throughout the south as well made it illegal for African-Americans to keep or carry 
firearms, ammunition, or other types of weapons.  
Despite southern governments’ attempts at re-asserting their legal power over 
African-Americans, and further despite President Andrew Jackson’s veto power which he 
used in March 1866, Congress was able to over-ride the executive decision and pass the 
Civil Rights Act a month later. African-Americans became full-fledged citizens and 
white southerners had a problem on their hands.382 Of this time, Tolnay and Beck (1992) 
explain, “If southern whites were to continue to enjoy an economy in which blacks 
labored to create wealth for the privileged, it would be necessary to devise some 
alternative mechanisms to again harness African-American labor. The mechanism of 
choice became violent repression.”383 Extra-legal lynching in turn became a favorite tool. 
Although having started earlier, between 1882 and 1930, following the end of 
Reconstruction, roughly 2,800 citizens died as a result of lynching, of which almost 2,500 
were African Americans and 94 percent of those having been victims of white lynch 
mobs.384 The vindicating rhetoric and argument for such extra-legal lynching of the time 
was that it made up for an inefficient and overly lenient justice system in the face of 
increasing black on white crime. Although much of the violence was directed towards 
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suspected ‘criminals,’ evidence suggests that the justice system in the south was far from 
afraid of administering lethal or otherwise harsh sentences to African-Americans, and did 
so at a ‘prodigious’ rate.385 If the evidence points to the legal system as having both the 
capacity and the willingness to dole out racially-prejudiced ‘justice’, why the need for 
privately sourced coercion? Tolnay and Beck again argue that beyond insuring swift 
‘popular justice,’ lynching served three inter-related functions: (1) it helped maintain 
social control over African-Americans through [extra-legal] terror; (2) it helped to 
suppress or eliminate African-American competitors from economic, political or social 
rewards, and; (3) it served to stabilize white class structure and preserve the white 
aristocracy’s privileged status. 386  The former governor of Mississippi, James K. 
Vardaman (1904-1908) summed up much of the white sentiment of the time when he 
stated that “If it is necessary every Negro in the state will be lynched; it will be done to 
maintain white supremacy.”387  
The southern whites turned towards lynch mobs and other forms of extra-legal 
coercion and intimidation following the end of the civil war is a well-documented chapter 
in US history. How might the theory posited in this study help explain such collaboration? 
Prior to the Civil War repression and slavery was a legal institution. Slave states in short 
did not need to turn to non-state groups simply because the state itself was the terrorist. 
With the end of the Civil War, southern states faced a new political environment in which 
the federal government, through federal troops, forced legal recognition of African-
Americans—effectively reducing their autonomy, albeit, not from societal forces but 
from federal sources. Although the south had largely been decimated in the process of the 
                                                      
385 Ibid. (18) 
386 Ibid. (18-19) 




Civil War, (along with its institutional capacity), following Reconstruction (1865-1880) 
much of what had been destroyed was re-established. If there were accounts of state 
actors turning towards non-state lynch mobs as a result of deficiencies in institutional 
capacity it’d make for a nice complementary and linier story with that of the Korean case.  
However, as far as I have been able to ascertain, the evidence does not support a capacity 
argument for the turn towards extra-legal violence, but rather, and overwhelmingly, a 
normative one.  
With both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments having been ratified, poor 
whites faced roughly 4 million new economic competitors in the form of southern 
African Americans who would work for less, so it’s easy enough to guess at their 
motivations for turning towards terrorism.388 Although poor whites made up much of the 
lynch mobs that carried out such ‘southern justice’ however, they did so with at least the 
complicity of state and local level actors, as well as with the white landowners and 
members of the aristocracy.389  
That state and local police would benefit from such social control measures is, as 
with the poor whites’ rational, readily understandable (yet still reprehensible). Why then 
would white landowners and other elites, who stood to gain from low labor prices and 
ostensibly, easier to control workers, support such measures? One oft-cited reason is that 
racial violence instigated by white land-owners may have been a way to maintain control 
over, and thus prevent resistance by their African-American workers.390 Still yet another 
reason provided is such ‘mob-justice,’ again, predominately carried out by poor whites, 
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served to maintain the social division between both sets of low-wage workers. In other 
words, it served to prevent coalition and collective action against the white elite, by poor 
black and poor whites.391 As explained by Morris (1984):  
All members of the white group had a stake in racial domination, because 
they derived privileges from it. Poor and middle-class whites benefited 
because the segregated labor force prevented blacks from competing with 
them for better-paying jobs. The Southern white ruling class benefited 
because blacks supplied them with cheap labor and a weapon against the 
labor movement. Finally, most Southern whites benefited psychologically 
from the system’s implicit assurance that no matter how poor and 
uneducated, they were “always better than the niggers.”392 
 
Through such continued practices of lynching and other forms of repression, the 
south saw an exodus of African-Americans which in turn began to populate much of 
the North.  
 The 1960s is yet another tumultuous and well-documented, violent period in 
the US south. In the midst of the Civil Rights Movement for instance, a number of 
instances showcase not only state-level toleration and complicity in criminal violence, 
but federal involvement as well.  
 On June 3rd, 1946 the US Supreme Court, in Morgan v. Virginia, ruled against 
segregated seating on interstate busses and trains. President Truman however failed to 
back the ruling with federal enforcement. In 1960, the court further ruled in Boynton v. 
Virginia that segregation in restaurants, waiting rooms, and restrooms was again, 
unconstitutional. The government under Eisenhower, similar to Truman’s response, again 
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remained unwilling to enforce federal law at the state and local levels. 393  Thus, 
segregation, despite being ruled illegal by federal law, remained in place as the unofficial 
law.394  
On May 4th, 1961 13 Freedom Riders boarded their buses bound for the 
Alabama in opposition to and in demonstration of locally, though ‘informally’ enforced 
segregation. Upon hearing about the Freedom Rider’s intent to break the ‘color line’ in 
Alabama, Birmingham police Sgt. Tom Cook and detective W.W. “Red” Self summoned 
Gary Rowe, a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) member (and unknowing to either Cook or Self, an 
FBI informant), to a meeting. Reportedly, Cook stated “I don’t give a damn if you beat 
them, bomb them, murder or kill them. We don’t ever want to see another nigger ride on 
the bus into Birmingham again.”395 A group of 60 KKK members were then chosen to 
attack the riders on May 14th when they arrived. The Knights would have a 15 minute 
‘grace period’ granted by Eugene “Bull” O’Connor, the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
Connor specifically instructed: “By God, if you are going to do this, do it right,” and 
further stated that the demonstrators should be beaten until they “looked like a bulldog 
got hold of them,” stripped of their clothes and chased from the bus depot whereby the 
police would arrest them for indecent exposure. Furthermore, “if any Klansman 
overstayed their welcome and wound up in jail were guaranteed light sentences.”396 
Rowe informed his FBI handler of the plot who in turn notified Birmingham’s 
police chief, Jamie Moore. Moore in turn delegated control to Tom Cook no less, one of 
the originators of the planned raid. In route to Birmingham, Klansmen met the bus in 
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Anniston and quickly overtook it, boarding the bus and assaulting the riders—one of 
which was beaten so badly he had permanent brain damage. Passively watching the 
assault were FBI agents and three local policemen. One officer on scene reportedly 
boarded the bus and told the Knights “Don’t worry about no lawsuits, I ain’t seen a 
thing.”397  
With nine Klansmen still aboard, the hijacked bus then proceeded to Birmingham 
where more Knights gathered in wait, armed with blackjacks, leaded baseball bats and 
steel pipes, including the FBI informant, Rowe. When the bus arrived the mob rushed the 
victims and carried out yet another round of ‘southern justice.’ As Rowe was clubbing an 
unidentified black woman, police detective Red Self informed him that the Klan’s 15 
minutes were over. As the Klansmen retreated, Self made sure he thanked him for doing a 
“good job.”398 
Following the Birmingham riots the action moved towards Montgomery on the 
20th of May. The FBI again informed authorities that the freedom riders were in route, 
and once again thugs were waiting for the demonstrators. Ten minutes into the riots the 
police arrived and remained on the sidelines. An hour and fifteen minutes later the police 
and sheriffs began to disperse the rioters. One white couple was arrested and jailed for 
“disorderly conduct”—they had been shielding victims from further assault.399 
Following the Birmingham riots the FBI questioned a number of those involved 
in the riots but federal charges were not initially filed. It finally took criticism of the 
bureau’s handling of the riots by Assistant Attorney William Orrick directly to Robert 
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Kennedy to get the bureau to finally act, though by 1962 only five were convicted. Even 
then those convicted received only light punishment.400 Rather than investigating the 
violence carried out by the Klan, Hoover was reportedly more interested in directing FBI 
resources towards checking the criminal backgrounds of the potentially ‘communist’ 
Freedom Riders.401 
Although again it is easy enough to ascertain the incentives of the state officials 
and local police for collaboration with members of the KKK (many of the officials were 
themselves members of course), the FBI’s response, or rather, lack thereof, is rather 
interesting. Though it’s less straight forward then the other cases and warrants much 
more research, the FBI did engage in various types of collaborative arrangements with 
certain groups and elements of the KKK. Cunningham (2013) argues that although 
Hoover had disdain for the KKK, going so far as to call them a “group of sadistic, vicious 
white trash,” he apparently found the civil rights activists more distasteful and the KKK 
useful for harassing them and suspected Communist members.402 Cunningham further 
explains:  
“He [Hoover] also felt strongly that the [civil rights] movement, which 
purportedly had ties to communist interests, posed a significant security risk. In 
a very real sense, the FBI allied with the klan’s goals, as it had long monitored 
and attempted to suppress civil rights initiatives through its “radical matters” 
investigations of prominent civil rights organizations and leaders—including 
Martin Luther King Jr.—whose purported moral shortcomings and alliances 
with communist agents made them suspect “subversives.”403 
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Given the overlap in interests, the FBI under Hoover emphasized controlling various 
factions of the KKK rather than eliminating them.404 This emphasis in turn allowed for a 
certain amount of Klan mobilization.405 Still, the FBI had a dual purpose. Close relations 
with the Klan, although opening up the door for their mobilization and use by the bureau 
at times, allowed for the FBI to gather substantial information through their informants 
and/or carry out anti-Klan FBI actions such as spreading rumors or otherwise creating 
division within their ranks. Thus, even though there are accounts of the FBI utilizing the 
Klan as the occasions called for (as exemplified in the Freedom Riders example above), 
they also put themselves in a position to neutralize them when the time came for it.406 The 
1964 Freedom Summer project murders in Neshoba County, Mississippi would provide 
in part the impetus for the FBI to do so. On June 21st of that year, civil rights activists 
James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner were brutally murdered, in 
which twenty-one people tied to KKK, including the architects of the attack, police 
Deputy Price and County Sheriff Rainey, were implicated. This act, as depicted in the 
film, Mississippi Burning, would generate significant national attention and pressure and 
which culminated into a heavy handed federal response and crackdown on KKK 
activities through the efforts of the FBI.407  
8.2.2: The Japanese state-criminal nexus 
 In addition to the case of case of collaboration in southern US states as described 
above, Japan has had a long and varied history of state-criminal collaboration in the 
market for extra-legal force. As explained briefly in the theory chapter, beginning as early 
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as the Tokugawa period (1603-1887) the shogunate (military commander), faced with 
financial shortages, famines and peasant protests during the 1830s turned towards so-
called bakuto (gamblers, who along with the itinerant peddlers (tekiya) were the 
predecessors to modern day yakuza) for assisting with maintaining order, acting as guides 
and informants in areas where the shoganate’s power was either weak or ambiguous at 
best.408 In other words, the shogunate was forced to rely on such non-state groups out of 
shear weakness (i.g. capacity concerns). Although Bakuto had their origins in gambling 
they were forced to develop a capacity for coercion in order to protect their territories 
from other potentially predatory bakuto. The Tokugawa government in turn capitalized 
on both the bakuto’s ability and willingness to use that violence.  
Prior to shogunate-bakuto collaboration however in the mid to late 1800s, local 
law enforcement and officials would cooperate with such groups in order to enlist their 
help not only as informants but also in harnessing them to act as quasi-bounty hunters in 
return for leniency or release from jail for their own crimes. Unimpeded by official 
boundaries, bakuto could travel freely to other jurisdictions, capture criminals and bring 
them back without a formal appeal to officials in the other territories, which was required 
if the daimyo (lord) sent his warrior retainers.409 Constrained by such horizontal and 
vertical procedures then, daimyu were presumably forced to resort to non-official, private 
means and mechanisms in order to enforce their will while at the same time avoiding the 
repercussions for doing so.  
In addition to the above instances of collaboration, during various struggles 
between the Tokugawa regime and pro-imperial forces the bakuto, with their reserves of 
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fighting forces became important in determining many of outcomes of the battles, much 
as the pubosang and later criminal gangs had in early Korean history and the run up to the 
1953 war, though again we can assume that this was largely under a logic of capacity.410  
During the 1920s, an economically prosperous period referred as the “Taisho” 
democracy era, saw the introduction of universal suffrage, an expansion of the middle 
class and an upsurge in labor unions.411 This period also saw the growth of Rightists and 
ultranationalists which enlisted the ranks of gangsters.412 Formed in 1919, in part of the 
brainchild of Takejiro Tokunami (the then minister of home affairs), the Dai Nippon 
Kokusui-kai (Great Japan National Essence Society) for example, an organization of 
more 60,000 gangsters, laborers, was extensively used as strike-breakers. Among many 
other instances, the Kokusui-kai force was used to violently attack 28,000 men who had 
walked out in the 1920 Yawata Iron Works strike.413 When the original president of the 
Kokusui-kai died in 1926, the long time politician and former minister of foreign affairs, 
civilian governor of Taiwan and mayor of Tokyo (among other high level positions), 
Goto Shinpei, reportedly lobbied for the top position of the organization but was passed 
over for not having sufficiently anti-communist qualifications.414 Three years later Suzuki 
Kisaburo, former home minister and minister of Justice assumed the president of the 
organization, as well as the head of the rightist Seiyuikai political party.415 Of the 
criminal-political alliance, Siniawer (2012) notes that: “Ultimately, the violence of the 
Kokusui-kai did inspire probing questions about the organization, but the murkiness of 
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the state-yakuza relationship helped shield the state from the brunt of criticism.”416 
Seiyuikai’s principle opposition, the Minseito Party, among other political powers 
organized their own paramilitary forces which were also staffed by gangsters.417 Such 
direct political-gangster collaboration would continue throughout the end of WWII.418  
The above description of political-criminal ties through the end of World War II 
by no means covers the entire extent of such relationships. Indeed, following surrender in 
1945 US occupying forces as well found thugs and gangsters particularly useful in going 
after leftists and suspected or self-acknowledge communists as had occurred during the 
US military occupation of Korea (1945-1948).419 And again, similar to the case of state-
criminal collaboration beginning in the 1920s, such collusion cannot simply be explained 
by the weak-state hypothesis.  
8.3: Conclusion 
  Such state-criminal collaboration as explained in the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation, as well as the US and Japanese cases briefly discussed above, highlights a 
largely understudied phenomenon of cooperation between two seemingly unlikely 
partners. In all three contexts we can clearly see state actors capitalizing on the ambiguity 
between legitimate, state coercion, and the illegitimacy of violent actions by non-state 
actors. Such collaboration cannot merely be explained away by the weak-state hypothesis. 
This study argues that although the weak capacity argument in part can explain certain 
types and instances of collaboration, the argument by itself is insufficient, and especially 
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so in cases where the state has the capacity to act, but chooses instead to delegate. In such 
instances, collaboration occurs as a result of a set of strategic choices—choices employed 

























1. Korean OC Groups and Members420 
Region (pop) Population of members OC Groups 
members % of total # % of total 
Seoul special region 
(9,820,171) 




Inch’ǒn 2,526 5.3 24 6.3 
Kyǒng-gi 10,419 22.0 37 9.7 




Pusan 3,519 7.4 97 25.3 
Urlsan 1,047 2.2 8 2.1 
Kyǒngnam  3,054 6.5 14 3.7 




Daegu  2,462 5.2 27 7.0 
kyǒngbuk  2,630 5.6 11 2.9 




Daecheon 1,442 3.1 10 2.6 
Chung-nam 1,890 4.0 16 4.2 
Chung-buk 1,459 3.1 9 2.3 
                                                      




Total 4,791 10.2 35 9.1 
Ho-nam 
호남 
Kwangju 1,417 3.0 20 5.2 
Chǒn-nam 1,819 3.8 15 3.9 
Chǒn-buk 1,781 3.8 15 3.9 
Total 5,017 10.6 50 13.0 
Kangwǒn 1,461 3.1 15 3.9 
Cheju-do  529 1.1 3 0.8 
Total 47,251 100.0 383 100.0 






















2. Distribution of Main Criminal Groups in Korea:421  
Seoul Special Region422 
LOCATION  NAME 
Miari Ssang t’aek yi p’a (쌍택이파) 
Mugyǒ-dong Pǒm Ho Nam P’a (범호남파); Yang Un Yi P’a (양은이파); Sǒ P
ang P’a (서방파) ; OB Dong Chae P’a (OB 동재파) 
Myǒng –dong Sin Sang Sa P’a (신상사파) 
Yǒng Dŭng Po Sam Il Tang (삼일당)à Chung Ang Dong P’a (중앙동파); Yǒng 
Dŭng Po P’a (영등포파); Yǒng Dŭng Po Si Jang P’a (영등포 
시장파) 
Dongdaemun Ku Kuk P’il Yi P’a (국필이파)à Kka Pul Yi P’a (까불이파)à 
Ch’ǒng Yang Ri P’a (청량리파); Dong Dae Mun P’a (동대문파) 
Kangnam-Ku Mok Po P’a (목포파); Dong A P’a (동아파); Hak Dong P’a 
(학동파) 
Gwanak-Ku Bong Ch’ǒn Sa Go Ri P’a (봉천사거리파)à Bong Ch’ǒn P’a 
(봉천파); Eagles P’a (이글수 파) 
 
Outside of Seoul 
LOCATION NAME 
Kyǒng-in Kkoll Mang P’a 꼴망파; Sǒn Jang P’a (선장파); Pu P’yǒng Sik 
Ku P’a (부평 식구파); Pu Ch’ǒn P’a (부천파); Pu Ch’ǒn Sik Ku 
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P’a (부천 식구파); Suwǒn P’a (수원파); Nam Mun P’a 
(남문파); Puk Mun P’a (북문파); Chu An P’a (주안파);  Yǒk 
Chǒn P’a (역전파); Ch’ǒnghawi Sang P’a(청하위생파); Tigers 
P’a (태이거파); Kuk Che Mapia P’a (국제마피아파); Wǒn ju 
Min P’a (원주민파)    
Bu-kyǒng 
 
Ch’il Sǒng P’a (칠성파)à Sin Ch’il Sǒng P’a (신 칠성파); Yǒng 
Do P’a 영도파; Hae Un Dong Ch’il Sǒng P’a (해운동 칠성파); 
Yutae P’a (유대파); 20 Sae Gi P’a (20세기파)à Sin 20 Sae Gi 
P’a (신 20세기파); Baek Ho P’a (백호파); Ul San Pok Gong 
P’a (울산 복공파); Ul San San Yǒk Chǒn P’a (울산 산역전파); 
Mi Ryang Yǒng Song P’a 밀양 영성파; Ma San Buk P’a (마산 북 
파); Sin Sin Yǒkchǒn P’a (신신역전파); Sin Mǒk Gong P’a 
(신목공파);  
Dae-kyǒng Hyang Chon Dong P’a (향촌동파); Dong Sǒng No P’a 
(동성로파)à Sin Dong Sǒng No P’a (신동성로파); Dong Ku 
Yonhap P’a (동구연합파); An Dong Dae Myǒng Hoe (안동 
대명회); Ku Mi Kŭm O San P’a (구미 금오산파); Po Hang Il 
Sim Hoe (포항 일심회);  Daemyǒnhae(대명회); Donghap P’a 
(통합파); Samgori P’a (삼거리파) 
Chung-bu: 
 
Ya Mang P’a (야망파); P’aridaisu P’a (파리다이스파); Ch’il 
Sul- I P’a (질술이파); Mog Po Nae Gi P’a 목포내기파à Ok Tae 
P’a (옥태파); Dae Ch’ǒn Tae Yang Hoe (대천 태양회); A San 
Tae P’yǒng Yang P’a (아산 태평양파); Hwa Sǒng P’a 
(화성파); Siranoni P’a (시라노니파); Sinkuraendu P’a 
(신구랜드파); Song ak P’a (송악파); Taeyanghi P’a 
(태양회파) 
Ho-nam Haeng Yo Na (행여나)à Dae Ho P’a (대호파)à Sǒng In P’ok 
Lyǒk Cho Chik OB P’a (성인 폭력조직 OB 파)à Sin OB P’a 
(신 OB 파)à OB Dong Chae P’a (OB 동재파) (Seoul); Dong A 




(Seoul) (양은이파) (서울); Kwangju Sǒ Pang P’a (광주 
서방파)à Sǒ   Pang P’a (서방파) (Seoul); Kuk Che PJ P’a 
(국제 PJ 파); 콜박스파; Mu Dŭng San P’a (무등산파); Dae In 
Dong P’a (대인동파); Jun Ch’ǒn Si Min P’a (준천 시민파); Sun 
Ch’ǒn Chung Ang P’a  (순천 중앙파); Mog Po So Sang P’a 
(목포 서산파); Kwang Yang Baek Ho P’a (광양 백호파); Na Ju 
Daehong Dong P’a (나주 대홍동파); Po Sang Yǒk Chǒn P’a 
(보성 역전파); Chǒn Ju P’a (전주파); Wǒldŭk’up P’a 
(월드컵파); Na-i Tŭ P’a (나이트파); Baek Hak Gwan P’a 
(백학관파);  Kurandu P’a (그랜드파);  Paejiwhang P’a 
(배치장파)  
Kangwǒn-do Yǒn Pang P’a (연방파); San Chong Noki Hwik 
P’a(산종로기획파); San Pik T’ori P’a (산빅토리파) 




















3. Key to Research Participants 
Police/prosecutors  
NAME OCCUPATION STATUS CITY 
Kim, Jung Gil  Minister of Justice  Retired  Seoul 
Kim, Hong Il  Prosecutor  Chief 
Prosecutor/General 








Lee, Sung-Yoon  Chief Prosecutor  Drug and OC Dept.  Inch’ǒn 
Kim, Tae-Kwon Public Prosecutor  Drugs and OC Dept.  Inch’ǒn  
Park, Dong In  Public Prosecutor  Drugs and OC Dept.  Inch’ǒn  
Chae, Yong-Jae Police Officer Chief of Korean 
National Police OC 
Div. 
Seoul  
An, Heung Jin  Police Officer  Chief of Korean 
National Police OC 
Div (Retired) 
Seoul 





Police Officer  National Police 
Agency (Japan). 
Japanese Liaison 
based in Seoul  
Seoul 
Tokashi, Susumu Police Officer  National Police 
Agency (Japan). 
Japanese Liaison 
based in Seoul  
Seoul 






P2 Police Officer  Violent Crime 
Division  
Seoul  
P3 Police Officer  Violent Crime 
Division 
Seoul 
P4 Police Officer  Violent Crime 
Division 
Seoul 
P5 Police Officer  Violent Crime 
Division 
Seoul 
P6 Police Officer  Violent Crime 
Division 
Ansan 
P7 Police Officer Violent Crime 
Division 
Ansan 
P8 Police Officer Organized Crime 
Division 
Pusan  





Gǒntal: Group A 
NAME OCCUPATION STATUS CITY 
GA1 Gǒntal 
(developer/promoter) 
Tumok  Seoul 
GA2 Gǒntal (construction) Pu-tumok  Seoul 
GA3 Gǒntal 
(entertainment) 
Pu-tumok  Seoul 
GA4 Former Gǒntal 
(construction) 
Former Pu-tumok  Seoul 
GA5 Former Gǒntal (local 
political organizer) 
Former Pu-tumok Seoul/ Chǒnju 
GA5 Former Gǒntal 
(small business 
owner) 




GA6 Former Gǒntal 
(political organizer) 
Ko mun  Seoul 
GA7 Former Gǒntal 
(gambling and loan 
shark) 
Former enforcer  Seoul/Ansan 














Gǒntal: Group B 
NAME OCCUPATION STATUS CITY 
GB1 Gǒntal 
(entertainment/Technology) 
Tumok  Seoul  
GB2 Gǒntal (undisclosed) Pu-tumok  Seoul 
GB3 Gǒntal (entertainment) Pu-tumok  Seoul 
GB4 Former Gǒntal (Head of 
sports organization) 
Pu-tumok  Seoul/Chǒnju 
GB4 Former Gǒntal (massage 
parlors/room salons/escort 
service) 
Former Pu-tumok  Seoul 
GB5 Former Gǒntal 
(undisclosed) 
Ko mun  Seoul  
 
Gǒntal: Group C (outside of Seoul) 
NAME OCCUPATION STATUS CITY 
GC1 Gǒntal (undisclosed) Tumok   Pohang  
CG2 Gǒntal (nightclub 
owner) 
Haengtong-








NAME OCCUPATION STATUS CITY 
Victim 1 (VC1) NGO staff  Head of NGO Seoul  
Victim 2 (VC2)  NGO staff Vice President of 
NGO 
Seoul  
Victim 3 (VC3)  Undisclosed  N/A Seoul  
Victim 4 (VC4)  Undisclosed  N/A Seoul 
Victim 5 (VC5)  Undisclosed  N/A Seoul  
Victim 6 (VC6) Undisclosed  N/A Seoul 
Victim 7 (VC7) Undisclosed  N/A Seoul 
 
Street Vendors  









GC5 Gǒntal (undisclosed) Haengtong-
daechang   
Busan  
GC6 Gǒntal (undisclosed) Haengtong-
daechang   
Busan  
GC7 Gǒntal (undisclosed) Haengtong-
daechang   
Chǒnju  
GC8 Gǒntal (undisclosed) Haengtong-
daechang    
Chǒnju  
GC9 Former  Gǒntal 
(body guard and 
driver for a 
politician) 
Haengtong-
daechang   
Chǒnju  








NAME OCCUPATION STATUS CITY 
SV1 Street vendor  N/A Seoul  
SV2 Street vendor N/A Seoul  
SV3 Street vendor N/A Seoul 
SV4 Street vendor N/A Seoul 
SV5 Street vendor N/A Seoul 













































Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
The Political Economy of Private Protection: Funded by Fulbright Korea 
 
PI: Jonson Porteux, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan 
Faculty Adviser: Assistant Professor Kenneth McElwain, Department of Political Science, 
University of Michigan 
 
Jonson Porteux invites you to participate in a research study about outsourcing of 
protection to non-state actors in South Korea. The purpose of this study is to understand 
how states organize and regulate violence wielding institutions (in this case, South Korea) 
in the face of political and economic development. This study is funded by the Fulbright 
Commission (Korean-American Education Commission).  
 
I am very glad to have you as one of my respondents in this study and I hope you can 
accept our interview. Your experience and opinions are very important to this research. 
While you may not directly benefit from this research in the short term, it is the overall 
hope to better understand this phenomenon and your assistance will greatly help with the 
intended result of this study.  
 
The researchers have taken the following steps to minimize the risks of this study. You 
will not be identified in any reports of this study. All your answers and records including 
your name, address, and contact methods will be kept confidential and will be destroyed 
after the research is complete. Your name will absolutely not be identified in this study, 
and will instead be listed as a number and letter of the alphabet (e.g. respondent A1). 
Furthermore, Sensitive questions will only be asked at the general, non-specific level so 





We plan to publish the results of this study, but again, we will not include any 
information that would identify you. There are some reasons why people other than 
researchers may need to see information you provided as part of this study. This includes 
organizations responsible for making sure the research is done safely and properly, 
including the University of Michigan, government offices or the study sponsor, the 
Fulbright Commission.  
 
The interview will take about 40 minutes. However, it may be necessary to contact you 
again for further questions and/or clarification of answers previously provided. The 
maximum amount of secondary contacts would be no more than 4—each consisting of a 
maximum time of 40 minutes each. During the process of interview, there might be some 
questions that you are not familiar with, we hope you can understand and cooperate. I 
would like to remind you that your participation in this study is completely voluntary. If 
at some point you are not comfortable with the interview, or with the way it’s going, you 
can ask us to stop the interview. Even after the interview is over, if you would like us to 
not use the interview, please let us know. That will be absolutely fine. If it is not 
convenient for you to answer any specific question please let us know, we will respect 
your opinion, skip this question, and move on to the next. And also, during the interview, 
please do not give your name, address, and other identifying information. Lastly, when 
referring to other people, please do not use names of other people. 
 
If you have questions regarding the research project, please contact the Principal 
Investigator, Jonson Porteux by email at jporteux@umich.edu.  If you have questions 
about your rights as a research participant, or wish to obtain information, ask questions or 
discuss any concerns about this study with someone other than the researcher(s), please 
contact the University of Michigan Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional 
Review Board, 540 E Liberty St., Ste 202, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2210, (734) 936-0933 
[or toll free, (866) 936-0933], irbhsbs@umich.edu. 
 








고지에 입각한 동의 알림 
사적 보호의 정치 경제학 
 
연구 책임자: 펄트 존슨 (Jonson Porteux), 정치학과 
연구 교수: Kenneth McElwain 정지학과  
 
미국의 미시간 대학은 한국에서 사설조직에 폭력행위를 의뢰하는 일에 대한 연구를 
수행하고 있습니다. 이 연구의 목적은 한국처럼 정치적, 경제적 발전을 이룩한 국가에서 
정부가 폭력조직들을 어떻게 통제하는지 이해하기 위한 것입니다. 저희는 이 연구에 
도움을 주실 분으로 귀하를 모시게 되어 대단히 기쁘며 저희의 인터뷰를 받아들여 
주시기를 희망합니다. 인터뷰를 통해 듣게 될 귀하의 경험과 의견은 저희의 연구에 매우 
중요한 것입니다. 저희는 진심으로 귀하의 격려와 도움을 받게 되기를 바라며 귀하는 이 
연구와 관련된 어떤 보고서에서도 신원이 노출되지 않을 것입니다. 귀하께서 주신 모든 
답변과 정보, 즉 귀하의 이름과 주소, 연락처 등은 기밀로 유지될 것이며 이 연구가 끝난 
뒤에는 모두 파기될 것입니다. 인터뷰는 40분 정도 소요되며 중간에 귀하께 익숙하지 
않은 질문이 나올 수도 있습니다. 하지만 추후에 심층질문을 드리거나 기존의 답변 
내용을 명확히 하기 위해 다시 연락을 드려야 할 필요가 있을 수 있습니다. 이 점 
이해하고 협조해 주시면 대단히 감사하겠습니다. 
 
이 연구에 귀하가 참여하는 것은 전적으로 자발적이어야 한다는 것을 알려 드리고 
싶습니다. 인터뷰 도중 불편해지면 귀하께서는 언제나 저희에게 중지할 것을 요구하실 
수 있습니다. 인터뷰가 끝난 후에라도 귀하가 제공한 정보나 의견이 이용되는 것을 
바라지 않으시면 저희에게 말씀해 주시면 되며 그것은 전혀 무리한 요구가 아닙니다. 
그리고 어떤 질문에 답하기가 곤란하실 때 진행자에게 말씀하시면 귀하의 의견을 
존중해서 그런 질문은 피하고 다음 질문으로 넘어가겠습니다. 또한 인터뷰 도중에 
이름과 주소, 또 달리 신원을 밝힐 만한 정보를 주지 마십시오. 마지막으로, 다른 사람을 




연구 프로젝트와 관련하여 궁금한 점이 있으시면 연구 책임자인 Jonson Porteux 
(jporteux@umich.edu)에게 이메일을 보내 주십시오.  
 
연구 참가자로서의 권리에 대한 궁금한 점이 있으시거나 이 연구의 승인과 관련해 알고 
싶은 점이 있으시면 미시건 대학의 행동과학 및 건강 분야 연구윤리심의위원회 
Institutional Review Board for Behavioral Science and Health (주소 : 540 East Liberty 
Street, Suite 202, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA 48104-2210)에 연락해 주십시오. 전화 
번호는 734-936-0933이고 이메일은 irbhsbs@umich.edu입니다. 
 




















5. IRB Oral Script 
The Political Economy of Private Protection: Project funded by Fulbright Korea  
PI: Jonson Porteux, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, affiliated 
with Seoul National University 
Faculty Adviser: Professor Kenneth McElwain, Department of Political Science, 
University of Michigan 
 
Hello. I am researcher from the University of Michigan in the United States, and I 
am conducting research on the outsourcing of protection and enforcement of regulation to 
non-state actors. I am wondering if you could kindly agree to participate in my interviews. 
I will ask some questions about your opinions and experiences concerning private 
protection. The interview will take about 40 minutes. The interview will take place at a 
convenient time and location for you. I very much appreciate your support!  
 
 
안녕하세요? 저희는 미국 미시건 대학 소속의 연구원들입니다. '저희는 정부가 
단체에 보호활동을 의뢰하는 일이나 사례에 대한 연구를 수행하고 있습니다.. 귀하께서 
저희의 인터뷰에 응해 주실 수 있는지 여쭙고자 합니다. 저희는 지방 법 제도와 관련한 
귀하의 의견과 경험에 대한 질문을 할 것입니다. 인터뷰는 40 분 가량 소요됩니다. 
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